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Abstract
Policy analysis, the scientiﬁc evaluation of policy impact, must include both
the technical transformation and political decision process. This analysis is
plagued by limited data that leads to model uncertainty. Not only the derived
models are uncertain, but also political decision-makers have to deal with this.
They form simple mental models, policy beliefs. Therefore, a political economy
equilibrium framework, the Computable General Political Economy Equilib-
rium (CGPE) model, is developed. The CGPE models the political and eco-
nomic system together and allows the disentanglement of political performance
gaps into knowledge and incentive gaps. Structural model uncertainty is han-
dled by a large simulation sample, while for parameter uncertainty, a MCMC
sample is derived. A distributed simulation tool has been developed. A meta-
modeling approach is applied to model the transformation of economic growth
into outcomes. Sector-speciﬁc policy impact functions are estimated using ob-
servational and expert data in a Bayesian estimation framework. We applied
this framework empirically to the case of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Programme (CAADP) in Ghana, Senegal, and Uganda. Indica-
tors for key sectors, key policies, and optimal policies are derived, and the
impact of model uncertainty on them is assessed. A theoretical framework for
measurement and evaluation of participatory network structures is developed.
The network generating process is estimated using exponential random graph
models, and separate measures for lobbying and informational inﬂuence are
derived. By combining this, individual policy beliefs are estimated, and their
political performance gaps are measured and disentangled into knowledge and
incentive gaps. The central results of these applications are: In the technical
evaluation, model uncertainty is important, as derived messages can change
dramatically. Designing eﬃcient participation structures is hard. Beyond bi-
ased incentive gaps, biased beliefs are important for the observed political
performance gaps. Using diﬀerent constitutional and participation scenarios,
we show that such a design does not solve the performance gaps. A way out
are transdisciplinary research approaches, as they connect the science world
with the society, and in doing so, new knowledge is generated.
Zusammenfassung
Eine fundierte Politikanalyse, d.h. eine wissenschaftliche Bewertung von Politi-
kauswirkungen, muss neben der technischen Transformation spezieller Politik-
instrumente in relevante Politikergebnisse auch die Analyse des gesellschafts-
politischen Entscheidungsprozesses, in dem die letztendliche Politikauswahl er-
folgt, umfassen. Das zentrale Problem einer umfassenden Politikanalyse ist die
begrenzte Verfügbarkeit von Daten. Formal impliziert dies eine fundamentale
Modellunsicherheit. In der bisherigen Praxis der wissenschaftlichen Politikana-
lyse wird diese fundamentale Modellunsicherheit bislang kaum berücksichtigt.
Ebenso wird der Umgang mit fundamentaler Modellunsicherheit von realen
politischen Akteuren und deren Implikationen in politische Entscheidungspro-
zesse bislang kaum berücksichtigt. Dies hat erhebliche Konsequenzen nicht nur
für die Eﬃzienz politischer Entscheidungen, sondern auch für die Bedeutung
von wissenschaftlichen Politikanalysen in der Politikberatung, d.h. die prakti-
sche Bedeutung von evidence-based Politikprozessen. Letztere werden in der
Literatur standardmäßig als ein institutioneller Garant von Good Governance
hervorgehoben. Im Gegensatz dazu steht die Kritik des Ökonomem Manski,
der in einem prominent publizierten Artikel in PNAS (Manski, 2018) klar her-
ausstellt, dass die gängige Praxis der wissenschaftlichen Politikanalyse einer
Ignoranz von fundamentaler Modellunsicherheit gleichkommt. Diese Ignoranz
impliziert die Manifestation spezieller Mechanismen in der politischen Praxis
- wie beispielsweise die systematische Selektion wissenschaftlicher Ergebnisse,
die die eigene politische Meinung unterstützen -, die insgesamt nicht nur zu
einer extrem ineﬃzienten Politikformulierung führen, sondern auch begrün-
den, warum wissenschaftliche Politikanalysen kaum einen eﬀektiven Einﬂuss
auf reale politische Entscheidungsprozesse ausüben. Im Gegenteil reale politi-
sche Prozesse sind vielmehr durch naive Vorstellungen, Policy Beliefs, der rele-
vanten politischen Akteure (Stakeholder und Wähler), die fachliche Laien sind,
bestimmt. In diesem interessanten Bereich einer erweiterten wissenschaftlichen
Politikanalyse unter expliziter Berücksichtigung von fundamentaler Modellun-
sicherheit leistet die vorgelegte Arbeit interessante Beiträge. Methodisch fallen
diese in die innovative Schnittstelle von Informatik und Sozialwissenschaften.
Konkret liegen diese in dem sich gerade etablierenden Teilgebiet Computational
Analytics and Public Policy. Inhaltlich werden die entwickelten Computational
Analytics Methoden zur Anlayse der CAADP-Reform in drei afrikanischen
Staaten mit Hilfe eines Computable General Political Economy Equilibrium
(CGPE) verwendet.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving the poverty ratio by
2015 has been achieved. As can be seen in ﬁg. 1.1, many regions are still in the
`Low income (L)' and `Lower middle income (LM)' categories (blue colored
countries), with most of them located in Africa. Achieving the Sustainable
Development Goal (SDG) #1 - No poverty: End poverty in all its forms ev-
erywhere. - remains an important and complex challenge(United Nations,
2015). In achieving this, there is a wide agreement in the development litera-
ture that sustainable economic growth is the only successful strategy to lead
developing countries out of poverty and even beyond into middle-income sta-
tus (Saith, 1981; Gaiha, 1989; Sen, 1997; Fan, Hazell, and Thorat, 2000; Diao
et al., 2012). Furthermore, scholars agree that public policy is a crucial deter-
minant of growth and poverty reduction (Fan, Hazell, and Thorat, 2000). The
political practice also echoes this agreement in the theoretical literature. For
example, at the annual ReSAKSS Meeting in 2015 in Addis Abbaba Ousmane
Badiane, IFPRI Director for Africa, highlighted the crucial role of governmen-
tal policy in promoting growth and reducing poverty in his opening address:
... policymakers need to continue to reﬁne policies, improve institutions and
increase investments to sustain and accelerate the pace of growth as well as
its inclusivity or broadness and the outcomes of their decisions can be the dif-
ference between persistent poverty and future shared prosperity for many of
Africa's most vulnerable populations.
However, while there is this broad agreement that government policy plays
a crucial role in achieving sustainable growth, putting this policy into an ef-
1
2The World by income - 2017
Income Group
Low income (L)
Lower middle income (LM)
Upper middle income (UM)
High income (H)
NA
Year 2017 Show history
Figure 1.1: The World by income - 2017
Source: https://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi-maps
fective operation is a complicated task. Given the dynamic environment, in
the economic and the political system, in which this transformation process
happens, we need model-based policy analysis. As a ﬁrst step, we need data to
know what happened, and this means being descriptive. Building upon that,
we need to understand why and how something happened, the model should
help us in diagnosis. The next step is then to predict and understand what
will happen, given some choices. The ﬁnal step is then to also help in making
a choice, further clarifying what one should do, i.e., develop a therapy.
Developing and empirically applying such a model is a complex task and
needs to connect diﬀerent worlds. It needs to connect economic with policy
modeling, and in doing so, it needs to combine diﬀerent disciplines like com-
puter science, statistical learning, and economic and policy analysis.
This combination of diﬀerent disciplines and approaches is the topic of this
thesis. The thesis consists of two main parts, the ﬁrst providing the theoretical
and methodological framework and the second applying it empirically to the
case of Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)
3in three African countries.
Chapter 2 provides the background and explains the motivation behind the
chosen modeling approach, while chapter 3 introduces the Computable General
Political Economy Equilibrium (CGPE) and the techniques required in solving
the challenges associated with it.
The second part focuses on the empirical application. Chapter 4 contains a
short introduction to the empirical background and introduces the framework
of the policy modeling problem. An explanation of the estimation approach
for the empirical application follows. The next chapter introduces the chosen
approach to deal with model uncertainty.
Three diﬀerent applications around the CAADP policy nexus are described.
The ﬁrst application, described in chapter 7, focuses on the often considered
problem of key sectors and key policies and compares the policy impact func-
tion (PIF) based approach with previous approaches. It also includes the
derivation of technically optimal policies. The second application, chapter 8,
looks at the lobbying and informational inﬂuence of stakeholders in the pol-
icy process. The last application applies the developed framework to look at
possible reasons for persisting policy failure.
The ﬁnal chapter 10 of the thesis is the summary and critical outlook.
4
Part I
Theoretical and Methodological
Framework
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Chapter 2
Policy Analysis: A theoretical
framework and literature review
There is a broad agreement in the economic literature that public policy is a
crucial determinant to enable future sustainable economic development. This
applies to regional, national and global levels, for example regional and na-
tional development policies (Saith, 1981; Gaiha, 1989; Sen, 1997; Fan, Hazell,
and Thorat, 2000; Diao et al., 2012), or international climate policy (Fan,
Hazell, and Thorat, 2000; Obergassel, Mersmann, and Wang-Helmreich, 2017;
Lofgren, Thurlow, and Robinson, 2004). This agreement in the theoretical
literature is also echoed in political practice (New Partnership for Africa's De-
velopment, 2003; NEPAD, 2010; African Union, 2014). In light of the broad
agreement that government policy plays a key role in achieving sustainable
growth, putting this policy into an eﬀective operation remains a complicated
task. A key approach is the promotion of evidence-based policies, where it has
been fully recognized that policy impact evaluation is an important prerequi-
site for evidence-based policy processes. In this regard, the term policy analysis
describes the scientiﬁc evaluations of the impacts of past public policies and
predictions of the outcomes of potential future policies (Manski, 2018).
However, linking scientiﬁc analysis to policy formulation and outcome eval-
uation is a very complex and tedious process. The problem is not just one
of applying rigorous science to high-quality data in order to tackle relevant
questions. This linking is diﬃcult enough but may still be the easiest part. A
second and even greater challenge is for the knowledge and insights generated
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8from policy research and analysis to ﬁnd their way into the decision making
process. Therefore, a comprehensive policy analysis goes beyond the classical
technical analysis of policy impact but includes the analysis of the political
process that determines the ﬁnal policy choice.
2.1 Classical Economic Models of Policy Analy-
sis
To illustrate these problems at an abstract level, let I denote a set of policy
instruments, with γ being the chosen implementation. Policy analysis includes
two diﬀerent aspects. First, it is necessary to assess the technical transforma-
tion of a policy γ into relevant policy outcomes Z. This transformation is
captured by the technical transformation function T (Z, γ). Second, diﬀerent
policy outcomes have to be evaluated from the viewpoint of society. Formally,
welfare analysis is a tool that provides an adequate evaluation criterion, an
index function S(z). This index function transforms each state of the world Z
into an index number, and by doing so, allows for consistent ordering of states.
Accordingly, if we were to know both functions, S(Z) and T (Z, γ), evaluation
would be a purely technical task. For a set of available, feasible policies, the
policy with the maximal evaluation value S(Z) would be implemented.
There are many diﬀerent ways to model the transformation of policies into
outcomes. However, each model corresponds to an intervention logic. Any
intervention logic for policy programs is based on theory. Generally, modeling
approaches can be distinguished in qualitative and quantitative models. Qual-
itative models, for example, the logical framework matrix, only provide a qual-
itative description of the intervention logic. Quantitative modeling approaches
are based on a quantitative speciﬁcation of relevant cause-and-eﬀect linkages.
Following Henning and Hedtrich (2017) quantitative evaluation models can
further be subdivided into model-based, and econometric policy evaluation
approaches. Understanding that any model approach implicitly or explicitly
determines a set of policy result functions φ helps in the diﬀerentiation of quan-
titative modeling approaches. Let M denote a set of models determining the
transformation of a policy γ into relevant outcomes Z, where m ∈M denotes
9a speciﬁc model. A policy result function is determined for each model m:
Z = φm(γ) (2.1)
Let βm denote a vector of model parameters and variables explicitly con-
sidered in the model m. Then we can further specify the intervention logic
by:
Z = φm(γ, βm) (2.2)
2.1.1 Econometric Models
In this framework, a simple model corresponds to an econometric modeling
approach that postulates a set of policy result functions φ(γ, β), where x de-
notes a set of control variables and uses observational data on Z, γ and x to
econometrically specify the parameters β of φ.
Econometric model approaches have been increasingly used over the past
decade to estimate the causal eﬀects of policies. A causal linkage can be
speciﬁed as a simple binary relationship between program participation and
a relevant performance variable, for example, the impact of participation in a
training program on farm-proﬁts or employment. The most straightforward
way to measure the policy impact in this context would be to compare the
performance of a program participant with the counterfactual performance of
the participant without participation. A signiﬁcant challenge of this approach
is to observe both performances, with and without participation simultane-
ously. The diﬀerent methods applied in this area are designed to distinguish
accidental association from causation. They provide empirical strategies to
identify the causal impact of diﬀerent reforms on any policy outcomes. The
best approach to identifying program impact on a given performance variable
is to conduct ﬁeld experiments. A random selection of the units of interest
into participating (treatment) and non-participating (control) groups in a pol-
icy program is made. Based on a comparison of the average performance of the
randomly selected treatment and control groups, the impact of the policy pro-
gram can be statistically evaluated. While experimental approaches can be ap-
plied for ex-post and ex-ante policy evaluation, a considerable drawback of this
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approach is that it is costly. For many policies, it is impossible to design sophis-
ticated ﬁeld experiments allowing a quantitative evaluation. In this case, other
econometric procedures based on observational data are available that allow
one to identify the true impact of a policy program assuming a non-random se-
lection of treatment and non-treatment groups. These econometric approaches
can be subdivided into non-parametric and parametric approaches. An in-
creasingly popular non-parametric approach to policy evaluation is matching
on observable factors, especially propensity score matching (PSM) (Caliendo
and Kopeinig, 2008). Matching and other econometric methods that build
on the idea of controlling for observable factors have clear limitations. The
policy impact is very often determined by factors that are unobserved by the
researcher. This problem of unobservables implies that PSM delivers biased
results or that policy impact is heterogeneous across participants. In order to
get around these problems, alternative methods have been developed. They
are used to emulate experimental settings using observational data. Examples
are `natural' experiments, such as the instrumental-variable approach and the
regression-discontinuity approach, or panel-data-based methods that aim to
account for endogeneity.
A general cutback of all econometric models, however, is the fact that
they are limited to causal inferences, i.e., empirical testing on the question
of whether a given policy program achieved its intended outcome or not. In
general, they are not alone suitable to explain why or how a policy program
works. Thus, econometric models are so-called reduced form approaches that
do not allow understanding an elaborate intervention logic. Accordingly, these
approaches are unable to explain how policy impact changes if speciﬁc frame-
work conditions change or to simulate impacts of policies that have not yet
been applied in the past as the speciﬁcation of the policy result function is
based on data observed in the past. A very interesting nonparametric ap-
proach applies PSM techniques, originally developed as an advanced ex-post
evaluation technique, to simulate ex-ante policy eﬀects at the micro-level (Todd
and Wolpin, 2006a,b). An advantage of a nonparametric estimation strategy,
when compared to parametric approaches, follows from the fact that the for-
mer are less demanding regarding data requirements and do not require any
speciﬁc functional form assumptions (Todd and Wolpin, 2006b). However,
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in many cases, nonparametric approaches are not applicable to ex-ante policy
evaluation, but stronger modeling assumptions have to be made, like assuming
a speciﬁc functional form.
2.1.2 Economic Equilibrium Models
As an alternative to econometric approaches, a common approach in economics
to specify an intervention logic is to apply a theoretical economic equilibrium
model. This means that T (γ, Z) corresponds to a system of non-linear equa-
tions. Diﬀerent approaches are available for equilibrium model-based policy
modeling, ranging from simple incidence analysis, over more advanced micro
and macro behavioral models to complex micro-macro linkages models. These
approaches diﬀer regarding the set of agents and actions they consider, as well
as the assumed coordination mechanism of individual actions and equilibrium
concepts. The complexity increases with the number of agents and the level
of behavioral response that models explicitly take into account. Technically,
these diﬀerences are covered by βm in the policy result functions in eq. (2.2).
The core of a standard economic equilibrium modeling application corre-
sponds to the simulation of shocks, where shocks are deﬁned as exogenous
shifts in policies or economic framework conditions. In order to simulate poli-
cies within an economic modeling approach, the policies must be implemented
into the model. Some policies (for example, direct and indirect taxes or tar-
iﬀs) can be easily and directly implemented into standard economic models.
However, for example, structural adjustment policies, policy programs aiming
to increase technical progress in economic sectors or policies aiming to im-
prove market access for enterprises (reducing transaction costs) or technology
adoption and learning, must be translated into economic model parameters.
For example, to model sustainable development policies, dynamic Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) models explicitly incorporate parameters repre-
senting sector-speciﬁc technical progress, as well as sector-speciﬁc transaction
costs, subsidy payments, and tariﬀs (see Löfgren (2001); Löfgren, Harris, and
Robinson (2002)). While modeling the impact of technical progress in diﬀerent
economic sectors on the growth of the average per-capita income, on income
distribution and poverty is straightforward, the translation of diﬀerent policy
instruments into sector-speciﬁc technical progress or transaction costs is by no
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means straightforward within a CGE approach. In this context, some schol-
ars (see for example Henning, Badiane, and Krampe (2018); Zhang and Fan
(2004)) suggest the implementation of a PIF. This function is deﬁned as a
transformation of policy instruments into relevant CGE parameters that cor-
respond to sector-speciﬁc technical progress or transaction costs. Speciﬁcally,
let βp denote the vector of relevant CGE parameters corresponding to tech-
nical progress or transaction costs. We then deﬁne a policy impact function
as the mapping of a policy γ into relevant CGE parameters: βp = PIF (γ).
The suggested policy impact function basically follows the work of Zhang and
Fan (2004). However, in contrast to the original approach, the approach sug-
gested by Henning, Badiane, and Krampe (2018) is more general and implies
a non-linear relationship between governmental spending and induced sectoral
growth. Moreover, this approach explicitly considers the composition of budget
spending for diﬀerent policy programs. Further, a similar approach was also
suggested by Bourguignon, Diaz-Bonilla, and Lofgren (2008); Bourguignon,
Bussolo, and da Silva (2008) in their Maquette for MDG Simulations (MAMS)
model, which models the impact of diﬀerent policy instruments on MDGs.
Analogously linking a CGE model with an ecological model (e.g. the Impact
model (Robinson et al., 2015)), that translates exogenous shifts in climate con-
ditions (global warming, rainfall) into relevant CGE parameters, is possible.
This allows modeling the impact of climate shocks on economic development
as well as on the policy impact on development (see Wiebelt et al. (2015)).
Formally, let βu denote the CGE parameters that are changed by exogenous
environmental shocks, ES, then it follows βu = ECO(ES). Finally, the CGE
can be further linked with other ecological or economic micro-modules, for ex-
ample, the poverty module used by IFPRI or a regional farm-model translating
farm output into impacts on the local environment, like biodiversity or change
in land fertility.
Based on the interlinked ecological-economic model framework, it is possible
to model policy impact on the development of relevant policy outcomes Z under
diﬀerent environmental framework conditions. The policy result function φ
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results as:
Z = φ (γ, βp(γ), βu(ES), βo)
= φ (γ, PIF (γ), ECO(ES), βo)
(2.3)
Other relevant CGE parameters, for example Armington or production elas-
ticities, are denoted by βo.
A general problem of model-based policy evaluation is that models are often
quite complex, and an empirical speciﬁcation of the model is often impossible
due to limited data. Central causal relationships assumed by a model cannot
easily be veriﬁed or tested empirically. A signiﬁcant challenge is, therefore,
to develop methods that can provide empirical evidence suitable for guiding
policy. This is not an easy task, because it refers to causal inferences that
require special research methods that are not always easy to communicate due
to their technical complexity.
2.1.3 Combining Econometric and Economic Equilibrium
Models
Therefore, the best approach to policy evaluation is to combine model-based
and econometric methods as complementary approaches. Econometric tech-
niques are applied to identify causal relations between speciﬁc policy programs
and central economic factors, and model-based techniques to analyze the im-
pact of a change in these economic factors on central outcome indicators. The
transformation function is separated into two parts:
1. a policy impact function (PIF) describing the relationship between policy
interventions and the economic factors
2. a growth goal function (GGF), policy outcome function, describing the
linkages between changes in economic factors and policy outcomes Z.
Econometric methods are more suitable for tackling the policy impact func-
tion, whereas economic models do a better job of tracking the policy outcome
function.
A general problem facing classical policy analysis is model uncertainty. All
actors, those involved in the policy choice as well as those in the policy analysis,
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are fundamentally uncertain which of the diﬀerent models m ∈M corresponds
to the true generative mechanism that represents the natural, economic or so-
cial phenomena on which policy analysis is focused (Marinacci, 2015; Wald,
1949; Fisher, 1957; Neyman, 1957; Haavelmo, 1944). At this point we abstract
from any ﬁner distinction of uncertainty, which includes for example uncer-
tainty in the data, the structure (model assumptions, theories, like Keynesian
versus New Classical speciﬁcations (Marinacci, 2015)) and the estimated pa-
rameters1. Intuitively, agents deal with uncertainty by forming beliefs. This
corresponds to subjective prior probabilities that a speciﬁc model is the true
generative mechanism. Individual beliefs are based on private information.
Accordingly, fundamental uncertainty and private knowledge (or private in-
formation) are considered as twin notions (see (Marinacci, 2015)). As Man-
ski (2018); Marinacci (2015) points out, model uncertainty is widely ignored
by standard policy analysis and the employed classical statistical approaches.
Both Manski (2018) and Marinacci (2015) demonstrate that the incorporation
of model uncertainty has signiﬁcant implications for policy analysis and in
turn, for policy choice.
2.2 Political Economy Models of Policy Analysis
Thus far, we have looked at policy choice as a complex but purely techni-
cal task. In reality, the policy choice is more than this. Individual society
members evaluate outcomes diﬀerently and need to agree on a common policy.
Therefore, the policy choice is a collective choice, where heterogeneous policy
preferences of individual society members are aggregated to a joint political
decision based on speciﬁc constitutional decision-making rules.
Comprehensive policy analysis includes both the analysis of the technical
transformation of policies into relevant outcomes, as well as the political pro-
cess in which an actual policy is collectively selected. In representative democ-
racies, preference aggregation is subdivided into two steps. First, heteroge-
neous voter preferences are transformed into the corresponding preferences of
a subset of political representatives via democratic elections. A central prop-
1For a ﬁner distinction see for example Draper et al. (1987); Draper (1995), as well as
section 3.3.2 and chapter 6
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erty of democratic elections is their representativeness, the correspondence
between the distribution of preferences among elected representatives with the
distribution of preferences among the voting population. Second, the het-
erogeneous preferences of political representatives are aggregated into a ﬁnal
political decision via legislative voting procedures.
Diﬀerences between observed and ideal policy choices result from two diﬀer-
ent sources. First, a biased aggregation of society preferences, political weights
of groups are diﬀerent between real policy processes and the ideal democratic
process. At a theoretical level, existing political economy models highlight
this bias as a primary cause of persisting ineﬃcient policies. Biased politi-
cal weights correspond to biased incentives of elected politicians, and result
from asymmetric lobbying activities (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) or biased
voter behavior (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002). More recently, Persson and
Tabellini (2000) highlight the role of formal constitutional rules as determi-
nants of politicians' incentives to misrepresent society's interests and choose
ineﬃcient policies. Beyond biases resulting from the aggregation of society
preferences, a second source of biased policy is that relevant political actors
do not fully know the true political technology. Understanding the compli-
cated relationship between policy instruments and induced policy outcomes is
diﬃcult. As a result, political actors use simple mental models to understand
how policies translate into outcomes. We call these simple mental models pol-
icy beliefs. Technically, policy beliefs (as introduced by Henning, Badiane,
and Krampe (2018)) correspond to model uncertainty as discussed above, i.e.,
policy beliefs correspond to agents' subjective prior probabilities for diﬀerent
models of policy impact. Hence, policy beliefs correspond to partial knowledge
regarding the probabilities that the diﬀerent models m are the true generative
mechanism determining the policy impact. In general partial knowledge im-
plies that agents focus only on a small subset of models, M g ⊂ M . However,
M g might be based on expert advice, and its nonsingleton nature might reﬂect
diﬀerent advice.
Based on their policy beliefs, political actors derive their individual prefer-
ences for policies. Similarly, some authors have recently highlighted the role
of biased voter beliefs as the primary determinant of ineﬃcient policy choices
(Beilhartz and Gersbach, 2004; Bischoﬀ and Siemers, 2011; Caplan, 2007). In
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particular, the work by Caplan (2007) has been highly recognized in public
choice literature, as he has collected an impressive amount of evidence show-
ing persistently biased voter beliefs. Based on his empirical ﬁndings, Caplan
(2007) draws the rather pessimistic conclusion that democratic mechanisms
of preference aggregation naturally lead to the choice of ineﬃcient policies.
In this context, two critical underlying premises that deﬁne the framework of
evaluating policy processes are adopted here. The ﬁrst premise is that biased
voter beliefs imply biased voter behavior and hence, a biased aggregation of
preferences. The second premise is that politicians and other stakeholders do
not fully understand the complex relationship between political instruments
and desired policy outcomes. Therefore, beyond biased incentives, a lack of
political knowledge becomes another essential cause of policy failure.
Formally, political economy approaches taking these aspects into account
can be formulated as follows (see, for example, Henning and Hedtrich (2017)).
Legislative bargaining is modeled, a set of political agents g ∈ G select a policy
γ according to given constitutional rules ξ. Each legislator has a spatial policy
preference, Ug(γ, γˆg), where γˆ denotes legislators' ideal point, the policy she
prefers to all other policies. A legislative bargaining model Ξ transforms given
policy preferences of legislators, UG, and given constitutional rules ξ, into a
legislative decision γ∗:
γ∗ = Ξ(uG, ξ). (2.4)
Policy preferences of legislators are derived from political support maxi-
mization:
Ug(γ) = argmax
γ
S(Z, γ)
s.t.
Z = φ˜g(γ).
(2.5)
φ˜g(γ) denotes the subjective believed policy result function of a legislator
g.
Finally, in democratic systems, political agents' policy support functions
S(Z, γ) result from electoral competition. Following relevant literature (e.g.
Grossman and Helpman (1996) or Henning, Badiane, and Krampe (2018)) it
follows that political support functions can be derived as the following weighted
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social welfare function:
Sg(z, γ) =
∑
v
Ωgv (δ
g
vUv(γ, γˆv) + (1− δgv)Sv(z)) + (1−
∑
v
Ωgv)
∑
i
ΩgiUi(γ, γ˜i)
(2.6)
v is an index denoting diﬀerent social voter groups, and i is an index de-
noting diﬀerent lobbying groups. Ωgv, δ
g
v are weighting parameters determined
by the voting behavior, while Ωgi is the relative political weight of a lobbying
group i depending on the relative access to political agents g. In this regard
Henning and Hedtrich (2017); Christiansen et al. (2018) suggest a modiﬁed
Baron-Ferejohn legislative bargaining game and proof that in the equilibrium
of this game the ﬁnal policy choice γ∗ follows from the following mean voter
theorem:
γ∗ =
∑
g
Cgγ˜g (2.7)
c = [Cg] denotes the vector of political control of legislators and is deter-
mined in the equilibrium of the game as a function of legislators' preferences
and the constitutional decision-making rules c = c(Ug, ξ). For large legislative
systems comprising of many legislators, like the political system of the Euro-
pean Union with 28 member states, computation of the equilibrium becomes
diﬃcult or almost impossible at least with standard solution algorithms (see
Christiansen et al. (2018)).
In the framework of a political economy model, comprehensive policy anal-
ysis can be conducted, including both the classical analysis of policy impact,
as well as the evaluation of the policy process determining policy choice.
The evaluation of policy processes can be based on the comparison between
actual, implemented policy choice γ∗ and the ideal policy choice γopt resulting
as the equilibrium of the political economy model. The latter assumes that the
political preferences of all political agents are derived from the maximization of
the social welfare function S(Z) and policy beliefs of all agents correspond to
the true policy result functions φtrue. Accordingly, total political performance
gaps result as the welfare loss realized under the actual policy compared to
the optimal policy. Furthermore, total performance gaps can be disentangled
in incentive-induced and knowledge-based gaps (see section 4.9).
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Chapter 3
Computational Techniques and
Tools for Advanced Policy
Analysis
3.1 Model Uncertainty as a Key Challenge for
Policy Analysis
A prevalent practice has been to report policy analysis with incredible certi-
tude. That is, exact predictions of policy outcomes are routine, while expres-
sions of uncertainty are rare (Manski, 2018). As Manski (2018); Marinacci
(2015) pointed out, model uncertainty has mainly been neglected in policy
analysis. However, Marinacci (2015) correctly argues further that this prac-
tice is in strong contradiction with the fact that predictions and estimates often
are fragile, resting on unsupported assumptions and limited data. Neglecting
uncertainty has negative consequences for policy choices made in political prac-
tice, as this will lead to ineﬃcient policy choices. Manski (2018) presented a
list of speciﬁc political practices that, by ignoring the uncertainty imply inef-
ﬁcient policy choices. For example, conventional certitude, that is, politicians
based their policy choices on model predictions taken as true although they are
not true. Another example is dueling certitude, where alternative assumptions
lead to contradictory predictions.
To better understand the role of model uncertainty in policy analysis, we
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follow Marinacci (2015) to formally deﬁne model uncertainty. Formally the
policy choice problem, deﬁned as in section 2.1, is to choose a policy γ ∈ Γ
that maximizes an objective function S(Z), with Z being the vector of rele-
vant policy outcomes. Policy outcomes are determined by policies, where a
set of intervention logics or generative mechanisms M exists. Each genera-
tive mechanism corresponds to a model φm, where m ∈ M denotes a speciﬁc
mechanism. The decision-maker knows that the true mechanism generating
the policy outcomes implied by a policy choice belongs to the setM . However,
the decision-maker is fundamentally uncertain about which model is the true
model. An individual decision-maker g has only partial information (knowl-
edge), which model is the true generative mechanism. Technically, to deal with
this fundamental uncertainty, agents form subjective beliefs, µg(m), about the
relative likelihood that a model φm is the true generative mechanism. µg(m)
can be interpreted as the probability that m is the true generative mechanism.
Accordingly, beliefs correspond to the subjective probabilities of an individual
decision-maker that any model m ∈M is the true generative mechanism φtrue.
In a Bayesian framework, µg(m) can be interpreted as subjective prior prob-
abilities. Therefore the policy choice γ∗g can be derived from a subjective ex-
pected utility maximization:
γ∗g = argmax
γ
∑
m∈M
µg(m)S(φ
m(γ)) (3.1)
The subjective priors µg reﬂects some personal information on models that
an agent g might have. This information can result from past subjective ex-
periences, or it can be based on the advice of a set of experts.
Therefore, at the decision-theoretic level, ignoring model uncertainty implies
that agents preselect one model m ∈M . This preselection might be based on
subjective priors or might be random. Following Manski (2018), we deﬁne
policy analysis as a scientiﬁc evaluation of the impact of past public policies
and the predictions of outcomes of potential future policies. Ignoring model
uncertainty corresponds to the fact that scientists advising political decision-
makers suggest only one model, with a probability of 1, as the correct model,
although they have diﬀerent private information allocating nonzero probability
to more than one model. In both ways, the derived policy choice will lead to
a loss of expected utility and thus is ineﬃcient.
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Moreover, in a dynamic and social environment, belief up-dating (learning)
occurs. Generally, two learning mechanisms can be distinguished, observa-
tional and communication learning Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2010). In a dy-
namic environment, observational learning occurs as belief-updating based on
observed outcomes implied by implemented policies. In a social environment
comprising of a set of political agents and experts, communication learning
occurs as belief-updating based on communicated policy beliefs (see Acemoglu
and Ozdaglar (2010)). At the decision-theoretic level, eﬃcient learning occurs
via Bayesian belief-up-dating.
However, in real political systems, belief formation and updating do not
necessarily follow strict Bayesian procedures, but real-life political agents often
apply simple heuristics and rule of thumbs corresponding to naive non-Bayesian
updating rules Henning, Badiane, and Krampe (2018); Henning (2019). The
latter is especially conceivable since Bayesian updating in real-world political
decision-making situations can be rather complicated, and real-world agents
do not have the capabilities to undertake these complex updates Acemoglu and
Ozdaglar (2010). Therefore, analyzing the political decision-making of political
agents in real-world political systems needs to include model uncertainty. That
implies that agents based their decisions partly on rather biased policy beliefs
and policy learning is also often rather ineﬃcient.
In this regard, an advanced policy analysis includes an understanding, i.e.,
modeling, how real-world agents form and update their beliefs via observa-
tional and communication learning. Moreover, this includes the analysis of how
model uncertainty can be better integrated into policy analysis, into scientiﬁc
modeling as well as better communicated from science to society. Moreover, an
advanced policy analysis includes the question if or how model uncertainty can
be reduced, that is how partial knowledge of the science sector can be increased.
A fascinating approach in this regard corresponds to transdisciplinary research,
meaning the generation of scientiﬁc knowledge via an interaction (communi-
cation) between science and society, for example, represented by stakeholders
Daniell, Morton, and Insua (2015).
Finally, please note that model uncertainty corresponds in essence to lim-
ited data. In the last several years, we have witnessed an explosion of data,
which was not imaginable in years past. Beyond this, the technology used for
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storing, computing, and modeling data has also evolved. Especially, the ap-
plication of computational algorithms to solve statistical estimation problems
resulting from limited data within a Bayesian framework as well as adequate
dealing with model uncertainty or the development and empirical speciﬁcation
of large interdisciplinary model frameworks, integrating models of diﬀerent
science disciplines, demand for speciﬁc techniques, like metamodeling.
Computing power mostly grew as predicted by Moore's Law (Moore et al.,
1965). Computational economics developed in line with the commoditization
of computing power. The increase in available computing power and sparked
by a problem in economics allowed the development of algorithms to solve, for
example, linear programming, quadratic programming, and non-linear prob-
lems (Nagurney, 1996). These advances made it possible to develop and solve
general equilibrium models that model multiple countries and a very diversi-
ﬁed production structure, like, for example, the GTAP model (Corong et al.,
2017). Another important strain in computational economics is Agent-based
Computational Economics (ACE). Here the focus is more on economic pro-
cesses and individual behavior and less on equilibria (Tesfatsion, 2006). It
allows the application of models that can not be solved in closed form but can
only be simulated. This is especially true when solving Bayesian estimation
problems, where the integration problem usually cannot be solved analytically
(Geweke, 1996). A solution to this problem is the application of Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, where the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is
an often applied algorithm (Metropolis et al., 1953; Hastings, 1970).
In this thesis, new computational modeling approaches and analytical tools
are developed and implemented. How these can be integrated with classical
models of policy analysis to derive an empirically applicable CGPE approach,
an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary model framework that solves the
above challenges of applied policy analysis, is demonstrated.
3.2 The Computable General Political Economy
Equilibrium Model
The challenge of analyzing participatory and evidence-based policy processes
empirically is to develop an applicable model framework that allows for quan-
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titative modeling of political decision making and policy-learning processes,
including the endogenous formation of a legislator's political preferences and
policy beliefs.
Overall, comprehensive policy analysis is plagued/confronted with the fol-
lowing challenges:
1. Integrating policy instruments into scientiﬁc models
2. Integrating models of diﬀerent scientiﬁc disciplines into a consistent model
framework
3. Empirical speciﬁcation of models T (z, γ)
4. Including model uncertainty into the policy analysis
5. Incorporating a positive model of real-life political decision-making
6. Specifying individual political beliefs of relevant political agents and
stakeholders
7. Modeling policy learning that is belief updating
Finally, a comprehensive evaluation of policy processes should provide the
possibility of developing a political therapy, the derivation of a strategy to
reduce identiﬁed performance gaps. The latter, in particular, calls for model-
based evaluation methodologies.
In this regard we suggest the CGPE model as well as the evolutionary CGPE
model(Henning and Hedtrich, 2017) which allows the assessment and identiﬁ-
cation of diﬀerent institutional reform strategies, including the reform of formal
constitutional rules, as well as the design of informal policy network structures
determining political participation of diﬀerent stakeholders (see chapter 8 and
Henning, Badiane, and Krampe (2018); Henning (2019)).
As can be seen from ﬁg. 3.1, the CGPE approach follows the structure of a
political equilibrium model outlined in section 2.2.
In detail, the CGPE model includes four modeling components:
(i) the derivation of politicians' incentives from electoral competition and
lobbying, i.e., modeling voter behavior and interest group activities
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Figure 3.1: CGPE-model
(ii) modeling legislative bargaining, i.e., the derivation of a collective policy
decision by a set of heterogeneous legislators based on constitutional rules
(iii) economic modeling of policy impacts, i.e., the transformation of policies
into outcomes
(iv) modeling of policy learning, i.e., the formation and updating of policy
beliefs via observational and communication learning.
The CGPE is an extension of existing classical approaches in policy analysis
found in the literature which focused only on the third component. The other
three components represent aspects of the policy process that play a crucial role
in explaining why some nations succeed while others fail in adopting eﬃcient
and eﬀective policies.
Implementation of the CGPE approach requires the speciﬁcation of the
ecological-economic model as well as of the political decision-making model.
Given limited available data classical econometric approaches are unable to
estimate all relevant model parameters. Therefore, we apply a Bayesian es-
timation framework, that allows an adequate treatment of model uncertainty
via Bayesian model selection averaging or model averaging. Moreover, we ap-
ply a Bayesian estimation technique to estimate relevant components of the
political decision-making framework, individual policy beliefs, as well as the
political inﬂuence of stakeholders. Metamodeling techniques are required to
facilitate the Bayesian estimation of the policy impact function as well as the
individual policy beliefs. In order to apply metamodeling, a large number of
simulation runs of the economic-ecological model are required, which would
be rather time-consuming using standard, sequential approaches. Therefore
a speciﬁc computational simulation tool, Distributed Simulation Tool (DST),
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has been developed that allows us to run a large number of model simulations
within a reasonable time.
Accordingly, we will describe the three fundamental computational tech-
niques in the following sections:
A. Bayesian estimation techniques (see section 3.3)
B. Metamodeling (see section 3.4)
C. Computational simulation tool DST (see section 3.5)
3.3 Bayesian Estimation Techniques
In contrast to the classical view, in a Bayesian analysis, the observed data
is considered ﬁxed, and the model parameters as random quantities (Lynch,
2007). In this section, the focus will be on the maximum a posterior (MAP)
technique. The building blocks are shared with other Bayesian estimation
techniques. The fundamental building block is the Bayes' theorem (Bayes,
1763; LaPlace, 1820). It states that for events A and B, given that P (B) 6= 0:
P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)
(3.2)
.
In Bayesian estimation, the subject of interest is usually not discrete events,
but probability distributions. The theorem is also valid for this case and
deﬁned as follows:
f(θ|data) = f(data|θ)f(θ)
f(data)
(3.3)
The posterior distribution is f(θ|data), f(data|θ) the sampling density for
the data, f(θ) the prior distribution for the parameter θ and f(data) is the
marginal probability of the data. f(data) is calculated as follows for a contin-
uous sample space (Lynch, 2007):
f(data) =
∫
f(data|θ)f(θ)dθ (3.4)
26
The normalizing part f(data) is often not needed in the Bayesian estimation
context, and therefore the Bayes' theorem is often stated in the proportional
variant:
f(θ|data) ∝ L(data|θ)f(θ) (3.5)
The prior f(θ) represents the knowledge about the parameter θ that is
available beforehand. It is represented as a probability distribution. It can
represent diﬀerent restrictions like, for example, bounds or non-negativity. A
low variance can be used if one is reasonably sure about a parameter, and a
high variance if not. The likelihood L(data|θ) is proportional to the sampling
density f(data|θ). The likelihood measures the probability of the data given
some parameters. The posterior f(θ|data), the probability of the parameters
given data. It is the combination of the prior knowledge with the observed
data through the likelihood function.
In a MAP estimation the to be optimized function is L(data|θ)f(θ). The
MAP estimate returns the mode of the distribution, that is the highest poste-
rior density (HPD). We can retrieve the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation
approach as a special case of the MAP by assuming a uniform prior distribu-
tion. Therefore the prior term becomes a constant in the optimization, and
the only remaining term is the likelihood.
Example Suppose we have a series of observed technical progress data for a
sector over time tfpt, with t ∈ T = 1, ..., 20. The observed values include some
errors t, and we assume those are independent and identically distributed
(iid). Assuming the data is generated by the following linear relationship
tfpt = A · t + B, we want to estimate the parameters A, B. In the classical
(frequentist) approach, this corresponds to linear regression. In the Bayesian
way, the problem to solve is very similar. We need to specify our prior knowl-
edge, due to previous studies, experiments, ..., as prior distributions for A
and B. We also need to deﬁne a likelihood function: The observed data does
not follow a perfect linear relationship, but it has some error. The assumed
distribution for these errors gives us the likelihood.
For illustrative purposes, we assume that A is normally distributed with µA
and σa, and B as well with µB, σB. The errors are iid and normally distributed
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with µ = 0 and σ.
So the parameter vector θ we are interested in, is θ = {A,B}. Given that
A and B are normally distributed, we have as a prior distribution for A:
pA ∼ N(µA, σ2A) (3.6)
pA ∼ 1√
2piσ2A
exp
− 1
2
(
A−µA
σA
)2
(3.7)
and analogously for B:
pB ∼ N(µB, σ2B) (3.8)
pB ∼ 1√
2piσ2B
exp
− 1
2
(
B−µB
σB
)2
(3.9)
The prior distribution pθ results as pθ = pApB.
In a similar fashion, we can deﬁne the likelihood for a single period t. The
likelihood measures the deviation of the observed tfpt data from the estimated
t̂fpt = A · t + B values, with t = tfpt − t̂fpt. Since we assumed a normal
distribution the likelihood function L(θ|t) = pθ(t) is deﬁned by:
pθ(t) ∼ N(0, σ2 ) (3.10)
pθ(t) ∼ 1√
2piσ2
exp−
1
2(
t−0
σ
)
2
(3.11)
Since the t are iid, the full likelihood for all observations results as the
product of the individual terms:
L(θ|) =
∏
t∈T
L(θ|t) (3.12)
Applying the Bayes rule we can now derive the posterior distribution p(θ|tfp).
p(θ|tfp) = pθ(tfp)p(θ)
p(tfp)
(3.13)
∝ pθ(tfp)p(θ) = L(θ|)p(θ) (3.14)
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In the case of a maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation we can drop the
normalizing term p(tfp) and use a proportional posterior (eq. (3.14)). This
results in the following optimization problem:
MAPθ = argmax
θ
L(θ|)p(θ) (3.15)
s.t. (3.16)
tfpt =A · t+B + t (3.17)
To improve numerical feasibility, we can transform the optimization problem
by taking the log of the target function and dropping constants. This will
change the value of the target function, but it will stay proportional to the
posterior distribution. The solution to the optimization problem will remain
the same.
For the likelihood we can derive:
L(θ|) ∝ logL(θ|) (3.18)
= log
∏
t∈T
L(θ|t) (3.19)
=
∑
t∈T
logL(θ|t) (3.20)
=
∑
t∈T
log
(
1√
2piσ2
exp−
1
2(
t−0
σ
)
2
)
(3.21)
∝
∑
t∈T
−1
2
(
t
σ
)2
(3.22)
∝ −
∑
t∈T
(
t
σ
)2
(3.23)
we can follow the same steps to derive the log priors for the prior distri-
butions pA and pB. This means that pA ∝ −
(
A−µA
σA
)2
and pB ∝ −
(
B−µB
σB
)2
.
Combining the log-likelihood with the log priors and dropping the negative
sign, we end up with the following minimization problem instead:
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MAPθ = argmin
θ
∑
t∈T
(
t
σ
)2
+
(
A− µA
σA
)2
+
(
B − µB
σB
)2
(3.24)
s.t. (3.25)
tfpt =A · t+B + t (3.26)
The maximum likelihood estimation(MLE) can be derived as a special case
of the MAP. This is done by assuming a uniform prior distribution for the
parameters, in this case, A and B. This means pA ∼ U(lA, uA) and pB ∼
U(lB, uB) with lower bounds lA, lB and upper bounds uA, uB. Then pA ∝
constant and pB ∝ constant. So instead of the quadratic terms for A and B
in eq. (3.24), there are only constants, and we can drop those. Then the only
remaining part is the (log-) likelihood L(θ|), and this is precisely the MLE
problem.
Even though an analytical solution could be derived for this simple exam-
ple, the focus will be on the computational implementation. An analytical
solution can not be retrieved for more complicated problems, and therefore,
the computational one is needed. The computational one follows the same
basic steps, regardless of how complicated the problem is.
Code After the theoretical derivation of the estimation problem, the next
step is to implement it. This can be done in any language that supports solving
non-linear optimization problems, for example, R Core Team (2018); GAMS
Development Corporation (2013). Since the later chapters will mostly use
General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS), it will be used here exemplary
as well.
For this example, the observed data will be generated by ﬁrst choosing a
true A and B. Then tfp data is generated according to the linear relationship
and an error t ∼ N(0, 1) is added. This can be done as follows:
Listing 3.1: data-generation.gms
1 * fix random number generator start point
2 execseed = 1;
3
4 sets
5 T /1*20/
30
6 ;
7
8 parameters
9 tfp(T) "observed␣technical␣progress"
10 ;
11
12 scalar
13 true_a /0.2/
14 true_b /2/
15 ;
16
17 tfp(T) = true_a * ord(T) + true_b + normal(0, 1);
To make the setup more easily reproducible, we ﬁx the starting point of the
random number generator, so it generates the same sequence of numbers on
every invocation. Next, we need to deﬁne our estimation model. The values
for σ, σA, and σB have been set to 1, and therefore, they can be left out,
and the code is simpliﬁed accordingly.
Listing 3.2: model.gms
1 scalars
2 prior_a
3 prior_b
4 ;
5
6 variables
7 A "estimated␣a"
8 B "estimated␣b"
9 ESTIMATED(T) "estimated␣tfp"
10 OBJECTIVE
11 ;
12
13 variables
14 ERR(T) "epsilon"
15 ;
16
17 equations
18 def_map_dev(T)
19 def_map_obj
20 ;
21
22 def_map_dev(T)..
23 ESTIMATED(T) + ERR(T) =E= tfp(T);
24
25 def_map_obj..
26 OBJECTIVE =E= sum(T, sqr(ERR(T))) + sqr(A - prior_a) + sqr(b - prior_b);
31
27
28 model map /
29 def_estimated
30 def_map_dev
31 def_map_obj
32 /;
Finally, we need to supply start values for the model variables, and then
the model can be solved. This can be done as follows:
Listing 3.3: solve.gms
1 prior_a = true_a;
2 prior_b = true_b;
3 A.l = prior_a;
4 B.l = prior_b;
5 ESTIMATED.l(T) = A.l * ord(T) + B.l;
6 ERR.l(T) = tfp(T) - ESTIMATED.l(T);
7 OBJECTIVE.l = sum(T, sqr(A.l - prior_a) + sqr(B.l - prior_b)
8 + sqr(ERR.l(T)));
9
10 solve map using nlp minimizing objective;
11
12 display A.l, B.l;
Implementing the MLE problem in GAMS is then straightforward. We
simply need to change the objective function, but can reuse the rest of the
model:
Listing 3.4: mle.gms
1 equations
2 def_mle_obj
3 ;
4
5 def_mle_obj..
6 OBJECTIVE =E= sum(T, sqr(ERR(T)));
7
8 model mle /
9 def_estimated
10 def_map_dev
11 def_mle_obj
12 /;
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3.3.1 Metropolis-Hastings
The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm solves the problem of generating a repre-
sentative sample from an arbitrary distribution. It belongs to the family of
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. It was initially developed by
Metropolis et al. (1953) and extended to the more general form by Hastings
(1970). Generating a sample for the distribution p(x) only requires the distri-
bution to be known up to a normalizing constant, p(x) = c · p˜(x), p˜(x) ∝ p(x).
Even if the distribution is fully known and available in analytical form, it might
still be hard to generate samples from it. Following the algorithm creates a
markov process that has as its stationary distribution pi(x) = p(x) (Lynch,
2007; Chib and Greenberg, 1995).
To implement the algorithm mainly two things are needed: A function
p˜(x) ∝ p(x) and a proposal distribution q(x). In the case of the original
Metropolis algorithm, the proposal distribution is independent of the cur-
rent state of the chain. In the more general Metropolis-Hastings variant, it
is conditional on the current state. Therefore the proposal distribution is then
q(x|xi−1).
A start point x0 is chosen. Usually, the ﬁrst part, the burn-in period, of the
chain is dropped from further analysis to remove the dependency on the start
point.
In the following a new candidate is proposed xc ∼ q(xi|xi−1). The candi-
date is accepted according to the acceptance ratio α = p˜(x
c)·q(xi−1|xc)
p˜(xi−1)·q(xc|xi−1) . The
acceptance ratio consists of the product of two ratios: The ratio of the target
densities p˜(x
c)
p˜(xi−1) and the ratio of the proposal densities
q(xi−1|xc)
q(xc|xi−1) . The proposal
is more likely to be accepted if the candidate is in a higher density region. This
ratio is then multiplied by the proposal ratio. In the ﬁnal step u ∼ U(0, 1) is
drawn and if u < min(1, α) the candidate is accepted as the new state of the
chain. Otherwise, the previous state also becomes the new state.
The distribution p˜(x) is often calculated in log terms with all constant terms
dropped, for example, to improve numerical stability. Therefore the acceptance
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Algorithm 1 Metropolis-Hastings
choose start point x0
for i ∈ {1, 2, ...} do
propose candidate: xc ∼ q(xi|xi−1)
α = p˜(x
c)·q(xi−1|xc)
p˜(xi−1)·q(xc|xi−1)
draw u ∼ U(0, 1)
if u < min(1, α) then
accept: xi ← xc
else
reject: xi ← xi−1
end if
end for
ratio is then:
α =
exp(log p˜(xc))
exp(log p˜(xi−1))
q(xi−1|xc)
q(xc|xi−1) = exp
(
(log p˜(xc))− log p˜(xi−1))) q(xi−1|xc)
q(xc|xi−1)
(3.27)
In the case of a symmetric proposal distribution, this further simpliﬁes to:
α = exp
(
(log p˜(xc))− log p˜(xi−1))) (3.28)
Example Continuing the example from above, we can solve the derivation of
the A and B values with an application of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
Most of the required functions are already deﬁned in the MAP example, that is:
the prior distributions for A and B, the likelihood L(θ|) and in combination
the posterior distribution p(θ|tfp). Therefore only the proposal distributions
qA(x|y), qB(x|y) for A, B are needed. To keep the example simple, we will use
normal distributions:
qA(x|y) ∼ N(y, σqA) (3.29)
qB(x|y) ∼ N(y, σqB) (3.30)
(3.31)
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Given that we already know the true A and B, but also the results from
the MAP, that returned the highest posterior density, we will assume rather
small variances: σqA = 0.05, σqB = 0.2. In a further simpliﬁcation, we assume
that the co-variances are zero; this will result in a worse acceptance rate. This
is not a problem, given that the problem is so small, and generating additional
samples is quick.
Code Now that we have all the needed parts deﬁned, we can implement
the algorithm. This is done again in GAMS. We need some additional param-
eters to store the sample points (mh_a(mh_i), mh_b(mh_i) ), for the candidate
(mh_cand_*) and some helpers (mh_estimated(T), mh_err(T), mh_alpha). The
sample point's log posterior is also stored (mh_log_posterior(mh_i)), and for
debugging purposes mh_accepted(mh_i) stores if the iteration's candidate was
accepted or not. Lines 18 to 24 generate the initial candidate, and in lines 26
to 45 the samples are generated.
Listing 3.5: mh.gms
1 sets
2 mh_i /1*30000/
3 ;
4
5 parameters
6 mh_a(mh_i)
7 mh_b(mh_i)
8 mh_estimated(T)
9 mh_err(T)
10 mh_log_posterior(mh_i)
11 mh_cand_a
12 mh_cand_b
13 mh_cand_log_posterior
14 mh_alpha
15 mh_accepted(mh_i)
16 ;
17
18 mh_a("1") = true_a;
19 mh_b("1") = true_b;
20 mh_estimated(T) = true_a * ord(T) + true_b;
21 mh_err(T) = mh_estimated(T) - tfp(T);
22 mh_log_posterior("1") = sum(T, sqr(mh_err(T))) + sqr(true_a - prior_a)
23 + sqr(true_b - prior_b);
24 mh_accepted("1") = 1;
25
35
26 loop(mh_i$(ord(mh_i) > 1),
27 mh_cand_a = mh_a(mh_i - 1) + normal(0, 0.05);
28 mh_cand_b = mh_b(mh_i - 1) + normal(0, 0.2);
29 mh_estimated(T) = mh_cand_a * ord(T) + mh_cand_b;
30 mh_err(T) = mh_estimated(T) - tfp(T);
31 mh_cand_log_posterior = sum(T, sqr(mh_err(T))) + sqr(mh_cand_a - prior_a)
32 + sqr(mh_cand_b - prior_b);
33 mh_alpha = exp(mh_log_posterior(mh_i - 1) - mh_cand_log_posterior);
34
35 if(uniform(0,1) < min(mh_alpha, 1),
36 mh_a(mh_i) = mh_cand_a;
37 mh_b(mh_i) = mh_cand_b;
38 mh_log_posterior(mh_i) = mh_cand_log_posterior;
39 mh_accepted(mh_i) = 1;
40 else
41 mh_a(mh_i) = mh_a(mh_i - 1);
42 mh_b(mh_i) = mh_b(mh_i - 1);
43 mh_log_posterior(mh_i) = mh_log_posterior(mh_i - 1);
44 );
45 );
Given the examples for MAP and Metropolis-Hastings, we can compare
their results to the ones for MLE and a classic linear regression. In ﬁg. 3.2
the estimates for A, B are shown, with lin-reg denoting the results from a
linear regression, map the maximum a posterior estimation, mle the maximum
likelihood estimation and mh the sample average of the Metropolis-Hastings
application. As can be seen, the estimates are very similar, except for the
linear regression, which has a lower value for A and a higher constant B as its
result. In ﬁg. 3.3 the estimated linear Total Factor Productivity (TFP) relation
is shown. The dots show the observed TFP values, and the lines the TFP
calculated based on the estimates from the diﬀerent estimation procedures.
Again only the linear regression is somewhat diﬀerent from the other three
estimation approaches, but this is expected, as the values for A, B were already
quite similar.
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3.3.2 Model Uncertainty
As motivated in chapter 2, model uncertainty is an essential factor of economic
modeling in general, and model-based policy analysis in particular(Steel, 2019;
Marinacci, 2015). According to Chatﬁeld (1995), there are three primary
sources of uncertainty. There is uncertainty in the structure of the model,
the parameter estimates of the model, and the observed data. The two main
strategies applied to handle model uncertainty are model selection and model
averaging. For a more in-depth overview of model uncertainty, see Draper
(1995); Chatﬁeld (1995) and for model averaging see Steel (2019).
In a Bayesian framework, we can use the posterior odds to pairwise compare
models (George and Clyde, 2004):
P (Mm1|y)
P (Mm2|y =
P (y|Mm1)
P (y|Mm2)
P (Mm1)
P (Mm2)
(3.32)
The prior ratio of model probabilities P (Mm1)
P (Mm2)
is updated by the data through
P (y|Mm1)
P (y|Mm2) to yield the posterior odds
P (Mm1|y)
P (Mm2|y . The posterior odds can be used
in model selection by using the one with the largest P (y|Mmk). In model
averaging, they are applied as well by using them as weights (George and
Clyde, 2004). The posterior distribution of a quantity of interest, denoted by
q, is the weighted average of the model-speciﬁc posterior distributions (Steel,
2019).
pq|y =
∑
m
pq|y,MmP (Mm|y) (3.33)
3.4 Metamodeling
A metamodel is an explicit simpliﬁcation of a more complex process, usually
given in an analytical form. It is often a model of a model, a surrogate, or
approximation. There are many applications of metamodeling, for example,
but not limited to, in engineering or natural sciences (Srivastava et al., 2004;
Noordegraaf, Nielen, and Kleijnen, 2003; Kleijnen and Standridge, 1988).
The observed process might be a real-world experiment like, for example, a
crop trial in agriculture or a simulation model. In the case of representing a
simulation model, the original model can be stochastic or deterministic. The
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chosen analytical form depends on the approximated process. It might, for
example, be in simple linear form without interaction eﬀects, or a quadratic
form with interaction terms, or Kriging form, but it could also be a neural
network (Cressie, 1993). It treats the observed process as a black box and,
therefore, only depends on the input parameters and output of the process.
Given input parameters θ and output y, the metamodel is y = f(θ). f(θ) de-
notes the mathematical function representing the metamodel (Kleijnen, 2005,
2018).
Metamodeling is motivated by the desire to better understand relationships
in complex models, like, for example, general equilibrium models. The much
simpler and explicit analytical form eases interpretation and quantiﬁcation of
main eﬀects. Depending on the type of the original process, it might not be
feasible to run it for all interesting inputs, which is especially true if it is a real-
world experiment. Another factor is that a metamodel can be better included
in further analysis (Kleijnen and Sargent, 2000; Kleijnen, 2008).
In order to derive a metamodel that provides a good ﬁt and predictive
capabilities, a good sample, a good experimental design is required. The ex-
perimental design, also known as Design of Experiments (DOE), is used to
generate a sample from the design space (Eriksson et al., 2000). The design
space gets so large quickly that it is not any more computable or practically
feasible to handle all possible points. Therefore many diﬀerent experimental
designs have been developed, of which the Central Composite Design and Latin
Hypercube sampling are examples that reduce the required number of sample
points (Giunta et al., 2003; McKay, Beckman, and Conover, 1979; Stocki,
2005). Based on the derived sample, the metamodel can be estimated. Before
the metamodel can be applied in other contexts, it needs to be validated. Dos
Santos and Nova (1999) contains an extensive overview of diﬀerent validation
measures.
See Jin, Hedtrich, and Henning (2018) for a more detailed introduction into
metamodeling and its possible applications in policy analysis.
39
3.5 Distributed Simulation Tool
3.5.1 Introduction
The task of handling model uncertainty in the PIF estimation, see chapter 6,
requires running a large number of simulations using the CGE model. This was
the initial spark that led to the development of the DST. This large number
of simulations is a somewhat particular case: For every single simulation, ten
solves of the CGE model have to be computed, where each depends on the
previous one. One single simulation is the smallest unit of work. Even though
there is probably still room for improving the solve time of the CGE model, a
single simulation already only takes about 20 to 30 seconds. The used solvers
and the modeling environment GAMS are mostly single-threaded.
The GAMS grid computing facility provides the ability to solve multiple
model instances in parallel. Its primary focus is solving instances that are not
dependent on each other. This is not the case for the CGE model, where a lot
of the year-to-year updating code would have to be rewritten, and parallelizing
using the grid computing facility would force a speciﬁc structure which is very
complex and not very understandable for the typical user of such models.
Therefore the goal is to develop a tool, which provides the ability to split
the units of work and calculate them in multiple processes in parallel. The
tool also should be able to run at the same time on multiple machines. The
tool, therefore, needs to take care of distributing the work across machines and
aggregating the results back together. A clear and simple structure for running
the simulations in a distributed fashion, requiring only minimal changes to the
original code, is to be developed as well.
The major requirements inﬂuencing the development of the tool, and the
chosen language and architecture are:
 simple to use
 simple to deploy
 works on Windows/platform independent
The last requirement is mainly driven by the fact that a larger number
of machines running Windows are readily available in the department, while
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also being able to run on most Linux variants eases the usage of computing
resources available in the computing center of the university.
Even though other architectures are undoubtedly possible, a client-server
architecture was chosen. An overview of the architecture and how the tool
works is given in the following. Afterward, the two main components: the
server and client, are described in more technical detail. For an overview
of the API, see section 3.5.3. The chapter is concluded by a short example
showing the required GAMS code and the steps necessary to run a model using
the tool.
3.5.2 Overview
The primary motivation behind the tool was the desire a large number of CGE
simulations, each of which is independent of each other, and solving a single
instance does not take long. In this case, it is not suitable to parallelize the
individual solves, but instead, parallelize units of work. A unit of work is,
for example, 25 diﬀerent simulation paths for the CGE model. The ﬂow of
the serial calculation can be seen in ﬁg. 3.4. The calculation starts with the
blue block, where the model deﬁnitions are loaded, and the simulations are set
up. It is then followed by calculating the simulations, the green blocks, one
after another. It is then concluded by calculating the second blue block, for
example, calculating ﬁnal indicators.
. . .
Figure 3.4: Serial Calculation of Simulations
The parallel computation also starts with the same code, the blue block.
It is followed by an additional orange block, which takes care of creating the
diﬀerent units of work. These units of work are then calculated in parallel on
multiple machines. The results of those are aggregated by another additional
block, the second orange one. After the aggregation, the second blue block
can run as before.
So this abstract overview already gives an idea that the required modi-
ﬁcations to the code are not that big. Some additional steps are required
nevertheless:
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. . .
Figure 3.5: Parallel Calculation of Simulations
In the ﬁrst step, the code has to be adapted to allow the parallel computa-
tion of multiple units of work. This involves deciding the size, i.e., the required
computation time of a unit of work. The code to create the units of work has
to be written. In the case of the simulations of the CGE, this only means
that out of the full sample of simulations, a sub-set is selected and saved in a
restart point. The computation code of the units of work has to be adapted
so that it only calculates the selected sub-set. This can often be achieved by
adding a simple $-condition to the simulation-loop. The last part is to write
the aggregation code for the results of the units of work.
The second step is to create the job on the server, which includes upload-
ing the code and deﬁning the commands for splitting the work, computing
the work, and aggregating the work. This will be shown in more detail in
section 3.5.5.
After the job is started, the clients will pick up diﬀerent tasks and execute
them. They will automatically download the code from the server, run the
appropriate command, and upload the result back to the server.
During the computation of the job, the user can inspect some basic infor-
mation like run-time of a task and also download individual results in the
web-interface. After the completion of the job, the aggregated result can be
retrieved. The clients communicate with the server using a JSON-based API.
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3.5.3 Server
The server application has two main components: It provides the endpoint
for the client application and also a web-interface for the user to check the
status of the jobs. It also provides a rudimentary administration interface.
The server application is written in Ruby (Matsumoto, 2017) using the Ruby
on Rails framework (Hansson, 2017). The application follows the conventions
for developing web applications of Ruby on Rails. These conventions include
structuring the code following the Model-View-Controller (MVC) pattern.
The server has a model component, which contains the classes to store the
required information. It also contains two controller-components, one for the
API and one for the web-interface. The API controllers and the web-controllers
both use views, which are either JSON or HTML based.
The model component includes a User model, which is used for authenti-
cation in the web-interface. It could also be used for the API interface with
little modiﬁcations, but that does currently not use authentication. It also in-
cludes a Downloadmodel. The Downloadmodel allows the provision of updated
versions of the client without having to redeploy the site.
The jobs are stored in the Job model and are named using the name col-
umn. They are grouped using the Group model. In this model, the commands
for the split, computation, and aggregate steps are stored in the respective
*_command ﬁelds. The compute_ﬁle is the name of the ﬁle, which is created
iteratively by the split task and used as the starting point of the compute tasks.
The result ﬁle is the ﬁle name of the result of the compute task, and the ag-
gregate ﬁle, respectively, the ﬁle name of the result of the aggregate task. The
split_into attribute speciﬁes into how many units of work the computation
should be split, meaning how many compute tasks.
Jobs have one SplitTask and one AggregateTask. The SplitTask, when
executed by the client, creates multiple ComputeTasks. The ComputeTask rep-
resents the unit of work. After the completion of all of the ComputeTasks the
AggregateTask is executed. All three task classes have status ﬁelds for:
accepted_at when was the task accepted by a client
computation_time how long did the computation take in seconds
ﬁnished_at when was the task ﬁnished by the client
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Domain Model
AggregateTask
accepted_at datetime ∗
computation_time float ∗
finished_at datetime ∗
result string ∗
status integer
worker string ∗
ComputeTask
accepted_at datetime ∗
computation_time float ∗
compute_file string ∗
finished_at datetime ∗
index integer ∗ U
result string ∗
status integer
worker string ∗
Download
description text
download string
name string ∗
Group
name string U
Job
aggregate_command string ∗
aggregate_file string ∗
code string ∗
compute_command string ∗
compute_file string ∗
name string ∗
result_file string ∗
split_command string ∗
split_into integer ∗
status integer
uuid string
SplitTask
accepted_at datetime ∗
computation_time float ∗
finished_at datetime ∗
status integer
worker string ∗
User
admin boolean
current_sign_in_at datetime
current_sign_in_ip string
email string ∗ U
encrypted_password string ∗
last_sign_in_at datetime
last_sign_in_ip string
name string
remember_created_at datetime
reset_password_sent_at datetime
reset_password_token string
sign_in_count integer
Figure 3.6: Models
status enumeration ﬁeld, which stores the current execution status of the
task, it can be one of created, computing, completed, failed
worker identiﬁcation of the computer executing the task
The compute tasks are numbered from one to the total number of compute
tasks, as speciﬁed in the split_into ﬁeld of the Job model. This is stored in
the index ﬁeld. The compute tasks and aggregate tasks both store the result
of the computation. The results are stored in the ﬁle system, and a reference
to the location is stored in the database.
The controllers can be grouped into the API controllers and the controllers
for the web-interface. The API controllers are all in the Api::V1 names-
pace. The web-interface controllers can again be grouped into two groups,
one for providing administrative access to the models, and one for the user
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Figure 3.7: Controllers
managing the jobs. The administrative controllers are all in the Admin names-
pace. The administrative controllers provide basic create-read-update-delete
(CRUD) functionality.
API
The API controllers provide the endpoints for the client, which are needed to
compute a job. Four controllers are used: JobsController, SplitTasksController,
ComputeTasksController and AggregateTasksController. As the names sug-
gest, they map closely to the models and are each responsible for handling the
respective model. For a detailed description of the required parameters and
responses, access the DEPLOY_URL/apipie URL. All responses are in JSON
format.
The JobsController provides the following methods:
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GET /api/v1/jobs/:id Get the details for a job
POST /api/v1/jobs Create a new job
The SplitTasksController provides the following methods:
GET /api/v1/split_tasks List available split tasks
PATCH /api/v1/split_tasks/:id Handles the status updates of a task. It
allows accepting, completing, and failing a task.
The ComputeTasksController provides the following methods:
GET /api/v1/compute_tasks List available compute tasks
PATCH /api/v1/compute_tasks/:id Handles the status updates of a task.
It allows accepting, completing, and failing a task.
POST /api/v1/compute_tasks Create a new compute task
The AggregateTasksController provides the following methods:
GET /api/v1/aggregate_tasks List available aggregate tasks
PATCH /api/v1/aggregate_tasks/:id Handles the status updates of a task.
It allows accepting, completing, and failing a task.
3.5.4 Client
The client is also written using the Ruby programming language (Matsumoto,
2017). It uses the previously described API methods to handle the actual
computation of a job. Each instance of the client handles exactly one job at
the time. There was no focus put into handling errors like network outages
since its primary application was in the university, where the network is very
stable. It was also developed under the assumption of completely trusting
the code to be executed not to be malicious. It does not sandbox or limit the
executed code in any way. This is a limitation that is acceptable in the current
use case. The ruby code itself works across all major platforms like Windows,
Linux, and Os X. The computers in the department usually do not have Ruby
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installed, but they come with Java pre-installed. The code is also compatible
with JRuby and can be bundled into a JAR ﬁle using the warble GEM. The
generated JAR ﬁle can then easily be executed on the department's computers.
To further simplify the execution on multiple computers, a set of Power-
Shell scripts has been developed. They open remote desktop sessions to the
computers, manage the retrieval of the current client executable, and start a
set number of clients on each machine. They also take care of stopping them
at an appropriate time and cleaning up afterward.
Exceptions occurring during the execution are logged using the Airbrake
GEM. The reporting target for the exception logging can be conﬁgured. It can
either be the Airbrake provided one, or the compatible, self-hosted, errbit1.
An overview of the classes in the client can be seen in ﬁg. 3.8.
DST - Client
Connection Worker JobCreator
Uploader Downloader SignalHandler Runner
Tasks
Manager Task
ComputeTaskSplitTask AggregateTask
Figure 3.8: Client Class Overview
The client has two operation modes:
 It can create jobs from a YAML-ﬁle, which has been generated by another
helper program and contains the attributes for the diﬀerent jobs.
 It can execute the tasks it retrieves from the server.
The ﬁrst one is relatively straightforward. When the client is started, a
Worker instance is created, which then creates an instance of the JobCreator
class and calls create! method on that instance. It then loads the attributes
1https://github.com/errbit/errbit
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from the YAML-ﬁle and sends a POST request to /api/v1/jobs using the
Uploader class for each set of job attributes in the ﬁle. The Uploader class
uses the Connection class for the technical handling of the request.
The client was initially created for the second use-case. When the client is
started, a Worker instance is created, and an instance of the Task::Manager
class is also created. The start method of that instance is then called, which
in turn calls the run method. The run basically does three steps:
1. sleep for a certain amount of time
2. Ask task manager to look for work
3. call itself, forming an endless loop
The endless loop can be canceled by sending a INT or TERM signal to
the process; this can, for example, be done by pressing CTRL+C in the pro-
cess window. The Task::Manager instance then tries to retrieve a task from
the server. It ﬁrst queries for compute tasks, by sending a GET request to
/api/v1/compute_tasks. If the server returns at least one task, the manager
then tries to accept it. Since this happens on multiple computers at the same
time, two diﬀerent clients may try to accept the same task. The server cap-
tures this, and the client then restarts the loop. If there are no compute tasks
available, the same process happens next for aggregate tasks and at last for
split tasks. This is something that undoubtedly can be improved, but works
good enough at the moment. It would be a possibility to have a dedicated
task endpoint in the server, which returns one available task and assigns that
to the requesting client.
When a task is accepted, the manager retrieves the attributes of the asso-
ciated job. If the code has not been retrieved so far, it will be downloaded.
Then the code will be extracted, and the required data for the task will be re-
trieved, for example, the compute ﬁle (the restart point) for the compute task
and also put into the extracted directory. In the next step, the task will be
executed; this is done using the appropriate command from the Job instance.
The command is passed to a new instance of the Runner class. It takes care of
launching the computation process and checking for the successful execution
status. It would also be possible to capture the output of the computation pro-
cess and store that, but this is not done currently. if the task was a split task,
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it will create split_into number of ComputeTasks by sending POST requests to
/api/v1/compute_tasks with the appropriate data. The task will update the
status by sending a PATCH request to /api/v1/*_task. The compute tasks, and
the aggregate task will also upload the appropriate result ﬁle. After the task
has been entirely handled, the next iteration of the endless loop is started.
3.5.5 Example
To further illustrate the usage of the previously described tool, the steps re-
quired to execute the code on multiple computers are shown. The diﬀerences
in the required GAMS code are shown, and also the required steps in the
web-interface.
Serial Execution
The serial execution code is shown in listing 3.6. It is a simple and contrived
example, but it serves the illustration purposes. Lines one to nine represent
the setup block. The ﬁrst blue block in ﬁg. 3.4. Lines eleven to thirteen the
execution blocks, the green blocks. Lines ﬁfteen to nineteen represent the
second blue block, where, for example, derived results from the simulations
are calculated.
Listing 3.6: serial_execution.gms
1 sets
2 SIM /1*100/
3 ACTIVE(SIM)
4 ;
5
6 parameters
7 age(SIM)
8 ;
9 ACTIVE(SIM) = YES;
10
11 loop(ACTIVE,
12 age(ACTIVE) = uniformint(0,99);
13 );
14
15 parameters
16 average_age
17 ;
18 average_age = SUM(ACTIVE, age(ACTIVE)) / card(ACTIVE);
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19 execute_unload "result.gdx" average_age;
Parallel Execution
The parallel execution requires some more steps. The code has to be split into
multiple ﬁles, namely 1setup.gms, 2split.gms, 3compute.gms, 4aggregate.gms
and 5derive.gms. In the second step, a job has to be created in the web-
interface, and the clients have to be started.
Code The ﬁrst split oﬀ ﬁle is the 1setup.gms ﬁle, which can be seen in
listing 3.7. It is the same as the ﬁrst eight lines from the serial execution. This
ﬁle will be executed prior to creating the job and the state of the program
be stored in a GAMS save point, which will be used as the restart point for
the 2split.gms, 4aggregate.gms and 5derive.gms ﬁles. 1setup.gms represents
the ﬁrst blue block in ﬁg. 3.5, 2split.gms the ﬁrst orange block, 3compute.gms
the green blocks, 4aggregate.gms the second orange block and 5derive.gms the
second blue block.
Listing 3.7: 1setup.gms
1 sets
2 SIM /1*100/
3 ACTIVE(SIM)
4 ;
5
6 parameters
7 age(SIM)
8 ;
The code in 2split.gms, listing 3.8, is the ﬁrst additional code required.
It splits the big set of simulations into smaller chunks. The ﬁle is called
split_into number of times by the client. It receives the current iteration
index %current% and the %total% number of iterations, being the split_into
number, as command line arguments. The result of each iteration is again
stored in a save point, which will be the restart point for the 3compute.gms
ﬁle. The client will upload the save points to the server while creating the
compute tasks.
Listing 3.8: 2split.gms
1 scalar lower, upper;
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2 lower = floor(((%current% -1) * card(SIM)) / %total%) + 1;
3 upper = floor((%current% * card(SIM)) / %total%);
4
5 ACTIVE(SIM)$(lower <= ord(SIM) and ord(SIM) <= upper)= YES;
The client will retrieve the previously created save points and then execute
the code in listing 3.9, the 3compute.gms ﬁle. The code starts the same as lines
eleven to thirteen in the serial execution, but the ACTIVE set is this time not
the full SIM set, but only a small sub-set of it. The result of the computation
is stored in the result.gdx ﬁle, which will be uploaded by the client to the
server.
Listing 3.9: 3compute.gms
1 loop(active,
2 age(active) = uniformint(0,99);
3 );
4
5 execute_unload "result.gdx" age;
In the aggregation step the 4aggregate.gms ﬁle is used, listing 3.10. Before
execution, the client will download all results from the compute tasks. This
ﬁle is then again called iteratively similarly to the 2split.gms ﬁle. The second
orange block represents it in ﬁg. 3.5.
Listing 3.10: 4aggregate.gms
1 parameters
2 age1(SIM)
3 ;
4
5 $INCLUDE 2split.gms
6
7 if(lower > 1,
8 execute_load "merged_result.gdx" age;
9 );
10 execute_load "results/%current%/result.gdx" age1=age;
11
12 age(ACTIVE) = age1(ACTIVE);
13
14 execute_unload "merged_result.gdx" age;
The ﬁnal step is to retrieve the merged result and execute the 5derive.gms
ﬁle, shown in listing 3.11. It ﬁrst loads the age parameter from the GDX ﬁle,
and the rest of the code is the same as lines ﬁfteen to nineteen in the serial
execution.
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Listing 3.11: 5derive.gms
1 execute_load "merged_result.gdx" age;
2
3 parameters
4 average_age
5 ;
6 average_age = SUM(ACTIVE, age(ACTIVE)) / card(ACTIVE);
7 execute_unload "result.gdx" average_age;
Running it In order to execute on multiple computers, the following steps
have to be done:
1. Execute gams 1setup.gms s=setup
2. Create Zip-File of the code including the setup.g00 restart point.
3. Create a job in the web-interface:
Figure 3.9: Job Creation in Web-Interface
4. Start clients
5. Wait for completion
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6. Download merged result from web-interface
7. Execute gams 5derive.gms r=setup
For this contrived example, which completes in a split second in serial execu-
tion, this is much work. In the case of running thousands of CGE simulations,
the additional required code is mostly the same as shown here, but the setup
and simulation code is thousands of lines. The computation of the simulations
would take multiple days to weeks on a single computer. Using the approach
described here, this can be done in a matter of hours.
3.5.6 Conclusion
The chosen architecture and language proved to be a good ﬁt for the problem of
creating a tool that allows the distribution of long computations across multiple
machines. After the initial adaptation of the code to the structure shown in the
previous section, it requires little manual attention to run the computation.
This improves reproducibility and allows for more experimentation, as running
a large simulation sample is no longer a week-long endeavor. It has been
successfully applied in the empirical application, which is described in the
later chapters of this thesis. Even though the primary motivation to develop
the tool was running simulations using GAMS, it is not limited to it, and the
general underlying idea and approach can be applied with any programming
language.
Part II
Empirical Application
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Chapter 4
Study Framework and Background
After having introduced the theoretical and methodological framework in the
ﬁrst part of the thesis, we will now show how to apply this framework to
the case of CAADP in three African countries, namely Ghana, Senegal, and
Uganda.
Imagine being a political practitioner: A politician who has to choose a
policy that best achieves her goals or an interest group that wants to lobby
for a policy that best fulﬁlls their clientele interests. If one does not want
to make a random guess, it is necessary to understand what impact a policy
has on goals. A goal might be poverty reduction or income of smallholder
farmers. In this section, a theoretical framework is derived that shows the
impact mechanism and allows a quantitative analysis of the choice problem.
In the ﬁrst step, the intervention logic is shown. The intervention logic
describes the transformation of a policy choice, allocation of budget, into goal
achievements. Based on the intervention logic the policy impact function (PIF)
and growth goal function (GGF) are introduced. Indicators for the popular
problem of key sectors and key policies can then be derived. The PIF and
GGF can then also be used to estimate optimal policies. As a last essential
step, it is then also possible to measure the impact of technological beliefs
and incentives to check if it is an incentive bias (as is often assumed, see, for
example, Persson and Tabellini (2000)) or a knowledge bias.
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4.1 PEBAP
The empirical framework for this thesis is the Promoting Participatory and
Evidence-Based Agricultural Policy Processes in Africa (PEBAP) project1.
The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
(BMZ) funded the project. The project was jointly implemented by Inter-
national Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Universities of Kiel
and Hohenheim, in collaboration with local research institutions in Ghana,
Uganda, and Senegal: The Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Re-
search (ISSER), the Institut Sénégalais de Recherches Agricoles (ISRA), and
the African Institute for Strategic Resource Services and Development, respec-
tively.
Research on African policy processes was conducted in close collaboration
with local stakeholders and policymakers in support of the CAADP. The goal
of the project was to support political performance in order to achieve more
eﬀective policies and strategies. The research included both qualitative and
quantitative methods. It includes studies from an individual level to the na-
tional level. At the individual level, voting decisions were analyzed, accompa-
nied by research on the inﬂuence and integration of diﬀerent organizations into
the policy process and is complemented by studies on the impact of national
investment plans. The project was implemented between 2012 and 2015.
4.2 CAADP
The 2003 Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa
marked the starting point for CAADP (New Partnership for Africa's Develop-
ment, 2003). Since then, over 40 countries have joined the CAADP process.
The declaration included the prominent goal of a shared commitment of al-
locating at least 10 percent of the national budget to agriculture in order
to achieve a 6 percent annual sector growth rate and improvements in food
and nutrition security. In 2014 the African Heads of State and the African
Union (AU) reasserted and recommitted to the principles and values of the
CAADP process with the Malabo Declaration (African Union, 2014; Os-
1https://pebap.agrarpol.uni-kiel.de/
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termann, 2017). Inside the CAADP process, the countries develop national
agriculture investment plans.
The national agriculture investment plans share a similar implementation,
at least for the three countries, Ghana, Senegal, and Uganda. The invest-
ment plans focus on diﬀerent policy instruments, which can be categorized
into four pillars: Natural Resource Management (NR), Farm Management
(FM), Market Access (MA) and Human Resource Management (HR). Inside
the NR pillar, two instruments can be distinguished. The ﬁrst being water
management, and the second being land management. The FM pillar consists
of programs focusing on food crops and livestock. A dedicated instrument
accompanies them for export crops in Senegal and Ghana Policy instruments
focusing on road and storage infrastructure and market support services be-
long to the MA pillar. The fourth pillar, HR, consists of programs focusing on
extension services and research and development.
4.3 CGE
Following the deﬁnition of Dixon and Parmenter (1996) the model developed by
Johansen (1960) is the ﬁrst CGE model. In the following period, the theoretical
underpinnings were reﬁned, before gaining more considerable popularity in the
1970s (Dixon and Parmenter, 1996). Nowadays, it is an often applied tool in
policy analysis, see, for example, Bourguignon and Pereira da Silva (2003);
Löfgren, Harris, and Robinson (2002); Fan (2008).
A CGE model fulﬁlls three speciﬁcations (Dixon and Parmenter, 1996):
computable A numerical solution can be found. Using a database, usually,
including ﬂows of commodities and factors between diﬀerent accounts,
the equations based on coeﬃcients and parameters are solved.
general They model multiple diﬀerent economic actors and are not limited
to, for example, just producers. They usually include actors representing
ﬁrms, households, and the government.
equilibrium The found solution is based on the assumption of market equi-
librium. The prices are adjusted so that there is no excess demand.
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The CGE model captures the eﬀects of external shocks on all relevant ac-
tors. This is not limited not only to direct eﬀects, but it also includes indirect
eﬀects. A technical progress shock in a sector might lead to lower prices for
the produced goods of that sector, meaning in turn that households spent less
of their budget good and have a higher demand for other goods, potentially in-
creasing their prices. Various assumptions determine the equilibrium solution
and quantity eﬀects. The behavior is, for example, determined by elastici-
ties for production or trade. The solution is also determined by the assumed
closure rules, for example, if the state budget is ﬁxed or not.
For a more complete introduction into CGE modelling, see for example
Dixon and Parmenter (1996); Löfgren, Harris, and Robinson (2002).
The applied CGE models in this thesis are single country models. They are
IFPRI Type II standard CGE models Löfgren, Harris, and Robinson (2002).
For all three countries, the CGE model has been linked to a micro-level poverty
module based on household surveys.
For Ghana, the model consists of 72 main activities and 72 commodities.
The agricultural sector is regionalized across four regions, namely coast, forest,
south, and north. The ﬁfth region, accra, has no agricultural activities. There
are four types of labor, and the land is also regionalized across the four regions
with agricultural activity. There is only one type of capital. Households are
separated into urban and rural in those four regions, with an extra household
for the ﬁfth region, accra. Therefore there are nine diﬀerent household types
in the Ghanaian CGE model. The social accounting matrix (SAM) is from
2007.
The Senegal model has 43 main activities and 36 commodities. The primary
agricultural sectors are disaggregated across 14 regions, as is the production
factor land. There are four types of labor and two types of capital. The model
has four diﬀerent rural and four diﬀerent urban households. The base year of
the SAM is 2011.
The Ugandan CGE model is not regionally disaggregated. It has 50 main
activities and ﬁve diﬀerent households. The factors are comprised of three
types of labor, land, and two types of capital, capital, and cattle stock. The
used SAM is from 2007.
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4.4 Intervention Logic
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Figure 4.1: CAADP Intervention Logic
In the ﬁrst step, a model capturing the relation between a chosen policy and
policy outcomes is derived. We focus on modeling investment policies since
these are crucial in solving the poverty goal, and here especially on CAADP.
Looking at ﬁg. 4.1, we see that we can split the impact mechanism into two
parts. In order to understand how money spent on diﬀerent programs leads to
diﬀerent goal achievements, one has ﬁrst to understand how money transforms
into economic growth in the diﬀerent sectors. In the second step, one has to
understand how economic growth in diﬀerent sectors transforms into diﬀerent
goal achievements.
The modeled policy outcomes Z capture diﬀerent aspects. The ﬁrst (Z1)
and ﬁfth goal Z5, farm income and urban income, are used as indicators for the
income growth of the households. The second goal (Z2), poverty, models the
vital aspect of poverty reduction. The third goal (Z3) captures the provision of
public goods, i. e. schools, health care, military, . . . . About 70% of the total
state budget is allocated to the provision of public goods. The fourth (Z4)
and sixth goal (Z6) capture the impact on special producers' proﬁts, namely
of the export sector and the industry sector. The last goal, sustainability, is
not actively modeled in this thesis. The framework can easily be extended to
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include it, as it would be possible to include other goals.
We can measure achievement levels Zz,t for a policy goal z ∈ {1, . . . , 6} in
time period t. In general, we are interested in the average linear growth rate
achieved over time T = t1 − t0. Given achievement levels Zz,t0 , Zz,t1 , we can
calculate the growth rate as follows:
wj =
Zz,t1 − Zz,t0
TZz,t0
(4.1)
A policy does not directly generate changes in the achievement levels of
the policy goals. The level of goal achievement depends upon the economic
growth achieved in the diﬀerent sectors. The economic growth is measured in
a change of factors f . This could, for example, be technical progress in a sector
s, with s ∈ S. Growth in the agricultural sector might be more beneﬁcial for
poverty reduction than growth in the industry sector. Diﬀerent sectors will
also most likely have diﬀerent eﬀects on various goals. In order to analyze
this relationship a growth goal function (GGF) (w = GGF (f)) will be used to
model this relationship. The following section will describe it in more detail.
Understanding how economic growth leads to goal achievement is not enough.
Economic growth does not fall from heaven, but it has to be generated. Invest-
ment policies generate it, with the policies being an allocation of budget to the
diﬀerent policy instruments i ∈ I shown in ﬁg. 4.1. The vector of budget allo-
cation is γ. Similarly to how diﬀerent sectors have diﬀerent impacts on policy
goals, diﬀerent policies generate diﬀerent levels of economic growth across the
various sectors. A policy focused on market access might be best for generating
growth in the export sector, but a policy focusing on farm-management might
be best for the crop sector. The relationship between policy and economic
growth is modeled with a policy impact function (f = PIF (γ)). It will be
introduced in more detail in section 4.6.
Given we have a GGF and PIF, we can deﬁne a function F (γ) = GGF (PIF (γ))
that relates a policy γ to growth rates of goal achievements w. Based on the
GGF and PIF we can derive indicators for the popular problem of (Diao et al.,
2006; Christiaensen, Demery, and Kuhl, 2006; Dorosh and Thurlow, 2018):
Key Sectors? Which sectors should one promote growth in to improve a
speciﬁc goal?
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Key Policies? Which policies should one invest in to improve a speciﬁc goal?
The indicators will be introduced in more detail in section 4.7. Based on
the intervention logic just described, it is possible to compare this approach
to previous ones, that focused only on growth - goal - linkages. Applying the
functions also allows the derivation of optimal policies and the comparison of
technological beliefs and incentives. This will be described in section 4.8 and
section 4.9.
4.5 Speciﬁcation of GGF
The growth goal function (GGF), as introduced in section 4.4, captures the
relationship between economic growth and policy goals. This relationship is
modeled in the CGE model. The applied target measure for the growth will
be the growth rates w of the policy goals. Since the CGE model is a rather
complex model that can not easily be included in further estimations, we will
derive the GGF as a metamodel of the CGE. In particular, we will derive a lin-
ear metamodel, that captures the main eﬀects. The derived linear metamodel
implicitly includes the equilibrium eﬀects modeled in the CGE. In order to
derive the metamodel, a simulation study will be done. This is described in
more detail in section 5.1.
The linear metamodel will have the following form:
w = wbase + ξGGF∆f (4.2)
The constant term wbase is derived using a base scenario, where no policy
shock is implemented. The GGF - Elasticity ξGGF is deﬁned and calculated to
assess the impact of diﬀerent shocks in economic sectors on the policy concerns,
Zz, z ∈ {1, .., 6}. This elasticity is the linear growth rate for the six policy
concerns induced by a shock ∆f per year. This is, for example, total factor
productivity growth in the diﬀerent economic sectors, but could also be, for
example, subsidies paid to the diﬀerent sectors. In the case of changes to
total factor productivity, the vector of changes ∆f results as ∆f = ∆tps =
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tpSIMs − tpbases . The GGF - Elasticity can then be calculated as follows:
ξGGFz,s =
(
Zsz,t1 − Zbasez,t0
Zbasez,0
)
1
(t1 − t0)∆f (4.3)
4.6 Speciﬁcation of PIF
A policy impact function (PIF) transforms a budget allocation (vector of γi)
into a vector of economic growth outcomes. In this thesis, the budget allo-
cation focuses on the CAADP implementation, combined with spending on
non-agricultural policy programs and the spending on public goods. The eco-
nomic growth outcome used is sector-speciﬁc technical progress.
In this thesis, a two-stage function is used for the PIF. At ﬁrst (in the lower
stage) the budget
∑
i∈I
γi = B is transformed into eﬀective budget for each sector
Bes. The eﬀective budget is transformed into technical progress in the second
step (in the upper stage).
PIF(γ) = tps(Bes) (4.4)
tps(Bes) = tp
max
s
1
1 + e−(asBes+bs)
(4.5)
Bes(γ) = ηs
(∑
i∈I
µs,iγ
−ρ
i
)−1
ρ
(4.6)
The transformation of budget spent into the sector-speciﬁc eﬀective budget
is done using a CES-function. As described in sections 4.2 and 4.4 the focus is
not only on agricultural versus non-agricultural policies, but on speciﬁc policy
programs under CAADP. The interdependencies between the diﬀerent policies
are captured in the lower stage parameter µs,i. The higher µs,i is compared to
µs,i′ , the higher the impact of policy program i compared to i′ is on technical
progress in sector s. For example, some sectors might not beneﬁt much/at all
from spending on water policies, and therefore if much money is spent on water
policies, the eﬀective budget for that sector is low. The scaling parameter ηs
could be used to incorporate the implementation eﬃciency of policy programs.
Given the lack of data for this, we choose ηs, so that the upper limit of Bes
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equals B:
ηs =
(∑
i
µ
1
1+ρ
s,i
) 1+ρ
ρ
(4.7)
. Now Bes = B if the allocation for that sector equals the optimal allocation.
The optimal shares αs,i can be calculated as follows:
αs,i
αs,j
=
(
µi
µj
) 1
1+ρ
(4.8)
1 =
∑
i
αs,i (4.9)
The optimal amount of budget for policy program i, when only looking at
a speciﬁc sector s, follows then as γi = αs,iB
On the upper level, a logistic function is used to transform an eﬀective
budget into technical progress. This allows for ﬂexible impact elasticities, in
contrast to the Cobb-Douglas form suggested by Fan and Rosegrant (2008).
In ﬁg. 4.2 the sigmoid form, as deﬁned in eq. (4.5), relating technical progress
to eﬀective budget is plotted. This functional form maps nicely to what one
would intuitively expect for the eﬀect of money on the promotion of technical
progress for a sector. If one only spends very little money, one will not get
much of an eﬀect. One needs to spend a certain amount of money for it to
become eﬀective, then spending more has a signiﬁcant eﬀect. After a certain
amount of money has been spent, money gets less and less eﬀective. There
exists a maximal rate of technical progress (tpmax) that can be achieved with
public policy programs in a speciﬁc sector s.
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Eﬀective Budget [Bes]
tp
s
Limit of technical progress [tpmax]
Figure 4.2: Sigmoid function relating eﬀective budget to sectoral technical
progress
4.7 Key Sectors and Key Policies
The derivation of indicators for key sectors and key policies is an often looked at
problem. For key sectors, we are looking for an indicator, that assigns a higher
value for a sector s compared to another sector s′, if it is more productive
in achieving a policy goal j. Similarly, for key policies, we are looking for an
indicator, that assigns a higher value to policy i compared to i′, if it is more
productive than the other. Let γ be a vector of a policy realization, that is,
allocation of budget to the diﬀerent policy instruments i. The target measures
are the additional achieved annual growth rates wz for the diﬀerent policy goals
z ∈ Z. Based on the intervention logic deﬁned in section 4.4 we will derive the
indicators for key sectors and key policies on an abstract level and then show
how they are derived based on the speciﬁcations given for the GGF and PIF
in sections 4.5 and 4.6.
In the following, we will focus on the second goal, as deﬁned in section 4.4,
poverty reduction. The same structure applies to the other policy goals, as
well.
Given the function
F (γ) = w : R|I| → R|Z|, (4.10)
as introduced before and the two partial functions PIF and GGF
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PIF (γ) = f : R|I| → R|K| (4.11)
GGF (f) = w : R|K| → R|Z|. (4.12)
K denotes the dimensions of changed factors f , in our case this is sector
speciﬁc technical progress. Therefore |K| = |S|. The PIF transforms a policy
realization γ into economic growth f . Sector-speciﬁc total factor productivity
is such a factor of economic growth. That, in turn, is transformed using the
GGF into policy growth rates w. Based on these functions, we can deﬁne
growth - goal elasticities and policy - growth elasticities.
Growth - goal elasticities measure the marginal impact of factor change fs
on growth rates w:
ξGGFs =
∂w
∂fs
=
∂GGF (f)
∂fs
(4.13)
As described in section 4.5, we will focus on technical progress as the main
factor of growth. The way we constructed the GGF, ξGGF results directly
from it. The ξGGF capture the second part of the relation between a policy
intervention and the growth in policy outcomes, as described in section 4.4.
Policy - growth elasticities measure the marginal impact of total budget B
on factor changes f , with B =
∑
i∈I
γi:
ξPIFs =
∂fs
∂B
=
∂PIF (γ)
∂B
. (4.14)
Given the derived two-stage form in eq. (4.4), the derivative can be calcu-
lated as follows:
ξPIF =
∂tps(Bes)
∂Bes
∂Bes(γ)
∂B
. (4.15)
The ξPIF complement the ξGGF and capture the ﬁrst part of the relation
described in section 4.4.
Based on the growth goal elasticities and policy growth elasticities it is now
possible to deﬁne policy goal elasticities ξPGE:
ξPGE = ξGGF ξPIF . (4.16)
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Equation (4.16) is the key sector indicator. It is deﬁned in the same way
for every other policy goal. In the later chapters, we will mainly focus on
key sectors of a Pro-Poor-Growth (PPG)-strategy and name the indicator for
poverty reduction (ξPGE2 ) PPG elasticity.
Based on the partial elasticities, it is also possible to deﬁne policy instrument
i speciﬁc elasticities:
ξPIEi =
∂f
∂γi
ξPIF . (4.17)
Equation (4.17) denotes the key policies indicator. Similar to the key sectors
indicator, we will focus on poverty reduction as the primary goal, and therefore
mainly look at ξPIE2,i .
4.8 Optimal Policies
Beyond the key sector and key policy indicators, which are just marginal point
indicators, it is of interest to also be able to ﬁnd optimal policies. In order to
do this, a function S(Z) is needed. This function, like a utility function, orders
the diﬀerent states of the world consistently. The state of the world includes
the previously deﬁned policy goals Z. The achievement levels of those goals
are determined by the policy γ. The policy γ is a chosen budget allocation
and therefore is equivalent to the costs associated with reaching that level of
Z.
Then it is possible to deﬁne an optimization problem that results in an
optimal policy γ∗.
max
γ
S(Z) (4.18)
s.t
Z = GGF (PIF (γ)
The function S usually only allows ordering of diﬀerent states of the world
but does not allow a comparison like this state is 50% better than another
state. A possible measure for how much better/worse a given policy is would
be the amount of money that could be saved by an optimal distribution across
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the diﬀerent policy instruments γi, while reaching an as preferable as state of
the world as before. This results in the deﬁnition of a loss function L(γ0)
L = |γ′|S(Z′)≥S(Z0)| − γ0| (4.19)
In order to derive γ′ we can deﬁne a similar optimization problem to the
one for optimal policies:
min
γ
|γ|
s.t
Z = GGF (PIF (γ)
Z0 = GGF (PIF (γ0))
S(Z) ≥ S(Z0)
(4.20)
In the next section, this loss function will be applied to measure the impact
of wrong technological beliefs and incentives.
4.9 Incentives and Beliefs
As shown in chapter 2, the uncertainty inherent to the political process leads
to actors forming beliefs of how a policy is transformed into outcomes. These
outcomes are evaluated from the viewpoint of the actor, which does not nec-
essarily correspond with an evaluation the society would perform. Political
actors choose speciﬁc policies because of actor speciﬁc incentives and techno-
logical beliefs. One actor might have the reduction of poverty as his main
incentive for choosing a speciﬁc policy, while another might base his decision
on the improvement of urban consumer income. The technological beliefs are
another essential part, that is, the actor speciﬁc mental model of how poli-
cies inﬂuence the diﬀerent policy goals. This leads to ineﬃcient policies being
chosen. This process of policy choice is depicted in ﬁg. 4.3.
This ignores an important aspect, though, policy choice in a democracy is
a collective choice. Therefore, as described in section 2.2, the decision process
is another source of ineﬃciency that needs to be considered. The ﬁnal policy
choice is not only determined by political incentives and knowledge, but also
political power.
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Policy Policy Outcome Outcome Evaluation
Policy Choice Political Knowledge
Political 
Incentives= +
Figure 4.3: Individual Policy Choice
In the following, we will derive a way to measure the political performance
gaps quantitatively. This is done exemplary for individuals, but the same
steps can be used to measure a collective choice. The previously introduced
framework allows us to measure the impact of incentives and beliefs on goal
achievement and also disentangle both factors. This allows checking if sub-
optimal policies are chosen because of biased incentives or wrong technological
beliefs. In this context, biased incentives mean incentives that do not represent
society's interests in diﬀerent goals.
Diﬀerent incentives result in diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the measuring func-
tion S(Z, γ). The technological beliefs are captured by the parameters deﬁning
the PIF (γ) function.
Assuming we know the true technology, that is the true speciﬁcation of the
PIF parameters, and we have a social welfare function capturing the society's
interests SWF (Z, γ) we can derive the impact of biased incentives and wrong
beliefs in the following way:
In a ﬁrst step we derive an optimal policy based on actor j speciﬁc incentives
Xj and technological beliefs T˜j, that is we solve the optimization problem from
eq. (4.18) with Sj(Z, γ) and PIFj(γ). This results in a vector γrealj .
In the next step, the true technology T and social interests XSF are used to
evaluate γrealj . We than apply the loss function eq. (4.19) using eq. (4.20). As
a result, we get the total performance gap Gj, measured as the budget that
could have been saved to achieve an as desirable state of the world.
This performance gap G consists of two parts, the knowledge gap GT and
the incentive gap GX , i.e. G = GT + GX . Be aware that GT and GX do not
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Table 4.1: Gaps Summary
Policy Interests Policy Beliefs
True Biased
[T ] [T˜ ]
Social [XSF ] 0 GT
Biased [Xg] GX G
necessarily have the same sign, given the biased incentives the wrong tech-
nological beliefs might push the chosen policy in the right direction or vice
versa.
The same procedure can be applied to measure the knowledge gap Gknow
and the incentive gap Gbias. For the knowledge gap, we use the actor speciﬁc
beliefs, but use the SWF as the evaluation function. For the incentive gap, we
use the actor speciﬁc incentives, which is the actor speciﬁc evaluation function
Sj but combined with the true technology.
Table 4.1 shows a summary of the diﬀerent gaps. Assuming an actor would
have both the true technological beliefs T and society's interests XSF , the
resulting performance gap would be by deﬁnition zero.
After applying these steps, we have not only a measure for the total perfor-
mance gap but also a quantitative measure for the inﬂuence of biased incentives
and wrong technological beliefs. In order to compare the diﬀerent beliefs, one
could apply a factor analysis of the parameter space. Another avenue might
be to look at the diﬀerent levels of changed factors and in turn, the diﬀerent
levels of goal achievement that are achieved under the actor speciﬁc beliefs.
This methodology not only allows an evaluation of individuals but in the same
way also of groups of individuals, for example, donors or civil society organi-
zations.
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Chapter 5
Empirical Estimation of PIF
In this chapter, the derivation of the GGF and the empirical estimation of
the PIF is shown. This approach follows the general estimation strategy, as
described in Henning et al. (2017). The employed estimation models and their
derivation are shown. The required data will also be described and how it has
been derived. The application will be exemplarily shown for Senegal, but the
same steps have been applied for Ghana and Uganda. The shown results in the
following chapters are based on applying the steps described here. In a ﬁrst
step the GGF will be derived based on CGE simulations. The next step then
is to calibrate the PIF with historical data. In the ﬁnal step, these results
are used to estimate a PIF with a future perspective incorporating expert
knowledge. After these steps we have a GGF and a PIF, which then allows us
to derive/calculate the indicators described in the theoretical framework (see
chapters 3 and 4).
5.1 Derivation of GGF
The GGF we will derive focuses on the impact of technical progress. A good
model for measuring this impact is a CGE model.
We apply an IFPRI-Type-2 standard CGE model (Löfgren, Harris, and
Robinson, 2002), that has been linked with a micro-based poverty module (see
for example Sene (2015b)). This allows the deﬁnition of measures that capture
the policy concerns deﬁned in section 4.4. The last goal, sustainability, will
not be modeled. The CGE model could be extended to include measures for
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CO2 emissions, or linked with another micro-level model that captures local
sustainability indicators.
The used measures are:
Z1 Small-Scale Farm Income
Z2 Poverty Reduction
Z3 Public Goods Provision
Z4 Welfare of Agricultural Export Sector
Z5 Welfare of Urban Consumers
Z6 Welfare of Industrial Sector
We are looking for a model that has the average linear growth rates wj as the
output. The CGE model output can be used to calculate these. We want to use
the model in the estimation of the PIF. Therefore we need an analytical form.
We can apply the metamodeling concept here. So instead of CGE(∆f)→ wj,
we have MCGE(∆f) = wj. In the empirical application, we will focus on the
prominent eﬀect of technical progress. So the vector of changed factors f is
[tps], with s ∈ S. We will derive a simple linear metamodel.
w = ξbase + ∆w
∆w = ξGGF ·∆f (5.1)
We can derive the values for ξbase and ξGGF via a simulation study. To
derive ξbase, we simulate a baseline run with all parameters set to default
values. To derive ξGGF , we run the following simulations: For each sector s a
run is generated and calculated, where ∆f = tp0 + ∆tp, with ∆tps = 4, and
∆tpk|k 6=s = 0. In each run, the baseline run tp is increased for this sector s by
4. After the simulations we can compute ξbase and ξGGF as follows:
ξbasej =
Zbasej,t1
−Zbasej,t0
Zbasej,t0
·T
wj =
Zsj,t1
−Zbasej,t0
Zbasej,t0
·T
∆wj = wj − ξbasej
ξs,j =
∆wj
∆tps
ξj = [ξs,j]
(5.2)
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t0, t1 denote the starting and end period of the simulation, with T = t1−t0 =
10. Zbasej denotes the achievement levels reached in the baseline scenario. We
have |S| scenarios, where tp is shifted for each sector s ∈ S separately. Zsj
denotes the achievement levels reached in such a scenario.
With this we can deﬁne MCGE(∆tp) = wbase + ξGGF ·∆tp. This is a linear
approximation, a metamodel, of the full CGE model. It only captures the
relationship between ∆tp and w, but it includes the general equilibrium eﬀects
that led to the derived coeﬃcients. This metamodel can now be applied in the
derivation of the PIF.
5.1.1 Implementation
The applied CGE model is implemented in GAMS, therefore also the derivation
of the GGF is implemented in GAMS. GAMS provides no language support
for something like modules or classes. The original code was split into two
main parts: The ﬁrst part deﬁnes the algebraical structure of the CGE and
calibrates it. The second part is a basic simulation module that solves diﬀerent
scenarios over time and takes care of the year to year updating. This also
includes the poverty module that runs after the CGE has been completely
solved. The parameters for the scenarios were deﬁned using Excel ﬁles. We
are following this basic structure, though we are only using the Excel ﬁles for
the base scenario and deﬁne the simulation scenarios programmatically. This
reduces possibilities for errors and allows for more quickly experiments with
diﬀerent simulation scenarios.
This means that deriving the GGF involves three steps. First, deﬁne and
calibrate the CGE model, second run the simulations, and last derive the
metamodel based on the simulation results.
5.2 Derivation of policy impact function
To complete our theoretically derived model, we also need to estimate the PIF.
As described before, this is done in two steps. The ﬁrst step uses historically
observed data to ﬁnd a ﬁrst good ﬁt for the parameters. The model is cali-
brated to replicate the past observations; it learns the past relationship. This
is what we call the empirical PIF. The goal is not to replicate the past but
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to predict the future. In order to ﬁnd parameters that match expected fu-
ture developments, the parameters are adapted in a second step using expert
opinions. This results in the expert PIF.
As described in section 4.6 we want to derive sector speciﬁc PIFs. Given
the chosen nested two-stage form, this leads to a large number of required
parameters. We need |S| × 3 parameters for the upper stage, this being the
tpmaxs , as, bs parameters.
As described in section 4.4, we consider diﬀerent policy programs under
CAADP, namely: water and land management, farm management policies
for food crops, export crops, and livestock, investment in road and storage-
related infrastructure, agricultural research and development and extension
services. Finally, we also distinguish investment in the non-agricultural sec-
tor as an additional policy instrument. The set of policy instruments I is
{water, land, fm−crop, fm−export, fm−live, fm−road, fm−storage, hr−
research, hr− extension, non− agr}. The vector of budget allocation γ then
is [γi] with i ∈ I. For the lower stage we need |I| × |S| parameters, µi,s.
So in total we have (|I| + 3) × |S| ≈ 600 parameters. Estimating these
with a classical estimation approach is hardly possible because of limited data
availability and inherent estimation problems. To be able to estimate these
parameters, we propose a Bayesian estimation procedure. In this approach,
prior information gained from a literature review and previous studies is com-
bined with statistical/historical data or expert information. This approach is
based on the work of Heckelei and Mittelhammer (2008) and closely follows
Henning et al. (2017).
5.2.1 Empirical PIF
We want to calibrate these parameters so that they replicate the past devel-
opment of total factor productivity and budget.
In particular, following Fan, Hazell, and Thorat (2000); Fan (2008); Sene
(2015a) we use available production and public budget expenditure data to
estimate PIF-parameters. Deﬁning TFPs,t as a TFP index for the sector s in
the year t and deﬁning γi,t the amount of total public expenditure allocated
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to a policy program i in year t implies:
TFPs,t = tp
0
s,t + ∆tps,t
∆tps,t = tp
max
s
1
1+e−(asBes+bs)
Bes,t = ηs
[∑
i
µi,sγ
−ρ
i,t
]− 1
ρ
ηs =
(∑
i
µ
1
1+ρ
s,i
) 1+ρ
ρ
with :
∑
i
µi,s = 1
(5.3)
tp0st denotes the technical progress realized in sector s in the year t with-
out any policy impact. In general, assuming suﬃcient observations for TFPs,t
and γt PIF parameters could be estimated applying standard econometric es-
timation methods. However, as has been pointed out by many other authors
(e.g., (Fan, Hazell, and Thorat, 2000; Fan and Rosegrant, 2008)), adequate
data is not available for most countries. In particular, panel data on detailed
budget allocation across speciﬁc policy programs are hardly available. In this
context, we suggest a Bayesian estimation approach combining data and prior
information.
Assuming prior information on parameters is encapsulated in normal prior
distribution, pr(θ), while the data information follows from the equation sys-
tem (eq. (5.3)). Moreover, in the Bayesian framework, it is straightforward to
deal with missing data problems, e.g., assuming some (or all) data on detailed
budget allocations across policy programs are missing, while data are only
available on the total agricultural budget (PAE) and total non-agricultural
data (PNE). In the Bayesian framework, missing data is considered as ad-
ditional further parameters, which can be estimated assuming corresponding
prior distributions.
Moreover, additional prior information might exist in the form of addi-
tional restrictions on parameter values or values of unobserved variables. For
example, the analyst might have prior information on lower or upper bounds
for speciﬁc parameters or unobserved variables derived from theory, expert
knowledge, or other empirical information.
Denoting by y1 the matrix of available empirical panel data, that is the
panel data on TFP and on budget expenditure, and let RES(y1, θ) denote
additional restrictions on parameters and unobserved variables, the Bayesian
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estimation approach corresponds to the following minimization problem:
θ∗ = argmin
θ
[θ − θ¯] Ω−1 [θ − θ¯] + ν ′ν
s.t.
TFPs,t = tp
0
s + ∆tps,t + νs,t
∆tps,t = tp
max
s
1
1+e−(asBes+bs)
Bes,t = ηs
[∑
i
µi,sγ
−ρ
i,t
]− 1
ρ
ηs =
(∑
i
µ
1
1+ρ
i,s
) 1+ρ
ρ
∑
i
µi,s = 1
RES(y1, θ) ≡ 0
(5.4)
Please note that we assumed that the TFP index can only be measured
with some error, ν, where we assume that for each sector and each year, errors
are drawn iid from N(0, 1). Further, the exogenous technical progress tp0s is
included in the parameter vector θ. Additionally, since we are mainly interested
in the general underlying trend in the TFP index, we applied the Hodrick -
Prescott ﬁlter.
Implementation
The optimization problem, as deﬁned in eq. (5.4), has been implemented as
a nonlinear programming problem in GAMS. Given the lack of support for
modules in GAMS, a poor man's version of namespacing has been applied.
Namely, all parameters, variables, and equations belonging to the estimation
problem have been preﬁxed by pif_emp. This structuring helps in separating
the code and preventing accidental side-eﬀects into other parts of the program.
The estimation results of the TFP index and the budget data have been col-
lected into Excel ﬁles. These are converted to GAMS's ﬁle format in order
to be loaded into the program. The complete model deﬁnition is shown in
listing A.1. The model deﬁnition is accompanied by code that initializes the
variables with start values and computes based on that a mostly feasible start
point in order to help the solver in ﬁnding a solution. A good start point is
often required so that the solver does not get stuck in corner solutions.
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5.2.2 Expert PIF
Given the calibrated parameters from the empirical PIF, we want to adapt
those in a way that they match the expectations for the future of political ex-
perts. Let G denote the set of political experts, with g ∈ G denoting the index
of a speciﬁc expert. Expert surveys were undertaken with relevant govern-
mental and non-governmental organizations. Interviewed organizations were
considered as experts in development and agricultural policy. Interviewed or-
ganizations were carefully selected using a list of potentially relevant organi-
zations compiled based on desk research and expert interviews. Based on this
initial list and by using a snowball sampling method, personal interviews were
conducted with the representatives of the preselected organizations. Intervie-
wees were asked to identify all the inﬂuential organizations on the provided
list or suggest the new ones. The suggested organizations that were not ini-
tially included in the list were added to the list when they are nominated more
than three times. In Senegal, for example, we have 15 governmental organiza-
tions and 31 non-governmental organizations in total. These non-governmental
organizations include seven donors, ten research organizations, four civil so-
ciety groups, and eight socio-economic interest groups (two farmer and six
agribusiness interest groups) (see (Henning et al., 2019) for detailed survey
data description).
During the interview, we asked experts to amount the desired achievement
levels for seven diﬀerent policy goals (Z) within the next ten years. Further,
we asked them to indicate the preferred policy positions (γ) from the viewpoint
of their organization. Policy positions correspond to preferred budget alloca-
tions for public good services vis-a-vis state budget resources spend on policy
programs as well as budget shares spend on CAADP and non-agricultural pol-
icy programs, respectively. Finally, interviewed organizations were asked to
subdivide the CAADP budget across four pillars and 9 CAADP programs.
Moreover, from the elite survey data, we derive the relative interests (X) of
interviewed governmental and non-governmental organizations in the achieve-
ment of diﬀerent policy goals. In detail, in the interview, we distinguished the
seven policy goals previously described in section 4.4. For each goal, intervie-
wees were asked to indicate on a 7 point rating scale the level their organization
desires realistically to achieve within the next ten years. The status quo level,
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as well as the corresponding levels of the endpoints, were speciﬁed for the
scales. Based on the interview data we could calculate the average annual
linear growth rate experts desire to achieve, i.e. wˆg,j = 110
Zg,j−Z0g,j
Z0g,j
. Political
experts are also asked to rank the relative importance of policy goals, where
Xg,j denotes the relative importance of the goal j from the viewpoint of expert
g. Finally, experts are asked to indicate how they allocate the budget across
policy instruments, i ∈ I, to most eﬃciently achieve their desired policy goals,
wˆg. In particular, γˆg = [γˆg,i] denotes the budget allocation preferred by expert
g.
We have time periods t ∈ {0, . . . , T}. Assuming that each expert evaluates
future development of policy goals based on the following inter-temporal Cobb-
Douglas-function Sg(ψ):
Sg(ψ) =
T∑
t
∏
j
δt (1 + ψj,t)
Xg,j (5.5)
Assuming policy shocks γ are constant over time and induce a constant
linear growth rate ψj(γ) for each policy goal, it holds:
ψj,t = ψ
0
j (γ) + ψj(γ) · t (5.6)
, where ψ0j (γ) is the in-period, direct eﬀect of a policy shock in period t.
ψj(γ) is the growth rate induced by a policy shock in period t− 1.
Given our intervention logic, policies impact on policy goals via induced
changes in technical progress. Inserting the derived GGF, rearrangements
results:
ψj(γ) = ξ
base
j + ξj ·∆tp(γ)
∆tp(γ) = PIF (γ)
(5.7)
Public spending in economic policy programs promoting tp has opportu-
nity costs, for example, assuming a constant state budget, these opportunity
costs correspond to a reduction of state expenditures for public services. The
provision of public services is an important policy goal. Let jps be the index
denoting the policy goal `provision of public services'. The level of the state
budget not spent on investment policies measures the achievement level for
jps. This means without a policy we achieve Zno-policyps = B0, with B0 being the
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total state budget in the base period. If we now spend money on investment
policies, we have the direct, in-period eﬀect of less money available for the
provision of public services, and an additional eﬀect in the following period.
This means for the base period we have:
Zjps,0 = B0 −
∑
j
γ (5.8)
For the following period, if we keep investing, we have the following level:
Zjps,1 = B0 −
∑
j
γ +B0 · ψjps(γ) · 1 = B0 ·
1 + ψjps(γ)−
∑
j
γ
B0
 (5.9)
Generalizing this to period t, the following achievement level results:
Zjps,t = B0 −
∑
j
γ +B0 · ψjps(γ) · t = B0 ·
1 + ψjps(γ) · t−
∑
j
γ
B0
 (5.10)
For the other policy goals we have no direct, in-period policy eﬀect. In addition,
the investment policies are paid in part by donors. Let αdonor denote the donor
share, therefore Zjps is only reduced by 1−αdonor. Now we can deﬁne the direct
policy eﬀect as follows:
ψ0j = −∆psj
∑
i
γi
B0
∆psj =
0 j 6= jps1− αdonor j = jps
(5.11)
Assuming political experts know the policy-growth (PIF) and growth-outcome
(GGF) relations, they can derive their optimal policy interventions, γˆg, and
desired future policy goal achievements wˆg from maximizing their evaluation
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function Sg :
γˆg = argmax
γ
T∑
t
∏
j
δt (1 + ψj,t)
Xg,j
s.t.
ψj,t = ψ
0
j (γ) + ψj(γ) · t
ψ0j (γ) = −∆psj
∑
j
γj
B0
ψj(γ) = ξ
base
j + ξj ·∆tp(γ)
∆tps(γ) = tp
max
s
1
1+e−(asBes+bs)
Bes(γ) = ηs
[∑
i
µi,sγ
−ρ
i
]− 1
ρ
(5.12)
The agents choose their policy by maximizing the following support function
Sg(ψ) =
T∑
t
∏
j
δt (1 + ψj,t(γ))
Xg,j . Therefore given an optimal allocation γˆ, it
has to fulﬁll the ﬁrst-order conditions. We want to derive ∂Sg(ψ)
∂γk
. For the
derivation let fj(γ, t) = 1 + ψ0j (γ) + ψj(γ) · t and Fj(γ, t) = fj(γ, t)Xg,j .
In a ﬁrst step, we derive the partial derivatives for fj and Fj.
∂fj(γ, t)
∂γk
=
∂ψ0j (γ)
∂γk
+
∂ψj(γ)
∂γk
· t (5.13)
=
−∆psj
B0
+ t · ξj ∂∆tp
∂Be
∂Be
∂γk
(5.14)
The derivative for ∂∆tp
∂Be
is:
∂∆tps
∂Be
= ∆tps · (1− ∆tptpmaxs ) · as (5.15)
The derivative for ∂Be
∂γk
is derived as follows:
∂Bes
∂γk
=
∂
ηs[∑
i
µi,sγ
−ρ
i
]− 1ρ
∂γk
= ηs
[∑
i
µi,sγ
−ρ
i
]− 1
ρ
−1
−1
ρ
(
µk,sγ
−ρ−1
k (−ρ)
)
= η−ρs η
1+ρ
s
[∑
i
µi,sγ
−ρ
i
]− 1
ρ
·(1+ρ) (
µk,sγ
−(1+ρ)
k
)
= η−ρs
[
ηs
[∑
i
µi,sγ
−ρ
i
]− 1
ρ
](1+ρ) (
µk,sγ
−(1+ρ)
k
)
= η−ρs µk,s
(
Bes
γk
)1+ρ
(5.16)
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In the next step we build the derivative for Fj:
∂Fj(γ,t)
∂γk
= Xg,j · fj(γ, t)Xg,j−1 · ∂fj(γ,t)∂γk
= Fj(γ, t) · Xg,jfj(γ,t)
∂fj(γ,t)
∂γk
= Fj(γ, t) · Xg,jfj(γ,t) ·
(−∆psj
B0
+ t · ξj ∂∆tp∂Be ∂Be∂γk
)
= Fj(γ, t) · Xg,jfj(γ,t) ·
(
−∆psj
B0
+ t ·∑
s
ξj,s
∂∆tps
∂Bes
∂Bes
∂γk
) (5.17)
Using the result from eq. (5.17), we ﬁnd the derivative for
∂
(∏
j
Fj(γ,t)
)
∂γk
:
∂
(∏
j
Fj(γ,t)
)
∂γk
=
∏
j
Fj(γ, t) ·
(∑
j
∂Fj(γ,t)
∂γk
Fj(γ,t)
)
=
∏
j
Fj(γ, t) ·
∑
j
Fj(γ,t)· Xg,jfj(γ,t) ·
(−∆ps
j
B0
+t·∑
s
ξj,s
∂∆tps
∂Bes
∂Bes
∂γk
)
Fj(γ,t)

=
∏
j
Fj(γ, t) ·
(∑
j
Xg,j
fj(γ,t)
·
(
−∆psj
B0
+ t ·∑
s
ξj,s
∂∆tps
∂Bes
∂Bes
∂γk
))
(5.18)
This allows us in the ﬁnal step to ﬁnd the derivative for ∂Sg(ψ)
∂γk
, which are
the ﬁrst order conditions:
∂Sg(ψ)
∂γk
=
∂
(
T∑
t=0
δt
∏
j
Fj(γ,t)
)
∂γk
=
T∑
t=0
δt
∂
(∏
j
Fj(γ,t)
)
∂γk
=
T∑
t=0
δt
(∏
j
Fj(γ, t) ·
(∑
j
Xg,j
fj(γ,t)
·
(
−∆psj
B0
+ t ·∑
s
ξj,s
∂∆tps
∂Bes
∂Bes
∂γk
)))
(5.19)
The PIF parameters could be estimated econometrically by using the ob-
served optimal policy positions and the preferred policy outcomes of a set of
political actors. Given a large number of parameters, a large set of relevant
actors would be needed, while the set for Senegal is rather small, with only 46
organizations. The limited data makes a direct estimation of the PIF impos-
sible because the econometric model is underdetermined. Therefore we will
again apply a Bayesian estimation approach.
Let χ denote the parameters of the PIF. We can then denote the derived
ﬁrst order conditions (see eq. (5.19)) of the support maximization problem
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as FOC(χ), with RES(χ) denoting additional restrictions on the parameters.
The prior values χ¯ are taken from the results of the empirical PIF, θ∗. The
covariance matrix Ω for the PIF parameters can be derived from the hessian of
the empirical PIF estimation1. Following Heckelei and Mittelhammer (2008)
we can derive χ∗ solving the optimization problem in eq. (5.20).
χ∗ = argmin
χ
[χ− χ¯] Ω−1 [χ− χ¯] + ′
s.t.
FOC(χ) +  = 0
RES(χ) = 0
(5.20)
Implementation
Similar to the implementation of the empirical PIF, the expert PIF has also
been implemented as a nonlinear programming problem in GAMS. The def-
initions are again preﬁxed with a common preﬁx, namely pif_exps. Again
an accompanying ﬁle has been written that initializes the variables with start
values and computes a feasible start point. Given the highly nonlinear tar-
get function and the many interdependencies, this is especially important for
the solver to ﬁnd a solution consistently. The complete model implementa-
tion in GAMS, based on the speciﬁed model from eq. (5.20), can be found in
listing A.2.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Empirical PIF
Exemplary results of the ﬁltering and the estimated TFP from the Bayesian
estimation of the empirical PIF are shown in ﬁg. 5.1. We can see the diﬀerent
stages of the estimation. In the ﬁrst step, the original data was estimated, as
described above. The next step then applied the Hodrick - Prescott ﬁlter to
retrieve the general underlying trend of the data, shown as the smoothed line.
This data was then used in the Bayesian estimation, and the results are shown
1Please note, that we set the covariance matrix to the diagonal matrix with the elements
Ω = [(χ¯)2]
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Figure 5.1: Replication of TFP for Maize Sector
in the estimated line. As can be seen, the estimation closely reproduces the
ﬁltered data, showing that our calibration approach works.
5.3.2 Comparison
Given the estimation results from the two diﬀerent PIFs, empirical, and expert,
we can now look at their diﬀerences. That is, which impact did the experts'
opinion have on the parameters of the two stages of the PIF. On the upper stage
of the PIF, transforming eﬀective budget into additionally realized technical
progress, we see that the experts appear to be a bit more conservative regarding
the eﬃciency of budget (see ﬁgs. 5.2 to 5.4). As can be seen from ﬁg. 5.3 experts
think that a little bit more money is needed before it has an eﬀect on technical
progress. Figure 5.2, with mostly slightly lower values for the expert PIF,
indicates that experts think that slightly more money to achieve a comparable
level of technical progress is needed, compared to the empirical PIF. They are
also slightly less optimistic about the maximum level of technical progress,
that can be achieved (see ﬁg. 5.4).
On the lower stage, transforming the budget into an eﬀective budget, we do
not see a big diﬀerence in the driving parameter µ. The general picture is the
same, as can be seen in ﬁgs. 5.5 and 5.6. The agricultural sector appears to be
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Figure 5.2: a
a little bit more diversiﬁed in what instruments are important for the diﬀerent
sectors.
Applying the two diﬀerent PIFs, we can calculate the expected, achieved
levels of technical progress, given the status quo allocation of budget. As
shown in ﬁg. 5.7, we mostly only see a diﬀerence in the agricultural sector.
This similarity is expected since the parameters for the other sectors do not
diﬀer much between the two PIFs. Given the captured technology beliefs of
the experts, they would expect a lot less technical progress for the agricultural
sector.
Finally, assuming that expert judgments on political goal achievements and
preferred policy strategy of political experts are related to the same period,
which is also covered by the empirical observations, both approaches estimate
the same PIF parameters. In this case, the two approaches could be directly
combined into one joint estimation approach.
If expert judgment, however, relates to future developments, estimated PIF-
parameter might diﬀer between the two approaches, since future policy-growth
relations might change when compared to past/historic policy-growth rela-
tions. In particular, it appears conceivable that the implementation eﬃciency
of policy programs diﬀers between past and future periods. Moreover, max-
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Figure 5.3: b
imal achievable TFP can change over time; for example, assume in the past
substantial yield gaps existed, which have been addressed by increased pub-
lic investment in extension services. To the extent, these policies have been
successful yield gaps have been reduced, implying lower potential to promote
TFP in the future2.
Thus, in general, future and past policy-growth relations diﬀer, and there-
fore the two estimation approaches can not be directly combined to one joint
estimation approach, if expert judgments are on future policy-growth-relations,
while statistical data describes past policy-growth relations. The two sets of
PIF-parameters still correspond to each other, at least to a certain degree, as
long as the future and past periods are close to each other.
2Please note that in the framework of sectoral production functions, TFP incorporates an
increase in technical eﬃciency, while the latter is by deﬁnition excluded analyzing micro-level
data of individual ﬁrms.
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Figure 5.4: tpmax
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Figure 5.5: Empirical PIF µ
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Figure 5.6: Expert PIF µ
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Figure 5.7: ∆tp under status quo budget allocation
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Chapter 6
Model Uncertainty
As has been introduced in section 3.1 and section 3.3.2 model uncertainty is
an important aspect of economic modeling. In this chapter, we will derive
steps that give a view of the uncertainty inherent in our models. These steps
are derived based on our goal of estimating the transformation of policies into
outcomes, but the general underlying approach can be applied to diﬀerent
problems as well.
The looked-at system is very complex and plagued by uncertainty. The sys-
tem is approximated by a combination of models that depend on assumptions.
Therefore it is interesting to see how speciﬁc model assumptions inﬂuence the
estimation results. It is also not enough to only give the best estimate. How-
ever, it would be better also to give credible intervals and be able to quantify
the uncertainty associated with the result. In using the results to advise po-
litical experts on future decisions, this is especially true.
The derived estimation framework provides a good solution to the complex
problem of estimating sector-speciﬁc PIFs. It consists of two main parts, the
GGF and the PIF. In both parts, we have sources of uncertainty. In the
derivation of the GGF, the results depend on the model assumptions for the
used CGE model. These assumptions include the choice of closure rules, the
value of elasticities for production or trade. Therefore we will estimate PIFs,
that are conditional on the assumptions. The Bayesian estimation procedure
allows a relative ranking of those PIFs and in turn, the selection of the most
probable model.
The estimation approach used for the PIF results in a mode of the poste-
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rior distribution, the HPD estimate, a point estimate. We want to derive a
representative sample of the posterior distribution. Given the complex form,
we can not directly sample from it. As has been described in section 3.3.1,
the Metropolis / Metropolis-Hastings (Metropolis et al., 1953; Hastings, 1970)
algorithms provide a solution for this problem. There are many variants avail-
able nowadays that build upon the basic variant1. We will use the Diﬀerential
Evolution Markov Chain (DE-MC) algorithm by Braak (2006); ter Braak and
Vrugt (2008). The chosen solution will be described in more detail in sec-
tion 6.3. The sample generation is potentially very time-consuming. As a ﬁrst
step, we will only apply it to the most probable model.
From the viewpoint of the model, we can think of the ﬁrst part as structural
uncertainty and the second part as parameter uncertainty. We can think of the
steps to handle the diﬀerent sources of uncertainty as an algorithm to apply.
In our speciﬁc case, this relates to the following steps:
Algorithm 2 Model Uncertainty Steps
for c ∈ {Ghana, Senegal,Uganda} do
estimate empirical PIFc (see section 5.2.1)
Start Structural Uncertainty
for e ∈ elasticity scenarios do
for l ∈ closure scenarios do
calibrate CGE model
derive GGF e,lc based on CGE simulations (see section 5.1)
estimate expert PIF e,lc (see section 5.2.2)
end for
end for
End
Start Parameter Uncertainty
select most probable model speciﬁcation PIF ∗c
generate representative sample for PIF ∗c
End
end for
For each country, we estimate an empirical PIFc, derive the diﬀerent meta-
1see https://m-clark.github.io/docs/ld_mcmc/ for an overview of diﬀerent algorithms
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models GGF e,lc based on the diﬀerent structural assumptions, and use that to
estimate the expert pif PIF e,lc conditional on those assumptions. These steps
are performed to handle the structural uncertainty and are described in sec-
tion 6.1. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 describe the ﬁnal describes the ﬁnal step, which
is to handle the parameter uncertainty by applying Bayesian model selection
and generating a representative sample. In all three sections, some initial re-
sults highlighting the uncertainty are shown. The chapter is concluded by a
summary in section 6.5.
The applied steps are shown with the application to the estimation of the
PIF. However, the general approach of doing a sensitivity analysis of model
assumptions and estimated parameter values can be applied to many other
problems as well.
6.1 Structural Uncertainty
The structural uncertainty relates to the assumptions used for the CGE model
in the derivation of the GGF. The applied CGE model is a standard IPFRI-
Type-II CGE model (Löfgren, Harris, and Robinson, 2002). To see the impact
of the assumptions, not only a single metamodel has been derived, but condi-
tional on each set of assumptions a speciﬁc metamodel has been derived, which
is then used in the estimation of the expert PIF. We consider two main as-
sumptions in our analysis: closure rules and elasticities. The closure rules are
a combination of a Savings/Investment rule and a Government Savings rule.
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the possibilities along with the explanation taken from
the original model implementation.
Table 6.1: Savings/Investment Rules
SICLOS Explanation
1 inv-driven sav  uniform mps rate point change for selected ins
2 inv-driven sav  scaled mps for for selected ins
3 inv is sav-driven
4 inv and gov are ﬁxed abs share - uniform mps rate point change
(cf. 1)
5 inv is ﬁxed abs share - scaled mps (cf. 2)
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Table 6.2: Government Savings Rules
GOVCLOS Explanation
1 gov savings are ﬂexible, dir tax rate is ﬁxed
2 gov savings are ﬁxed, uniform dir tax rate point change for
selected ins
3 gov savings are ﬁxed, scaled dir tax rate for selected institutions
4 gov savings are ﬁxed, uniform sales tax rate point change for
selected commodities
5 gov savings are ﬁxed, scaled sales tax rate for selected com-
modities
For the elasticities, we looked at trade, import and export, and production
elasticities. As a very ﬁrst, brute force step to capture the uncertainty around
elasticities, they have been shifted by a factor of either 0.5, 1, or 1.5. This
approach follows and extends what Breisinger et al. (2011) did as a sensitivity
analysis, resulting in 33 = 27 combinations of elasticity scenarios. These are
combined with the 25 closure scenarios. So we end up with 27 ∗ 25 = 675
scenarios, for which a conditional metamodel, the GGF, is derived and in turn
a conditional PIF is estimated.
As shown in section 5.1, we need to run a simulation path for each sector.
Therefore we end up with |S| ∗ 27 ∗ 25 simulations; for Senegal, there are
about 34000 simulations that have to be calculated. For Ghana and Uganda,
a similar number of diﬀerent paths have to be calculated, since the number of
sectors is very similar.
6.1.1 Implementation
This large number of simulations is not feasible to solve serially on just one
computer. Assuming one simulation takes about 10s to compute, we would
need roughly 4 days of non-stop computing to compute all scenarios for one
country. Each simulation path is independent of each other, and therefore, this
provides an opportunity to solve them in parallel. This requires a process that
allows splitting the work into smaller units, distribute it to potentially multiple
computers, collect computation results, and aggregate them back together.
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The DST handles this process, which is described in detail in section 3.5.
In order to improve the reproducibility of the simulations, a small Ruby
(Matsumoto, 2017) script has been written, that generates everything required
for the computation to be run using the DST. As a ﬁrst step, the script checks
out a speciﬁc revision of the model code from the Subversion2 repository. In
the next step, it creates the base calibration point of the CGE model, which is
dependent on the shifted elasticities. The ﬁles are then cleaned to only include
the required ﬁles for the simulation and then compressed into a single ZIP-
ﬁle. The script also creates a descriptive ﬁle; the DST client can use that to
create the jobs automatically. The only manual step required is then to start
the jobs and run the DST clients. In order to use the computers available in
the department's computer lab, Powershell3 scripts have been developed. The
lab is in use during weekdays; therefore, the clients have to be stopped before
that. For the complete process of launching clients on the many machines
and stopping them, scripts have been developed. They launch remote desktop
sessions, start the clients, and take care of stopping the clients and cleaning
up generated ﬁles.
After the simulations have been computed, we can derive the GGF and in
turn, estimate the PIF, not once, but 675 times. The PIF estimation process
also takes multiple hours. Diﬀerent from the CGE simulations, though, we
now have multiple, independent estimation problems that we want to solve.
Therefore it has been parallelized using the GAMS Grid and Multi-Threading
Solve Facility4. The grid computing facility provides diﬀerent ways to imple-
ment parallel solves. We have adopted the approach of using multiple threads
on one machine. This involves creating something similar to a thread pool
and managing it on a highly abstract level, by submitting only as many jobs,
meaning model instances to be solved, as threads are available, storing the
solve results when one has ﬁnished and then submit a new job. Given the
cheaply available many-core machines in cloud oﬀerings like Amazon Web Ser-
vices (AWS) or Google Cloud Platform (GCP), the estimation process has
been adapted to make use of that. This allows the estimation of all PIFs to be
completed in about an hour. We are using the AWS oﬀering for now. For the
2https://subversion.apache.org/
3https://docs.microsoft.com/de-de/powershell/
4https://www.gams.com/latest/docs/UG_GridComputing.html
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estimation process, a custom Amazon Machine Image (AMI) has been created
that contains the required environment for the PIF estimation. The estimation
process has been automated using Ansible5. The automation script requests a
new spot instance for each country and then loads the estimation script onto
the launched machine. This estimation script, in turn, downloads the results
of the simulation sample and then runs the PIF estimation. The estimation
results are stored in a private S3 bucket, from where they are downloaded for
further analysis onto the local machine.
6.2 Model Selection
After having derived steps to determine the impact of model assumptions on
the resulting PIFs, it is interesting to look at the odds ratios of the diﬀerent
PIFs, to select the most probable one. It is also of interest to see if certain
assumptions are clearly preferred over others. In this regard, we use expert
opinions as ﬁlters. The model speciﬁcations can be ranked by how well they
replicate the expert opinions, and therefore, the experts implicitly select the
model speciﬁcation, that is in line with their not directly observable mental
model.
Let y denote the data used in the PIF expert estimation. The posterior
density h(χ|y) is proportional to L(χ|y)p(χ). p(χ) denotes the prior density
and L(χ|y) the likelihood function. The objective function (see eq. (5.20)) used
in the estimation is the negative log of the posterior density, with constants
having been dropped. Given the assumption of normally distributed priors
and errors, it is reduced to quadratic distances. Let t denote the objective
function.
Let Mm with m ∈ {1, . . . , 675} denote the PIF estimation derived based
on the diﬀerent assumptions on closure rules and elasticities. Assuming we
have no further prior information about the probability for a model to be the
true one, we assign P (Mm) = 1675 . If we are only interested in selecting the
model that best replicated the data, we could select the one with the minimum
objective value t(Mm).
Given the derivation and assumptions of the objective function and the
5https://www.ansible.com/
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P (Mm) we can calculate the posterior odds ratios for models Mm1,Mm2 as
follows:
P (Mm1|y)
P (Mm2|y =
e−0.5t(Mm1)
e−0.5t(Mm2)
P (Mm1)
P (Mm2)
(6.1)
Since P (Mmi) = P (Mmk)∀i, k ∈ {1, . . . , 675} the ratio further simpliﬁes to:
P (Mm1|y)
P (Mm2|y = e
0.5(t(Mm2)−t(Mm1)) (6.2)
Having the estimation results based on the model implementation, as de-
scribed in the previous section, model selection is straight forward to imple-
ment: Find the minimal target function value out of the solved value.
6.3 Parameter Uncertainty
The next step is to look at the parameter uncertainty. Based on the best ﬁt
model selected in section 6.2, we will derive a representative sample of the
estimated PIF parameters. This section will also brieﬂy discuss the technical
implementation of the sampling procedure.
In a ﬁrst naive approach, the classical Metropolis-Hastingsgs algorithm was
implemented. That lead to meager acceptance rates of below 1%, which made
the sampling practically infeasible. In the next step, a block-wise variant was
tried, but it still was plagued by low acceptance rates. This ﬁnally led to the
DE-MC algorithm developed initially by Braak (2006). In order to derive the
sample, we will apply the DE −MCZ algorithm, a derivation of the original
algorithm that requires fewer chains and therefore making it applicable to
our problem (ter Braak and Vrugt, 2008). It belongs to the family of the
MCMC algorithms. It builds upon the same principles as the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm, which has been introduced in section 3.3.1. The applied
variant is an adaptive Metropolis sampler (ter Braak and Vrugt, 2008). It
allows eﬃcient sampling of the relatively large parameter space of the PIF
parameters.
Let χ denote the parameters of the PIF with dimensionality d. The evalu-
ation function of the posterior is denoted by pi(χ). The algorithm proceeds as
follows:
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1. Generate an initial sample Z of size M0 × d, with M0 > max(d,N). N
denotes the number of chains, which is at least three, but usually between
ﬁve and ten. The sample can, for example, be generated using the prior
distributions for the parameters.
2. The ﬁrst N rows of the matrix Z are assigned to X, the initial population
and M is set to M0.
3. The population X is updated K times by the following procedure:
(a) For each chain i, with current state Xi, two rows zr1, zr2 of Z are
selected without replacement
(b) A new proposal x∗ is calculated:
x∗ = Xi + γ · (zr1 − zr2) + e. (6.3)
The current state is updated into the direction of the diﬀerence
between the past states zr1, zr2. The value of γ is proposed to be
2.38√
2d
. And ﬁnally a random jitter e ∼ N(0, b)d is added, with b small.
(c) Using this proposal the Metropolis ratio r is calculated by pi(x
∗)
pi(Xi)
and
the proposal is accepted with probability min(1, r). This means Xi
becomes x∗ in the acceptance case and is left unchanged otherwise.
4. After the K updates, append X to Z, and the new number of total
samples becomes M = M +N .
5. This is repeated by starting again at step 3 until the desired sample size
has been reached or the chains have converged.
This way, the algorithm only stores a thinned part of the entire past, as
only each Kth iteration is added to the sample, which helps with storage
requirements. The extended version of this algorithm that also includes a
snooker update, as described in ter Braak and Vrugt (2008), will not be applied.
6.3.1 Implementation
The complete sampling procedure has been implemented in Julia6. Julia is a
relatively new language, build with the goal of high performance. A relevant
6https://julialang.org/
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target of the language is scientiﬁc computing. It is open-source and freely
available. The sampling procedure was implemented with the help of many
packages, but the most important one being DEMC.jl7.
The parameters of the PIF have certain restrictions on them that prohibit
eﬃcient direct sampling. Therefore the parameters have been transformed so
that they can be sampled without restrictions from R. The a, b and tpmax
parameters are bounded in an interval l < x < u, with l, r ∈ R and x being a
value of those three parameters. To get the unbounded value y, we apply the
following transformation:
y = − log(u− l
x− l − 1) (6.4)
To transform the unbounded value y back into the bounded value x, we
apply the reverse:
x = l +
1
1 + e−y
· (u− l) (6.5)
This can be easily implemented in Julia, as can be seen in listing 6.1.
Listing 6.1: pack.jl
1 function boundsPack(x::Float64, l::Float64, u::Float64)::Float64
2 -log((u - l) / (x - l) - 1)
3 end
4 function boundsUnpack(y::Float64, l::Float64, u::Float64)
5 l + (1 / (1 + exp(-y))) * (u - l)
6 end
The µ parameters are a little bit more complex, since they are not only
bounded between zero and one, but in addition
∑
i∈I µs,i = 1∀s ∈ S. This
makes the transformation a little bit more complicated, but it is still straight-
forward. For all sectors the non-agr policy instrument is active, that means
µs,non-agr > 0. This allows us to use it as the normalizing instrument in the
following transformation into the unbounded value:
ηs =
1
µs,non-agr
ys,i = log(ηs ∗ µs,i) ∀s ∈ S, i ∈ I \ {non-agr}
(6.6)
7https://github.com/chrished/DEMC.jl
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To transform it back into the bounded space, the following transformation
is applied:
ηs = 1 +
∑
i∈I\{non-agr}
eys,i
µs,i =
eys,i
ηs
µs,non-agr =
1
ηs
(6.7)
This transformation is only applied to µs,i that are active, meaning they are
not ﬁxed to zero.
Given those transformations, the DE-MC algorithm runs in the unbounded
space, and for the posterior calculation, which is needed in the acceptance
ratio, the parameters are transformed back into the model parameter space.
The posterior calculation has been optimized so that it computes quickly. The
starting point was a naive transformation of the GAMS code using nested
dictionaries, which is structurally similar to the GAMS code. This version
requires between 60 and 80 milliseconds to compute the posterior value. This
has been veriﬁed to calculate the same values as the GAMS code. In a sec-
ond step, it has been used to verify that the optimized version also computes
the same values. The optimized version precomputes some static values and
uses vector and array math instead of loops where possible. Also, repeated
memory allocations have been reduced. It employs, for example, the fact, that
currently the CES function exponent is always 0.5, and therefore the various
exponents often simplify to 0.5 or −0.5. The code has been optimized using
the BenchmarkTools.jl8 package and the @profile command of the Juno IDE9
They were used to ﬁnd slow areas of the code and to verify changes actually
resulted in improvements. The optimized version of the posterior calculation
requires under one millisecond to compute the value. This means, roughly
speaking, we can compute 100 times as many samples with the optimized as
with the naive version, alternatively only a hundredth of the time is required
to compute the same sample size. This optimization allows the generation of
a sample with 200000 sample points in under an hour. The algorithm could
be further sped up by employing parallel computing, which has not been done
so far. The samples for the three countries are computed in parallel using
8https://github.com/JuliaCI/BenchmarkTools.jl
9http://junolab.org/
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independent processes, as a poor man's version of parallelism.
The starting sample Z that is required by the algorithm can be generated
from the prior distributions of the parameters. Given that we already have the
HPD estimate, we can help the algorithm and create the initial sample around
the HPD estimate, an area where we expect a higher density of the posterior.
The HPD estimate and the parameters of the PIF are transformed into a RData
ﬁle using an R script, which in turn is then loaded into the Julia program. The
sample is written to CSV ﬁles, as this provided the easiest and best-performing
way to load them back into the GAMS framework for further analysis. Running
further analysis based on the sample, we ran into some performance problems
with GAMS. GAMS implements sparse data structures using linked lists. For
each sample point spi ∈ {1, . . . , 200000} we want to calculate some derived
value di. This results in GAMS in doing
200000·(200000−1)
2
lookups, as it iterates
the list always from the beginning. This can be solved by splitting the iteration
index into multiple dimensions like for example spouteri ∈ {1, . . . , 400} and
spinneri ∈ {1, . . . , 500}. This then results in only (400+500)·(400+500−1)2 searches.
6.4 Results
We derived an approach to handle structural and parameter uncertainty and
also implemented it. In the following, some exemplary results showing the
impact of model uncertainty are shown.
6.4.1 Structural Uncertainty: Impact on GGF
In the ﬁrst step, we can look at what impact the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations
have on the estimations. Looking at the derived GGF elasticities for poverty
reduction on the meso-sector level, shown in ﬁg. 6.1, we can see that all three
countries follow the same pattern. The crop sector has the largest values,
followed by the export sector. The livestock and ﬁsh sectors have the lowest
values of the agricultural sectors, except for Senegal, where the livestock sector
achieves a similar level as the export sector. In all the agricultural sectors, the
impact of the diﬀerent model assumptions is small, and the elasticities are
highly concentrated. The agribusiness sector has values between the export
and crop sector. The non-agricultural sectors are not as clear cut. The industry
100
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
cr
op
ex
po
rt
liv
es
toc
k
fis
h
agr
ibu
sin
ess
ind
ust
ry
se
rv
ice
pu
bli
c
G
G
F 
El
as
tic
ity
Ghana Senegal Uganda
Figure 6.1: Meso Sector GGF Elasticities
sector elasticities for Uganda are not impacted much by the diﬀerent model
assumptions, but they are for Ghana, and to a much larger extent for Senegal.
The public sector also has a larger variance in all three countries, but with
similar values across the countries. The service sector has roughly the same
values for Ghana, with a similar variance. In Senegal, the service sector has
the highest elasticity, by a factor of two to three. The service sector in Uganda
also has the highest elasticity, but only by a fraction.
In summary, there appears to be a larger uncertainty around the impact
of growth on poverty reduction in the non-agricultural sectors than in the
agricultural sectors. In the agricultural sectors, the three countries are also
very similar in both the level and the variance of the elasticity.
6.4.2 Structural Uncertainty: Impact on PIF
In the next step, we will look at the impact of the diﬀerent model assumptions
on the estimated PIFs. As an example, ﬁg. 6.2 show the distribution of the
tpmax parameter for Senegal on sector level. We can see that there are many
sectors for which there is a broad range of values, for example, the vegetables
and fruits sectors (aveg and afrui), but also in the industry and services sectors,
for example, the telecommunications sector (atelcom) or the enterprise services
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Figure 6.2: Senegal: tpmax
sector (anetrps). Some sectors have only minimal variance; for example, the
ﬁsheries sector (aﬁsh) or the chemical industry sector (achem). For Ghana,
a very similar picture can be observed, while the variances are, in general,
smaller for Uganda.
As a ﬁrst indicator of what this means, we can look at the predicted technical
progress levels, given the status quo budget allocation. In ﬁg. 6.3, we can see
the diﬀerent achieved levels for the three countries. We observe rather high
variances. For example, the crop sector in Senegal has an interquartile range
between 1% and 10% TFP, and a median value of about 3%. For most sectors,
the interquartile range is not very large, but the values of the observations in
the lower 25% and upper 25% ranges cover a broad range.
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Figure 6.3: Meso Sector Average TFP
6.4.3 Model Selection
Figures 6.4 to 6.6 show the distribution of the posterior odds ratios relative to
the best ﬁt model. The best ﬁt model has a value of 1.00, with a value of 0.25
meaning, that the best ﬁt model is four times as likely as the comparison to
be the correct model.
For Ghana, we can see that there is one speciﬁcation clearly preferred over
the others: The speciﬁcation with closure scenario 3−2 and elasticity scenario
0.5 − 1.5 − 1.5. This means that the model with government savings closure
rule 3 (see table 6.2) and savings/investments closure rule 2 (see table 6.1)
best ﬁt the expert data. The import elasticity parameters for the CGE have
been multiplied by 0.5, export elasticity parameters by 1.5, and production
elasticities also by 1.5. Elasticity scenario 0.5− 1.5− 1 also has relatively high
odds ratios. These higher odds ratios indicate that lower import and higher
export elasticities are preferred. Most of the simulated speciﬁcations have low
odds ratios, as shown by the abundant light gray area in ﬁg. 6.4.
For Senegal, the picture is not as clear cut. The preferred model has higher
values for the import, export, and as well for production elasticities. The
closure scenario is 3 − 4, meaning government savings closure rule 3, and
saving/investments closure rule 4. There is no clear preference for a speciﬁc
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Figure 6.4: Ghana: Odds Ratios
elasticity scenario, with higher import and export elasticities being slightly
preferred. Government savings closure rule 3 is preferred over the alternatives.
For the savings/investments closure rule, rule 1 has the lowest odds ratios,
followed by rule 5. Rule 4 has the highest odds ratios, with the other rules
falling in the middle.
In Uganda, we see a clear dominance of the closure scenarios 3−1 and 3−2.
Again the government savings rule 3 is preferred. The preferred model has
shifters of 0.5 for import and export elasticities and 1 for production elasticities.
Six more model speciﬁcations have an odds ratio higher than 0.9. They all are
under the same closure scenario, but varying elasticity scenarios. This is similar
to Senegal, where no clear separation between the elasticity scenarios can be
found. In all countries, though the government savings rule 3 is preferred, a
model speciﬁcation where government savings are ﬁxed, and a scaled direct
tax rate for selected institutions is implemented.
Figure 6.7 provides a diﬀerent look at the same data. We sorted the models
according to their odds ratios with the most probable model from highest to
lowest and then normalized the sum of all odds ratios to one. This means
the most probable model is the ﬁrst, and the least probable one the last. The
ﬁgure shows the running sum of the normalized odds ratios. Here we can see
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Figure 6.5: Senegal: Odds Ratios
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Figure 6.6: Uganda: Odds Ratios
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Figure 6.7: Cumulative Odds Ratios
that for Ghana and Uganda, compared to Senegal, a much smaller number
of models is required to reach 70% of the mass. A more clear preference for
speciﬁc models can be observed for Ghana and Uganda, as shown by those
results. In combination with the previous ﬁgures, we can conclude that there
is a preference for speciﬁc model structures.
6.4.4 Parameter Uncertainty
The generated sample is based on eight chains, with 25000 iterations per chain.
Therefore the total sample size is 200000. The sample computes in about an
hour, including the burn-in period. The full set of PIF parameters has been
changed in the sample.
Figure 6.8 shows the posterior values of the accepted draws for Uganda.
As can be seen, each chain moves through diﬀerent areas. Even though the
posterior values of the accepted draws are quite distant to the posterior value
of the HPD estimate, the posterior value of the mean and median is quite close
to the HPD estimate.
For illustrative purposes ﬁg. 6.9 shows the sample distribution for the tpmaxs
parameter in Senegal. We can see that for most sectors, a vast range of values
got accepted. The interquartile range is, compared to the ﬁrst and third quar-
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Figure 6.8: Uganda: Log Posterior
tiles for most sectors rather small. The mean (thick dot) and median (small
dot) values are also usually close to each other.
In the next step, we can look again at the average TFP per meso-sector
predicted under the status quo budget allocation. We can see in ﬁg. 6.10
that Uganda has the lowest variance in the agricultural sectors, except for the
ﬁsheries sector. Senegal has rather large variances for the crop and livestock
sectors. Ghana falls in between those two countries, with usually lower vari-
ances than Senegal, but higher than Uganda. The non-agricultural sectors
are very similar across all three countries, both in the median value and the
interquartile ranges being rather small. The service sector in Ghana is an
exception, as well as the public services sector in Senegal.
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Figure 6.9: Senegal: tpmax
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Figure 6.10: Meso Sector Average TFP
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6.5 Conclusion
Handling model uncertainty is an important but complex task. The required
computational resources increase by a signiﬁcant factor. For each country, in-
stead of about 45 simulations, 35000 simulations had to be calculated. More-
over, based on the set of diﬀerent assumptions, 675 PIF estimations had to be
done. Manually running all the simulations and estimations is no longer feasi-
ble. The whole process needs to be structured appropriately and automated.
The large simulation samples required for the structural uncertainty led to
the development of the previously described DST (see section 3.5). This tool
made it possible to compute the simulation sample and approach the handling
of structural uncertainty. A representative sample of the posterior distribu-
tion could be generated by applying the DE-MC algorithm, as well as of the
associated parameter distributions. This involved transforming the evaluation
of the posterior from GAMS to Julia. The transformation is right now still a
manual process since it also involves rewriting the code to optimize the per-
formance. There appear to be some ﬁrst attempts at conversion tools (see, for
example, https://github.com/jac0320/toJuMP.jl), improving and applying
these tools is interesting for future work.
Regarding the model results, we see that both structural and parameter
uncertainty are present. The ranges of possible values are broad in both cases.
In Ghana, a clear preference for one model speciﬁcation has been determined,
while in Uganda, at least a speciﬁc closure rule combination is preferred. The
picture is much more diﬀuse in Senegal.
Even though the estimation and model uncertainty steps have been imple-
mented with a speciﬁc case in mind, the underlying approach is much more
general.
Chapter 7
Key Sectors - Key Policies
After having developed the estimation framework in chapter 5 for PIFs and a
framework for handling uncertainty in chapter 6 around it, we now want to
apply it to the ﬁrst empirical application: The problem of ﬁnding key sectors
and key policies for poverty reduction. We are trying to ﬁnd sectors and
policies, if invested in, have a substantial eﬀect on poverty reduction. Beyond
the indicators for key sectors and key policies, it is interesting to derive optimal
policies from the point of view of society. Only ﬁrst-best policies are derived;
that is, they do not take political feasibility into account.
In this chapter, we will ﬁrst compare the derived indicators with previously
used measures that were derived based solely on a CGE. The next step is then
to look for similarities and diﬀerences between the three countries. The ﬁnal
step is then to look at the impact of model uncertainty on our results and if
we can ﬁnd stable results that are applicable in political advisement. Here we
will focus mainly on poverty reduction, though the same steps can be applied
to the other policy goals (see section 4.4) as well. This problem is a ﬁrst step
in policy advice in the context of pro-poor-growth.
7.1 Methodological Implementation
7.1.1 Indicators
The applied indicators have already been derived in an abstract form in sec-
tion 4.7.
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The indicator for key sectors is an extension of previously used measures. It
is a combination of growth - goal elasticities with policy - growth elasticities.
Let z ∈ Z denote a policy goal, as introduced in section 4.4.
The growth - goal elasticities ξGGFs,z are based on the derived GGF (see
section 5.1) and measure the impact of TFP changes ∆tp on goal achievement
levels. Studies based solely on a CGE analysis derive the same indicator under
the name CGE elasticity.
ξCGEs,z = ξ
GGF
s,z =
∂GGF (∆tp)
∂∆tp
(7.1)
Policy - growth elasticities ξPIFs , measuring the marginal impact of total
budget B on ∆tp changed levels, are deﬁned as follows:
ξPIFs =
∂∆tps
∂B
= ∂PIF (γ)
∂B
= ∂∆tps(Bes)
∂Bes
∂Bes(γ)
∂B
.
(7.2)
Using these two measures, we can now deﬁne policy - goal elasticities:
ξPGEs,z = ξ
GGF
s,z ξ
PIF
s,z . (7.3)
Looking at the second goal Z2, poverty reduction, we will call the policy -
growth elasticity PPG - elasticity, denoted by ξPPGs,z .
7.1.2 Optimal Policies
As a ﬁrst step, we deﬁne an optimization problem that returns the optimal
policies given one speciﬁc model. As described in section 4.8 we can use the
estimated GGF and PIF to deﬁne an optimization problem, that is very similar
to the one from eq. (5.12). The only diﬀerence is that the interest factors Xg,z,
which were actor speciﬁc, are now replaced by αz, capturing society's interest
in the goal z. A more detailed explanation of the derivation of these weights
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is given in section 9.1. Therefore the following optimization problem results:
γˆ = argmax
γ
T∑
t
∏
z
δt (1 + ψz,t)
αz
s.t.
ψz,t = ψ
0
z(γ) + ψz(γ) · t
ψ0z(γ) = −∆psz
∑
i
γi
B0
ψz(γ) = ξ
base
z + ξz ·∆tp(γ)
∆tps(γ) = tp
max
s
1
1+e−(asBes+bs)
Bes(γ) = ηs
[∑
i
µi,sγ
−ρ
i
]− 1
ρ
(7.4)
The function
T∑
t
∏
z
δt (1 + ψz,t)
αz is the evaluation function for the goal
achievements derived from investing into the policy γ. Since the derived PIF
is a local approximation lower (Blow) and upper bounds (Bup) on the total
spent budget are added:
Blow ≤∑
i
γi
Bup ≥∑
i
γi.
(7.5)
In a similar fashion also a ﬁxed budget restriction can be added:
Bfix =
∑
i
γi. (7.6)
The combination of eq. (7.4) and eq. (7.5) is the employed model to ﬁnd
optimal policies for a speciﬁc model.
In the previous chapters chapters 6 and 7, we looked at the results un-
der model uncertainty and have given ranges of possible values. Now we are
trying to ﬁnd optimal policies, meaning we need to optimize conditional on
the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. As a ﬁrst approximation, we might solve
each model independently with the just described optimization problem, and
use the weighted average of the obtained results. This approach might lead
to wrong results, however. Therefore we will adapt the optimization problem
and solve them all at once (Rockafellar, 2001; Steel, 2019). We will introduce a
new target function, that weighs the individual model results, as deﬁned in the
individual optimizations target function, according to the odds ratios derived
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in section 6.2. wMj denotes these weights, and they are normalized so that
their sum equals one, with Mj denoting the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations.∑
Mj
wMj = 1 (7.7)
The constraints become model speciﬁc, but we search for a single γ vector.
Therefore the complete optimization problem then is:
γˆ = argmax
γ
∑
Mj
wMjRMj
s.t.
RMj =
T∑
t
∏
z
δt
(
1 + ψMj ,z,t
)αz
ψMj ,z,t = ψ
0
Mj ,z
(γ) + ψMj ,z(γ) · t
ψ0Mj ,z(γ) = −∆psz
∑
i
γi
B0
ψMj ,z(γ) = ξ
base
Mj ,z
+ ξMj ,z ·∆tpMj(γ)
∆tpMj ,s(γ) = tp
max
Mj ,s
1
1+e
−(aMj,sBeMj,s+bMj,s)
BeMj ,s(γ) = ηMj ,s
[∑
i
µMj ,i,sγ
−ρ
i
]− 1
ρ
Blow ≤∑
i
γi
Bup ≥∑
i
γi
(7.8)
Following Varian (1994), our target function
∑
Mj
wMjRMj fulﬁlls the expected
utility form, with RMj being the utility derived from the policy choice γ under
model Mj.
7.2 Results
7.2.1 Key Sectors
As described in the original derivation of the key sectors indicator (see sec-
tion 4.7), the PPG elasticity, looking only at growth-outcome relations might
not be enough. Standard CGE-concepts, i.e. CGE-elasticities and -multipliers,
as derived for example by (Diao et al., 2006; Christiaensen, Demery, and Kuhl,
2006; Dorosh and Thurlow, 2018), capture only this part, but neglect the
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policy-growth linkages. Figure 7.1 shows an exemplary comparison of the dif-
ferent indicators for Senegal. All indicators are given relative to the maize
sector (amaiz ).
As can be seen from ﬁg. 7.1 identiﬁed key sectors crucially depend on the
applied concept. In particular, standard CGE-concepts imply that especially
growth in non-agricultural sectors has the potential to reduce poverty. In
contrast, applying the concept of PPG-elasticities, taking both growth-poverty
and policy-growth linkages into account, implies that, at least in Senegal, by
far the highest potential to reduce poverty can be found for economic growth
in agriculture, especially the food sector.
0
10
20
30
40
am
aiz
ar
iceam
il
ao
ce
r
am
an
ao
tubave
g
afr
ui
ape
a
ao
ole
ao
cr
op
ali
ve
afo
re
afi
sh
ae
xtr
a
afo
od
ata
b
ac
ot
ale
a
aw
oo
d
apa
peraoi
l
ac
hemaru
b
agl
ass
am
eta
l
am
ac
heq
ac
on
str
p
adi
ver
s
aw
at
ac
on
st
atr
ade
as
er
p
aa
cc
om
atr
an
sp
ate
lco
m
afi
n
ae
sta
te
ae
ntr
ps
apu
bli
ca
ae
du
ahe
alt
h
ac
oll
ec
Sector
R
el
at
iv
e 
v
al
ue
CGE Elasticity CGE Multiplier PPG Elasticity
Figure 7.1: Senegal: Key Sectors
Please note that PPG-potentials of non-agricultural sectors like telecommu-
nication, chemistry, or trading as well as the high potential of the agricultural
export sector, that are indicated by standard CGE-concepts, are ﬁnally not
conﬁrmed by the PPG-concept, because the marginal costs to promote TFP
in these sectors are incredibly high. This fact, however, does not necessar-
ily imply that TFP is low in these sectors. For example, a very high TFP
of over 7% on average could be observed over the last decade in Senegal for
telecommunication. However, given the already high level of achieved TFP, it
appears extremely costly to promote TFP even further in telecommunication.
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In contrast, for the trading sector, a very low level of TFP could be observed
over the last decade in Senegal, and the empirical PIF estimation also implies
that it is generally extremely costly to promote TFP in this sector. Given
the fact that the trade sector in Senegal, as in many other African countries,
includes to no small extent the informal sector, this conclusion appears very
much conceivable. Finally, interpreting PPG or CGE-elasticities, one has to
be aware of the fact that these elasticities are local indicators. They depend
on the amount of public resources invested in promoting TFP and the level of
TFP that has been realized in a sector.
Country Comparison
As a next step, it is interesting to see if we can ﬁnd blueprints or patterns
that are the same between the three countries. Can we replicate the ﬁnding
for macro-economic policies, that have some clear blueprints to apply (Taylor,
1993)? We will answer this question by using the indicators derived from the
best ﬁt model (see section 6.2).
To ease the comparison, we have aggregated the sector-speciﬁc PPG elastic-
ities to meso-sector PPG elasticities. Figure 7.2 shows the derived elasticities,
for all three countries, relative to the crop meso-sector. We can see that for all
three countries, the crop meso-sector has the highest relative PPG elasticity,
but beyond that, we can not see a clear picture. Ghana has the lowest relative
PPG elasticities for the other meso-sectors, especially for the non-agricultural
sectors. Uganda has relatively high elasticities for the non-agricultural meso-
sectors, entirely diﬀerent from the other countries.
Trade oﬀs between policy goals
Given our framework, we are not only able to compute the elasticities for
poverty reduction (Z2), the PPG elasticities, but also for the other policy
goals: Farm Income (Z1), Public Goods (Z3 = Zps), Agr. Export Income (Z4),
Urban Consumer Income (Z5), and Industry income (Z6). Figure 7.3 shows
the correlation of the elasticities for poverty reduction with the ones for the
other goals. In addition, we can again see the comparison between all three
countries, and Z2 has been kept as a comparison, even though its value is by
deﬁnition 1.
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Figure 7.2: PPG Key Sectors
We can see that for all three countries Z1, Zps and Z5 are positively corre-
lated with Z2 but to a very diﬀerent degree. Ghana generally has the highest
correlations between the goals, while in comparison, Senegal and Uganda have
lower values. For Z4, the countries are diﬀerent. Ghana and Uganda have a
negative correlation, while for Senegal, a positive correlation can be observed.
Industry income is only positively correlated in Uganda, while it is strongly
negatively correlated in Ghana. This means that policy not focusing on poverty
reduction as its goal, will often also lead to poverty reduction, but to a usually
much lesser degree. The importance of the diﬀerent goals for a policy decision,
the incentives, will be more closely looked at in chapter 9.
Model Uncertainty
So far, we have only looked at the results from the best ﬁt model, but as
seen in chapter 6, the results might change with model assumptions and when
taking the estimation uncertainty into account. Therefore we will now check
the previous results while taking the model uncertainty into account.
Structural Uncertainty The ﬁrst step is taking the uncertainty from the
model assumptions into account, as described in section 6.1. Figure 7.4 shows
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Figure 7.3: Tradeoﬀs
the relative PPG elasticity for the meso-sectors across the countries, again
normalized to the crop meso-sector. The model variance, depicted by the
100% scenario, and the best ﬁt models variance with 50% of the cumulative
density, depicted by the 50% scenario, are also shown. If we take the full
model variance, the clear cut dominance of crop is not replicated for Ghana
and Senegal. Models, which have not been selected by the estimation process as
good ﬁt models, are also taken into account. Therefore it is more interesting
to look at the 50% scenario. We can see that the high model variance is
strongly reduced, and the dominance of the crop meso-sector is reproduced.
In Uganda, we notice that the intervals for the diﬀerent meso-sectors do not
overlap. Therefore the relative ordering of the sectors is stable. In Senegal and
Ghana, the diﬀerent meso-sector intervals mostly overlap.
Parameter Uncertainty Now we want to look at the impact of the uncer-
tainty of the parameter estimates. As described in section 6.3 a MCMC sample
has been generated. The indicators for key sectors and key policies have been
calculated for each sample point.
Given the large range of acceptable values for tpmaxs , as shown in ﬁg. 6.9, it
does not surprise that the messages for the PPG elasticity indicator are not as
117
l
l
l
l l l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l l
l l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Ghana Senegal Uganda
cr
op
ex
po
rt
liv
es
toc
k
fis
h
agr
ibu
sin
ess
ind
ust
ry
se
rv
ice
pu
bli
c
cr
op
ex
po
rt
liv
es
toc
k
fis
h
agr
ibu
sin
ess
ind
ust
ry
se
rv
ice
pu
bli
c
cr
op
ex
po
rt
liv
es
toc
k
fis
h
agr
ibu
sin
ess
ind
ust
ry
se
rv
ice
pu
bli
c
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
R
el
at
iv
e 
PP
G
 E
la
sti
ci
ty
100% 50%
Figure 7.4: PPG Key Sectors
clear cut as before. Figure 7.5 again shows the relative PPG elasticity for the
diﬀerent meso-sectors. Ghana has relatively small variances across all meso-
sectors, while for Uganda, relatively large variances can be observed. Senegal is
in the middle of both countries, with larger variances for some meso-sectors (for
example, livestock) and small ones for the others. The apparent dominance
of the crop meso-sector is only conﬁrmed for Ghana, while for Senegal, the
90% credible interval of the livestock meso-sector overlaps with the crop meso-
sector. In Uganda, the 50% or 90% credible intervals of multiple meso-sectors
intersect with the crop meso-sector. The crop meso-sector keeps dominating
the other agricultural sectors, though, with an exception for Senegal (90%
credible interval for livestock). Looking at the general picture, it is similar to
the one for the best ﬁt model, as shown in ﬁg. 7.2.
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Figure 7.5: MCMC Sample: PPG Key Sectors
7.2.2 Key Policies
The on-going political debate on designing optimal CAADP-policy strategies
highlights the problem of identifying key policies. In the presented frame-
work, key policies correspond to policy programs and investment strategies
that achieve a maximal TFP for PPG key sectors. In ﬁg. 7.6, we present the
relative marginal impact of diﬀerent agricultural policy programs on poverty
reduction calculated relative to the marginal impact of non-agricultural in-
vestments. Calculations are based on CAADP implementation in 2015. We
are comparing the key policy indicator for the two diﬀerent stages of the PIF
estimation, the empirical stage, which is based on historical data and the ex-
pert stage, which combines the empirical PIF with expert views on future
outcomes. We can see that under both PIFs, the agricultural policies have a
much higher marginal impact on poverty reduction than the non-agriculture
policy. The expert PIF mostly strengthens this view, with generally higher
elasticities, except for fm-export. Therefore experts have a slightly diﬀerent
view on the future than looking back.
We can see that investment in agriculture, especially investments in rural
infrastructure (MA) and human resources (HR), are signiﬁcantly more pro-
ductive in reducing poverty when compared to non-agricultural programs.
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Figure 7.6: Senegal: Key Policies
However, investments in the FM pillar have a comparatively low relative
marginal impact on poverty. This low impact is remarkable since signiﬁcant
resources are allocated to the FM pillar. However, the marginal productivity
of public expenditures under diﬀerent policy programs is a local indicator
that crucially depends on the distribution of public expenditure across policy
programs. Thus, these can be interpreted as indicators in which direction
public money needs to be reallocated to maximize poverty reduction.
Country Comparison
Similar to the key policies indicator, we can again compare them across the
three countries. Figure 7.7 shows the key policy indicator aggregated to pillar
level, normalized to the non-agriculture (NA) pillar. Compared to the other
two countries, we see relatively low values for Uganda, indicating the budget
is already allocated in a good way. In Senegal, especially the MA pillar has
a sizeable marginal impact, followed by the HR pillar. The HR pillar shows
the largest potential in Ghana. We can not observe a clear ranking of policy
pillars across the countries.
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Structural Uncertainty
If we now look at the second indicator, the key policies, we see in ﬁg. 7.8 the
intervals of the full model variance again mostly overlap and are quite large.
Therefore no clear ranking of the diﬀerent pillars can be observed. The results
of the 50% scenario, deﬁned as before, show that the variance is strongly
reduced. The intervals mostly do not overlap anymore, and therefore, a clear
ranking of pillars can be made. These results replicate the ordering obtained
under the best ﬁt model.
Parameter Uncertainty
For the key policy indicator, shown in ﬁg. 7.9, we observe a little diﬀerent
picture regarding the variances. This time Ghana and Uganda have the small-
est variances, and Senegal has the largest ones. The 50% and 90% credible
intervals mostly do not overlap, providing strong evidence for stable results
regarding key policies under model uncertainty. The ranking of the diﬀerent
pillars is stable.
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Figure 7.9: MCMC Sample: Pillar Key Policies
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7.2.3 Optimal Policies
Model Selection
First, we are going to look at the results for the best ﬁt model, which provides
a comparison for the results of the model averaging approach in the following
section. We applied the optimization model from eq. (7.4), combined with
eq. (7.5) to derive the optimal budget allocation γ for the investment policies.
In line with the results from the analysis of key sectors and key policies in
chapter 7, we can not ﬁnd similar patterns between countries. In ﬁg. 7.10, we
see very diﬀerent optimal budget allocations, denoted as the share of the total
state budget, for the diﬀerent countries. Ghana has slightly higher budget
shares for agricultural investment policies (AG), compared to non-agricultural
investment policies (NA), with a total of about 30%. Senegal is very diﬀer-
ent, and given our results, only very little investment should be made into
agricultural policies, while about 13% of the total budget should be spent on
non-agricultural policies. Uganda is again very diﬀerent, with a very high agri-
cultural investment share compared to the non-agricultural investment share.
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Figure 7.10: Policy Direction Budget Shares
In ﬁg. 7.11 the relative shares of the four diﬀerent CAADP shares are shown.
Ghana and Uganda appear to be similar to some extent. Senegal is diﬀerent,
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with much higher shares for market access policies (MA) and also the largest
share for farm management policies (FM). The share of human resources poli-
cies (HR) is much lower compared to the other two countries.
Therefore both the total amount of state budget allocated is diﬀerent be-
tween the countries and also the distribution of money inside the agricultural
investment policies.
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Figure 7.11: CAADP Pillar Shares
Model Averaging
In the previous section, we looked at the results of the best-ﬁt model, and
therefore taking model uncertainty in a limited way into account. This is a
limited picture, though, since, for example, in Senegal, the odds ratios for the
best ﬁt model compared to the next best ones are not that high. Therefore,
predictions made relying only on the best-ﬁt model will lead to biased results
(Steel, 2019).
For the results in this section, we solved the extended optimization problem
from eq. (7.8).
In ﬁg. 7.12, we again see the optimal budget shares for the two policy
directions across the three countries. As introduced, this is now not based on
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optimizing a single model, but instead on the optimization that uses all model
speciﬁcations, weighted according to their odds ratios (see section 6.2).
For Ghana and Uganda, similar results to the ones based on the best ﬁt
model are obtained. For Senegal, on the other hand, a very diﬀerent picture
results. Instead of very little investment into agriculture, about 10% of the
total budget is now allocated to it. The inverse is true for non-agricultural
investment, instead of the main investment share, it now only has a tiny share.
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Figure 7.12: Policy Direction Budget Shares
Looking at the CAADP pillar shares, that is the distribution of budget in-
side the agricultural investment policies, in ﬁg. 7.13, again very similar picture
for Ghana and Uganda can be observed. This is not true for Senegal. The
natural resources pillar (NR), together with the market access pillar (MA),
have now the largest shares. The farm management pillar (FM) receives very
little investment, and also the human resources pillar (HR) has a smaller share
than before.
For Ghana, the results can be explained by having a single model with a
relatively large share of the weight (see ﬁg. 6.4). In Uganda the majority of
the weight is on models with similar model assumptions (see ﬁg. 6.6). Senegal,
on the other hand, has neither a particular model dominating the other ones
nor a speciﬁc model assumption being strongly preferred (see ﬁg. 6.5).
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Figure 7.13: CAADP Pillar Shares
7.3 Summary
The identiﬁcation of key sectors crucially depends on the applied concept.
The results dramatically shift between the partial indicators like CGE elastic-
ity and our concept of the PPG elasticity, and therefore the partial indicators
might be misleading. The shown results are in support of the derivation made
in section 4.7. There are no clear blueprints across the countries discernible
from the results. For the key sectors indicator, the only commonality is the
dominance of the crop meso-sector, with Senegal and Ghana being at least
somewhat similar. For the key policies indicator, there is also no clear ranking
across all countries, that would allow a blueprint for policy changes. The shown
correlation values between the diﬀerent policy goals show some indication that
incentives might be an important factor, and these will be looked at in more de-
tail in chapter 9. The derived results are stable under model uncertainty, both
from the viewpoint of model assumptions and parameter estimation. There
is also no clear pattern of uncertainty across countries. Uganda, for example,
has the highest variances for the PPG elasticity under the MCMC sample, but
the smallest for the key policies indicator.
The results of this chapter show that handling model uncertainty is an es-
sential aspect of policy advice. They also give an indicator that more straight-
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forward to apply model selection might not be enough, and we need to apply
model averaging techniques. The derived optimal policies are only ﬁrst-best
policies, meaning they are a technically optimal solution, but they do not take
political feasibility into account. Under this perspective, the low investment
shares for non-agricultural investment policies in Senegal and Uganda appear
questionable. The same is true for the FM pillar that in practice mainly con-
sists of subsidies paid to the farmers, having such a low share. Additionally,
we also do not ﬁnd a blueprint that is true for all countries, neither on the
allocation of budget to agricultural versus non-agricultural investment policies
nor in the distribution of budget to the diﬀerent CAADP pillars within agri-
cultural policies. Thus, strengthening our similar results from the analysis of
the key sector and key policy indicators.
Chapter 8
Modeling and Evaluation of
Participatory Policy Processes
This chapter was published in Social Networks, 58, Christian Henning, Chris-
tian Aßmann, Johannes Hedtrich, Julian Ehrenfels and Eva Krampe, What
Drives Participatory Policy Processes: Grassroot Activities, Scientiﬁc Knowl-
edge or Donor Money? - A Comparative Policy Network Approach -, 78 
104, Copyright Elsevier (2019) (Henning et al., 2019).1
8.1 Introduction
Academic studies and policy statements lauding the beneﬁts of participatory
policy processes have made participation one of the most widely used con-
cepts in development politics (Reed, 2008; Young, 1980; Pretty, 1995). The
beneﬁcial claims include normative claims, such as the claim that participa-
tion promotes the realization of democratic values like empowering the poor
or other marginalized groups (Greenwood, Whyte, and Harkavy, 1993; Okali
et al., 1994; Macnaughten and Jacobs, 1997; Wallerstein, 1999). Moreover,
stakeholder participation may increase public trust in decisions and civil so-
ciety when participatory processes are perceived as more transparent and fair
(Richards, Blackstock, and Carter, 2004), thus implying less conﬂict (Martin
and Sherington, 1997). Beyond normative claims, pragmatic claims focus on
higher quality and sustainability of political decisions arising from participa-
1DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2019.03.001
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tory policy processes (Webler, 1999; Beierle, 2002; Brody, 2003; Blackstock,
Kelly, and Horsey, 2007).
However, there is little quantitative evidence for the claimed beneﬁts of
participatory policy processes (Beierle, 2002; Reed, 2008) and on the rela-
tive inﬂuence that diﬀerent stakeholders have on policy decisions. Disillu-
sionment has grown among practitioners and stakeholders who feel let down
when these claims may not be realized (Reed, 2008). Accordingly, many schol-
ars are increasingly taking a critical look at participation as a mere label or
metaphor and warn against misuses of participation (Eberlei, 2007; Colletta,
1976; Gow and VanSant, 1983; Kelly and Van Vlaenderen, 1996; Lineberry,
1989; Rahnema, 1992; White, 1996). One critique is that stakeholder par-
ticipation has not been meaningfully implemented by governments (Siebold,
2007), with marginalized groups still being excluded from political decision-
making or their involvement being limited to pure consultation (Burton, 2004;
Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000; Duane, 1999; Handley et al., 1998). The
failure of participatory policy processes is explained by the fact that partici-
pating stakeholders lack the capacity and technical knowledge to make good
political decisions (Hage, Leroy, and Petersen, 2010). Although participatory
policy processes are still at the center of the development discourse in polit-
ical practice, there is neither a comprehensive theory of participatory policy
processes nor an empirical analysis of stakeholder systems.2 Current stud-
ies basically claim many beneﬁts of stakeholder participation and relate these
claims vaguely to abstract theories, such as the theory of communicative action
of Habermass (1987) or the theory of polycentric governance of Ostrom (2010).
What is still lacking is a comprehensive theory relating interaction structures
among stakeholders with political performance at the system level, which can
be applied empirically (Dowding, 1995). A prerequisite for applying this kind
of theory is a methodology allowing an empirical measurement of interaction
structures.
As a contribution to ﬁll this gap, this paper suggests a policy network ap-
proach to empirically analyze participatory policy processes in terms of the
2For example, stakeholder participation is one of the cornerstones of the Poverty Re-
duction Strategy approach (PRS) launched in 1999 by the IMF and the World Bank; see
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm.
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inﬂuence that diﬀerent stakeholders have in policy processes in the context
of the implementation of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development
Programme (CAADP) in three countries: Senegal, Ghana, and Uganda. The
CAADP policy processes are especially suited for this kind of analysis as pro-
moting greater participatory and evidence-based policy processes is one of the
key principles during the design and implementation of the CAADP agenda
at the country level. Following previous network approaches (Friedkin and
Johnsen, 1990; Pappi and Henning, 1998), measures of lobbying and informa-
tional inﬂuence with regard to relevant stakeholder organizations are provided
and empirically assessed. These measures depend on two diﬀerent policy net-
works: an information exchange network and a political support network. To
account for the uncertainty of observed networks and to identify the determi-
nants of network structure, the empirical analysis is based on the estimation
of exponential random graph models (ERGM).3 Given the estimation results
on the network generating process, we provide statistical inferences about the
political inﬂuence of speciﬁc non-governmental organizations, such as donor
organizations versus research and grassroot organizations. In particular, we
assess whether diﬀerent organizations apply diﬀerent inﬂuence mechanisms,
such as whether research organizations specialize in providing expert informa-
tion, while interest groups or grassroot organizations specialize in providing
political support to the government. Furthermore, we empirically test the ex-
tent to which political inﬂuence in development politics is dominated by inter-
national donor organizations dictating governmental policies via strategically
granted development funds, as well as how this may diﬀer across the three
countries. Moreover, we shortly discuss options for designing participatory
policy networks.
3Analyzing determinants of the formation of policy network ties and applying econometric
models is not new in the literature (e.g., (Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer, 2004; Adam and
Kriesi, 2007; Weible, Pattison, and Sabatier, 2010)). Although these countries diﬀer with
regard to macro-political and macro-economic conditions, we focus on all three countries in
the same policy domain; i.e., the implementation of CAADP, including the same types of
governmental and non-governmental organizations. In particular, the exponential random
graph models (ERGM)-model has already been used to analyze determinants of political
communication and participation in industrialized countries (Henry, Lubell, and McCoy,
2011; Leifeld and Schneider, 2012; Lee, Lee, and Feiock, 2012). Furthermore, Prell, Hubacek,
and Reed (2009) applies social network analysis to stakeholder systems.
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Overall, we can conclude from our analyses that many of the criticisms of
participatory policy processes in developing countries also apply to stakeholder
participation induced under CAADP. In particular, participation is dominated
by donors in Ghana and Senegal and by non-farm interests and public agencies
in Uganda, while in all countries, marginalized groups are still not strongly
involved in political decision-making processes. However, at least in Senegal
and Ghana, we found clear and positive empirical support for the promotion of
evidence-based policy processes under CAADP in that research organizations
exert high informational lobbying inﬂuence. In contrast, in Uganda, the old
patronage networks that have been characteristic of many autocratic African
states of the old days (Gibbon, Bangura, and Ofstad, 1992) are still prevailing.
For example, the government is controlled by particular economic non-farm
interests and is mainly advised by subordinated state agencies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 8.2, we describe the
conceptual background of policy network studies and corresponding measures
of political inﬂuence. In section 8.3, we present the empirical approach and
explain the collected policy network data, while section 8.4 discusses the main
results. Section 8.5 concludes the paper.
8.2 Theoretical framework
8.2.1 Policy networks and political inﬂuence in partici-
patory policy processes
The theoretical background relates to interest group theory, which nowadays
comes in two versions. The ﬁrst is classical lobbying theory, where politicians
seeking reelection grant political favors to particular interest groups in ex-
change for political support. Typically, these classical lobbying approaches are
described as models of vote buying, where interest groups trade resources such
as campaign contributions for favorable votes (Grossman and Helpman, 1994,
1996).4 However, vote-buying models do not explain interest-group behaviors
4Classical models correspond to a market organization of political exchange (Coleman,
1966; Wilson, 1969), whereas other approaches assume a non-market organization of politi-
cal exchange (Koford, 1982) or (Weingast and Marshall, 1988). The most prominent current
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to the full extent. For example, lobbying expenditures greatly exceed cam-
paign contributions for most interest groups, and lobbying expenditures are
generally not direct transfers to politicians. Furthermore, lobbying ﬁrms exert
more eﬀorts to hire policy experts, conduct policy research, and make sub-
stantive claims to politicians than would be expected from a pure vote-buying
perspective. Thus, these models should be supplemented with explanations
for how lobbyists substantively advocate for policy alternatives. Accordingly,
informational lobbying has been suggested as a second mechanism for interest
group inﬂuence (Austen-Smith, 1993; Ball, 1995). Politicians have only lim-
ited information about the impact of policies on voters' welfare and implied
electoral responses. For example, interest groups have policy information that
legislators crave and gain inﬂuence by strategically revealing that information
to sway legislators toward their preferred policy.
However, both the vote-buying model and informational lobbying theory ne-
glect the fact that lobbyists need access to politicians to be successful, regard-
less of the mechanism. Vote-buying and informational lobbying are plagued
by the problem of opportunistic behavior. Hence, vote-buying models have
motivated eﬀorts to explain how contributions inﬂuence policy despite the in-
centives of politicians to renege on agreements after contributions are made,
or vice-versa in terms of how an interest group can commit to their promises
to honor policy favors after policy decisions have been made by legislators.
Analogously, more recent studies on informational lobbying highlight the im-
portance of the limited access that lobbyists have to politicians (Schnakenberg,
2016). In this context, the organization of actions in social networks is studied
as a decentralized form of self-governance that controls for opportunistic be-
havior by applying a reputation-based punishment mechanism (Buskens, 2003;
Raub and Weesie, 1990). Gaining access to politicians is not trivial since es-
tablishing social relations is costly and often requires an existing level of social
embeddedness. At an empirical level, applied policy network studies are per-
fectly aware of this fact (Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Knoke et al., 1996; Pappi,
König, and Knoke, 1995). At a theoretical level, Pappi and Henning (1998)
approach to classical lobbying is the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model, which concep-
tualizes political exchange among welfare-seeking interest groups and politicians seeking
reelection as a menu auction.
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suggest an organization of political exchange in social networks, and Friedkin
and Johnsen (1990) suggest a model of how actors update their beliefs based
on information exchange organized in a social network. These models hence
provide the theoretical basis for the measures of political inﬂuence used in this
paper linking network structure and political decisions.
To illustrate, we model a collective policy decision, γ ∈ RL, which is con-
sequential for a set of policy outcomes z = (Z1, . . . , ZK) among a set of stake-
holders E = {i = 1, . . . , N}. We deﬁne a stakeholder as an organization that
is involved and interested in the formulation of policies in a certain policy do-
main. Organizations can be formally involved based on constitutional rules or
informally based on lobbying. Accordingly, we further subdivide stakeholders
into a subset of political agents G ⊂ E, with generic elements of G denoted
as g ∈ G, and a subset of interest groups. Political agents include the gov-
ernment; that is, ministries, the prime minister, members of the cabinet, the
president, and legislative groups. Many diﬀerent organizations form the sub-
set of interest groups, such as farmer associations, civil society, or grassroot
organizations. In contrast to political agents, these organizations are only in-
formally involved in political decision-making. Collective policy choices are
made by political agents based on constitutional rules. To model the outcome
of legislative decision-making, we apply the following mean voter decision rule5
γM =
∑
g
CgPg = C
′P, (8.1)
where Cg denotes the political control of agent g determined by constitutional
5Note that the mean voter decision rule can be interpreted as a legislative norm that
can be derived from non-cooperative legislative bargaining models under speciﬁc assump-
tions (Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Schoﬁeld, 2007; Weingast, 1979). We do not model
the political decision-making process in detail. However, following existing approaches, such
as (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989; Grossman and Helpman, 1996), we assume that the out-
come of legislative bargaining corresponds to a lottery of the ideal points of political agents
(legislators), where the probability that a political agent will be successful in implementing
her ideal point depends on constitutional rules. Let Cg denote this probability for a po-
litical agent g. Furthermore, assuming that political agents are risk averse implies ex ante
that every agent prefers a common policy proposal that corresponds to the weighted mean,
γM =
∑
g∈G CgPg, compared to the lottery over proposals. Hence, following Weingast
(1979), we interpret the mean voter decision rule as a self-enforcing legislative norm.
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rules, while Pg denotes the policy positions of an agent and C = (C1, . . . , CN)′
and P = (P1, . . . , PN)′ are corresponding vectors.6 Political exchange im-
plies that agents trade some of their political control against political sup-
port provided by other stakeholders, resulting in a political control vector
CT = (CT1 , . . . , C
T
N)
′, where CTi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N . Accordingly, includ-
ing political exchange policy choices result by the mean voter decision rule
γM = CT
′
P. (8.2)
Policies are translated into outcomes that are related to the political support
that a stakeholder organization receives from society members. Stakeholders
maximize their political support. We assume that stakeholders perceive the
former by the political impact function, F (γ, ai) , while the latter is captured
by the political support function V (φi). Thus, individual policy positions
depend on the relative interest φi that a stakeholder has in the diﬀerent policy
outcomes, as well as the personal beliefs ai on how policies transform into
outcomes z, i.e., P = P (φ,A) and Pi = Pi(φi, ai). We denote the set of relative
interests of stakeholders as φ = (φ1, . . . , φN)′, where φi = (Φi1, . . . ,ΦiK) with∑K
k=1 Φik = 1, whereas A = (a1, . . . , an)
′ denotes the set of individual beliefs
on the transformation of policies into outcomes and ai = (ai1, . . . , aiJ) denotes
the individual beliefs of stakeholder i.7
Diﬀerent lobbying models then describe how values of CT and P (A, φ) are
determined. We follow the approach of (Pappi and Henning, 1999) in assuming
that political exchange is organized in networks and deﬁnes a Walras equilib-
rium that incorporates actor-speciﬁc transaction costs of political exchange.
Thus, the political control held by diﬀerent organizations in the exchange equi-
librium arises from a network of actor-speciﬁc support transfers, T = [ti,j], and
the interest of political agent g in a political support resource is denoted by ωg.
As many lobby groups have no direct access to powerful political agents, they
search for indirect access via other lobby groups. Providing indirect access to
political agents is not free, but lobby groups take a part of support resources
provided by other lobby groups as a brokerage commission. Summarizing the
6Note that this implies Ci = 0 for all i /∈ G.
7J denotes the number of parameters describing stakeholders' belief how policies translate
in outcomes.
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individual broker shares µi of a stakeholder i by a diagonal matrix µ, and
following Henning (2009), the political control is given as
CT = ME(I − Ω)C with ME = [I − µ [I − (I − µ)T ]−1 TΩ]−1 , (8.3)
where Ω is the diagonal matrix with diagonal elements ωi with ωi = 0 for all
i /∈ G, and I denotes an identity matrix of corresponding size. Accordingly,
CT is the vector of total political control of diﬀerent governmental and non-
governmental organizations in the political equilibrium. Hence, the policy
choice of a political agent i results in the weighted mean of ideal positions
of all actors in the policy network where the individual actor's weight in the
ideal position of an agent equals the network multiplier; i.e., the corresponding
elements of the matrix ME.
With regard to policy positions, lobbying and network structure determine
how beliefs regarding the transformation of policies into outcomes are updated.
We focus on communication learning (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2010). Individ-
ual agents are only imperfectly informed about the true political technology.
However, in the aggregate, the total set of agents is generally well informed
if the number of agents is suﬃciently large. Therefore, agents are interested
in a collective communication process through which they communicate their
received signals and avoid strategic behavior by limiting their communication
to only people they trust.8 To analyze communication structures, we deﬁne
a network relation bi,j, where bi,j > 0 indicates that agent i and agent j have
an established communication tie. We deﬁne Bi,j =
bi,j∑
j′ bi,j′
with
∑
j Bi,j = 1.
Accordingly, B = [Bi,j] denotes the normalized communication network, where
Bi,j > 0 indicates that actor i pays attention to actor j. Within one period, a
political communication process occurs, where stakeholders repeatedly update
8Note that an optimal communication process would correspond to a super-agent who
aggregates the privately received signals of all agents and communicates the aggregated
signals back to all individual agents. However, in reality, actors' ability to communicate their
experience may be limited, as actors have heterogeneous preferences. Thus, they also have
incentives to strategically communicate biased signals to induce other agents to form biased
beliefs. Rational social learning is generally possible even in this setting (Acemoglu and
Ozdaglar, 2010). However, the mental capabilities of real-life political actors are often too
limited to justify the assumption of perfect rational learning. Alternatively, scholars assume
that actors apply a naive non-Bayesian learning mechanism such that beliefs are formed by
taking the average of all beliefs communicated by other agents (Golub and Jackson, 2010).
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their political opinion by taking weighted averages of their neighbors' opinions
with Bi,j being the weight or trust that actor i places on the current belief of
agent j in forming his or her belief for the next period. Summarizing all initial
beliefs of individual actors with regard to the political technology parameters
in the matrix A˜ = (a˜1, . . . , a˜n)′, the process of belief formation has a sta-
tionary point since B is a stochastic matrix. Following Friedkin and Johnsen
(1997) as well as Jackson (2008), the stationary beliefs on political technology
parameters summarized as Aˆ = (aˆ1, . . . , aˆn)′ are given as
Aˆ = MBA˜, where MB = [I − (I − Λ)B]−1Λ, (8.4)
where Λ denotes a diagonal matrix with elements λi corresponding to the
individual weights that stakeholders put in their own initial belief. Since in-
dividual weights are larger than zero, the assumed communication process
converges to an equilibrium, where stakeholders hold heterogeneous ﬁnal be-
liefs.9 The limit belief of each stakeholder, aˆi, results in a weighted average
of the initial beliefs (A˜), where the weights of stakeholders' initial beliefs (A˜)
for stakeholder i's ﬁnal belief are given as the ith row of the multiplier matrix
MB = (MB1 , . . . ,M
B
N )
′.10
To relate the network multipliers, MB, with informational lobbying power,
stakeholders' policy positions, P (φ,A), are determined by their beliefs. For
the sake of simplicity, assume that policy positions can be expressed as linear
functions of policy beliefs and political interests, i.e.
P i(φi, aˆi) = γ
0
i (φi) + aˆiDa, (8.5)
9Friedkin and Johnsen (1990) assume that all actors attribute the same weight to their
own initial belief. In our more general model, the relative weight that actors put on their
own beliefs and that of other actors might signiﬁcantly diﬀer across actors. Diﬀerent levels
of self-control might reﬂect an actor's individual information level. For example, highly
uncertain actors might put more weight on the communicated positions of other actors
when compared to actors that are more certain regarding their knowledge of the impact of
policies on outcome. Thus, our model includes the deGroot model (DeGroot, 1974) and the
Friedkin model (Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990) as special cases.
10MB is the matrix of network multipliers mBi,j given as the elements of M
B
i , which are
similar to the Hubbell index (Hubbell, 1965). The multiplier also deﬁnes the ﬁeld strength
of stakeholder j's initial beliefs operating on another stakeholder i's ﬁnal belief.
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where the matrix Da is the same for all i.11 Substituting eq. (8.5) into the
mean voter decision rule given by eq. (8.1) and noting that aˆi = MBi A˜ implies
that the ﬁnal policy choice results in
γM =
∑
i
CTi γ
0
i (φi) +
∑
i
CTi M
B
i A˜Da. (8.6)
Based on eq. (8.6), we deﬁne CB = (CB1 , ..., C
B
n )
′ as the vector resulting
from CTMB. CBi can be interpreted as the weight of the initial beliefs of an
individual stakeholder in determining the ﬁnal political decision. Accordingly,
we interpret CBi as the informational lobbying inﬂuence of a stakeholder i.
Analogously, the vote-buying inﬂuence CTi can be interpreted as the relative
impact of the political interests in policy outcomes of an individual stake-
holder on the ﬁnal political decision. Hence, while classical lobbying theories
like Grossman and Helpman (1994) focus on vote-buying lobbying assuming
perfect knowledge and theories of informational lobbying focus on beliefs only
ignoring vote-buying, our theory combines both approaches and simultane-
ously incorporates both vote-buying and informational lobbying.12
To operationalize our approach, we need empirical observations of relevant
input variables; that is, the political support (T ) and communication network
(B), the broker shares µ, the relative interest of stakeholder in political support
Ω, and the importance of one's own initial beliefs Λ. Finally, we also need a
measurement of the constitutional voting power, C. We follow Pappi and
Henning (1999) to survey relevant data and specify all relevant input variables
empirically. Details are provided in the empirical section.
Overall, this framework allows us to analyze political power structures in
participatory policy processes empirically based on underlying policy network
structures. Beyond a descriptive analysis of political power structures, our
framework would also allow us to evaluate observed political power structures
by comparing policy choices derived from empirically observed power struc-
tures with speciﬁc benchmark policies, such as policies that are considered
as desirable from a social welfare perspective. It would also be interesting
11For example, a ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation of P i(φi, aˆi) could be used to obtain a
corresponding linear function.
12Technically, this follows as we disentangle stakeholders' preferences over policies into
stakeholder's preferences over policy outcomes (φi) and stakeholders' initial beliefs how
policies translate into outcomes (a˜i).
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to analyze how individual multipliers and political power structures can be
changed by inﬂuencing the underlying support and communication network
structures. Particularly, understanding the network-generating process and
the impact of network structures on policy choices enables the design of eﬀec-
tive lobbying structures (i.e., policy network structures that imply desirable
policy outcomes). However, empirical information on policy choice functions
P (φ, Aˆ) would be needed. This especially includes information on how de-
cisions transform into observable outcomes (i.e., the policy impact function)
and initial policy beliefs, (a˜), which are rather diﬃcult to derive empirically.
Therefore, we restrict our empirical analyses to the empirical estimation of the
two lobbying inﬂuence measures, CT and CB, and the empirical estimation of
the network-generating process regarding the two policy networks B and T ,
respectively. We leave the evaluation of policy choices and optimal design of
underlying policy network structures for future research.13
Given the theoretical measures of political inﬂuence, we consider hypothesis
13 However, to further motivate the potential of our theoretical network approach as
a useful framework for future evaluation and design of optimal participatory policy pro-
cesses, intuitively, we deﬁne a benchmark policy γ∗ = γ0i (φ
∗) + aDa,. Then, the policy
bias becomes: [γM − γ∗]2 =
[∑
i C
T
i (γ
0
i (φi)− γ∗(φ∗) +
∑
i C
T
i M
B
i [A˜−A]Da
]2
. Note that
in eq. (8.6), the term A˜Da is a vector with the components a˜iDa. Assuming that ini-
tial individual beliefs follow from individual information signals Golub and Jackson (2010),
where for each stakeholder, information signals are drawn independently from a symmet-
ric distribution around the true political technology, parameter a implies that individual
components of A˜ − ADa (i.e., (a˜i − a)Da) are stochastic variables, which are statistically
independent of each other and all have an expectation value of zero. Obviously, the variance
of an individual component corresponds to the level of uncertainty of a stakeholder. Let σ2i
denote this variance. Accordingly, the policy bias becomes a stochastic variable, where the
variance of this variable results in a linear function of the variances σ2i and the constant∑
j
∑
i C
T
j C
T
i [γ
0
j (φj) − γ∗(φ∗)][γ0i (φi) − γ∗(φ∗)]. The weight of each individual variance,
σ2i , is just equal to the square of the informational lobbying power of a stakeholder, [C
B
i ]
2.
Therefore, minimizing the expected policy bias implies that the relative informational power
is just the inverse relation of the individual variances; i.e., the less uncertain an individual
stakeholder is in assessing policy impacts, the higher her relative informational power would
be in an optimal stakeholder communication. Moreover, note that the constant corresponds
to the policy bias induced by biased representation of society's interests through stakeholder
participation via vote-buying lobbying. Accordingly, total policy bias resulting from stake-
holder participation can be subdivided into incentive and knowledge bias.
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on the structure of policy networks.
8.2.2 Hypothesis on emergence and determinants of pol-
icy network structures
In order to draw valid conclusions on political inﬂuence from observed network
data, empirical policy network analysis requires statistical assessment of the
robustness of derived inﬂuence measures. Estimating the network-generating
process in terms of tie formation enables one to draw statistical inferences
about empirically derived network measures.14 Regarding the understanding of
network generating processes, scholars point out that the formation of network
structures is determined by actors' preferences and the structure of the meeting
process among the set of relevant actors (Moody, 2001; Currarini, Jackson, and
Pin, 2009; Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer, 2004). We follow these scholars
and consider preferences and meeting opportunities as the two main categories
of determinants of political communication.
Given the purpose of lobbying as an interest-mediation mechanism, lobby-
ing organizations try to contact highly inﬂuential governmental organizations.
Analogously, stakeholders like research organizations try to communicate their
(scientiﬁc) knowledge to powerful politicians. However, because access to pow-
erful governmental organizations is rather restricted, organizations might also
apply an indirect inﬂuence strategy (i.e., contacting other non-governmental
organizations that have access to powerful politicians). Therefore, we expect
that the higher the perceived inﬂuence of an organization is, the more likely it
will be that other stakeholder organizations will want to establish an informa-
tion exchange or a political support tie with this organization. We consider per-
ceived political inﬂuence to reﬂect both informal and formal legislative power
for two other reasons. The ﬁrst directly considers brokerage relationships. The
second is in line with Weingast (1979) and Shepsle and Weingast (1987), who
argue that beyond formal constitutional rules, real legislative decision-making
processes are determined by speciﬁc informal legislative norms. Informal leg-
islative norms appear especially relevant in developing countries with young
14Further, the formation of policy network ties might be of particular interest because as
it is a prerequisite for designing desirable policy network structures, e.g. structures which
imply a more eﬃcient political decision-making process in development politics.
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democracies, in which the rule of law is often only weakly developed (Brat-
ton, 2007). For example, political power tends to be intensely concentrated
around the president. As a result, the government often dominates legislative
decision-making (van de Walle, 2003). Furthermore, analyzing policy network
tie formation from the viewpoint of politicians, it is interesting to form polit-
ical support ties with interest groups that have a high capacity to inﬂuence
the electoral choices of the voter. The number of members or the budget of a
stakeholder organization might be good indicators of the capacity to inﬂuence
voter decisions. Moreover, organizations are interested in obtaining technical
information on policy impacts from other organizations that have reputations
of being knowledgeable. As discussed by Sabatier (1987), scientiﬁc organiza-
tions are perceived as sources of high-quality information that can be used
to strengthen one's own policy proposals. Other actors try to receive expert
information from scientiﬁc organizations or other organizations with a high
reputation of political knowledge, such as donors.
However, access to powerful governmental organizations or knowledgeable
non-governmental organizations is restricted by meeting opportunities. Ac-
cordingly, many empirical network studies stress the importance of institu-
tional and structural context factors (Lubell, Henry, and McCoy, 2010; Leifeld
and Schneider, 2012). Membership in umbrella organizations or common
membership in political committees indicates meeting opportunities, which
increases the probability of a pair of actors forming a policy network tie. We
further argue that established network ties provide meeting opportunities. Es-
tablished political support relations induce the establishment of information
exchange ties, and vice versa: ceteris paribus, established information exchange
ties facilitate the formation of political support ties. Analogously, within the
same network relation, an established tie from actor i to j provides an oppor-
tunity to establish a reciprocal tie from j to i.
Furthermore, beyond actors' utility derived from an established network tie
and beyond cost to establish and maintain a tie, transaction costs of politi-
cal interactions determine the formation of policy network relations (Moody,
2001). As explained above, both exchange processes (exchanging political sup-
port as well as information) are plagued by the problem of opportunistic be-
havior. Accordingly, organizations seek to form ties with actors that they can
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trust. Formally, trust corresponds to the probability that exchange partners
will not behave opportunistically. Hence, the risk of opportunistic behavior
implies transaction cost for actors interacting with these partners. As demon-
strated in the literature, potential opportunistic behavior of exchange partners
is fundamentally determined by interaction structures among partners (Raub
and Weesie, 1990; Henning, Henningsen, and Henningsen, 2012). In particular,
we distinguish two sets of factors that determine transaction costs. The ﬁrst
are factors that determine actors' potential to punish opportunistic behavior,
and the second are factors determining actors' incentive to behave opportunis-
tic.
Regarding the ﬁrst set, there is well-established literature on social exchange
and networks (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Raub and Weesie, 1990; Buskens,
2003), as well as on relation-based self-governance (Dixit, 2003; Greif, 1994).
A common implication of these studies is that, c.p., the potential to pun-
ish divergent exchange partners is promoted if binary exchange relations are
socially embedded; i.e., exchange partners share a large set of joint other ex-
change partners (Raub and Weesie, 1990; Buskens, 2003; Dixit, 2003; Henning,
Henningsen, and Henningsen, 2012). If ego has many shared neighbors with
alter, then alter is more likely to trust ego as a sender of high-quality infor-
mation (Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer, 2004; Berardo and Scholz, 2010). A
policy network tie formation is scrutinized by common neighbors, resulting in
a situation of social control (Leifeld and Schneider, 2012). It is also easier
for alter to contact other actors if there are many common neighbors. This
strengthens clustered regions in the network (Henry, Lubell, and McCoy, 2011;
Sabatier, 2007). We expect patterns of transitivity to be at work in policy net-
works. That is, an organization will seek information exchange or support
relations from another organization if a third party links them both (Holland
and Leinhardt, 1971; Berardo and Scholz, 2010). Analogously, reciprocity of
network relations provides the potential to punish divergent behavior of ex-
change partners.
A second line of argumentation relates to actors' incentives to behave op-
portunistic. In this regard, political homophily might be an important de-
terminant for both network relations. A similarity of policy preferences is
expected to reduce commitment problems inherent in information exchange.
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Receiving information from sources with similar policy preferences decreases
the likelihood of receiving information that does not match one's own interests
(see (Festinger, 1954; Austen-Smith, 1993)). Moreover, approaching organiza-
tions with similar political interests is rational because it reduces the ﬁnancial,
emotional, and processing costs of political communication.15 Analogously, po-
litical homophily is also important in explaining the establishment of support
relations because it reduces political transaction costs in as much as politicians
can expect that a support relation with ideologically diﬀerent organizations,
such as a socialistic party with a business organization, will be punished by
negative electoral responses of their voters.
Overall, it is of interest to compare the importance of diﬀerent determi-
nants regarding the tie formation in political support and expert information
exchange networks. Are policy network ties mainly determined by expected
beneﬁts resulting from an established tie, or are they mainly determined by
the costs to establish and maintain a tie? Are they mainly determined by
transaction cost due to the risk of opportunistic behavior? Are these trans-
action costs mainly driven by structural relations that increase stakeholders'
potential to punish divergent exchange partners, or are they mainly driven by
homophily reducing agent's incentive to behave opportunistically? Moreover,
it is interesting to analyze the extent to which the importance of speciﬁc de-
terminants diﬀers for political support when compared to political information
networks. Especially, regarding the design of participatory policy networks it
will be instructive to identify the relative impact of variables on policy network
formation that can be easily controlled, such as meeting opportunities, when
compared to diﬀerent structural and preference variables, which hardly can be
controlled exogenously.
15For experimental evidence on political preference similarity as a driver of tie choice, see
Ahn et al. (2013).
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8.3 Empirical study
8.3.1 Study background and empirical hypotheses
Our analyses is embedded within a project analyzing participatory policy pro-
cesses in development politics (PEBAP) through the Comprehensive Africa
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) as a major development strat-
egy in African countries. African leaders of over 23 countries endorsed in 2003
in Maputo and again 2014 a decade later in Malabo CAADP as an action plan
for putting agriculture back on Africa's development agenda. A challenge that
continues to face African policy makers in moving beyond their commitments is
ensuring that the ﬁnal selected policies and investment strategies are eﬀective
in producing their intended goals. In this regard, one of the key principles of the
CAADP reform process is promoting greater participatory and evidence-based
policy processes during the design and implementation of the CAADP agenda
at the country level. CAADP follows a central strategy that is promoted by
most important international donor organizations, such as the World Bank
and IMF, which emphasize broad-based participation of stakeholders inside
and outside the governments, including parliaments, civil society organizations
(CSOs), private-sector representatives, and other stakeholders at the national
and local levels as one of the core principles of their poverty-reduction strat-
egy. However, the implementation of participatory policy processes including
CAADP is still criticized as being a mere label or metaphor. Accordingly, even
nowadays, it is debated to what extent the CAADP process has succeeded in
becoming an eﬀective participatory policy process. In this regard, very little
substantial empirical evidence has been provided so far.
To undertake our analysis, we use data collected within an international
comparative analysis of CAADP policy processes in Ghana, Senegal, and
Uganda.16 One essential part of the study is a policy network survey that
was conducted in all three countries on political interactions, policy goals, and
16The PEBAP project was jointly implemented by the International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI) and the Universities of Kiel and Hohenheim in collaboration with local
research institutions: The Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research (ISSER), the
Institut Sénégalais de Recherches Agricoles (ISRA), and the African Institute for Strategic
Resource Services and Development (AFRISA).
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preferred policy positions of key policy makers and stakeholders regarding the
most appropriate state budget allocations to diﬀerent policy programs under
the CAADP agenda. The three countries were selected because they vary
systematically in both their economic and political development. Thus, com-
paring policy network structures within the same CAADP policy domain might
reveal interesting insights on how participatory policy processes vary with the
level of economic and political development. According to the GDP per capita
and the poverty index, Ghana is the most economically developed country,
followed by Senegal, while Uganda is less developed. Analogously, according
to the Freedom House indices of Civil Liberty (Freedom House, 2014) and
Political Rights, as well as the polity IV score of democratization (Marshall,
Jaggers, and Gurr, 2012), Ghana is the most advanced democracy, followed by
Senegal and Uganda.
Given the general considerations from above, we provide in the context of
our empirical analysis of participatory structures under CAADP the following
hypotheses. Are marginalized groups such as the poor meaningfully involved
in the CAADP process; i.e., do grassroot organizations and CSOs as well as
parliamentary groups that represent them exert signiﬁcant political inﬂuence,
or is the CAADP process dominated by international donor organizations?
Furthermore, do grassroot organizations and CSOs have their own political
expertise, or are they swayed by information provided by donor organizations?
To what extent do these organizations exert informational lobbying power be-
yond vote-buying lobbying power? Moreover, since the CAADP agenda also
promotes evidenced-based policy processes, it is interesting to test whether re-
search organizations exert high informational inﬂuence. We can analyze these
central hypotheses of participatory and evidenced policy processes under the
CAADP agenda by applying our quantitative policy network-based inﬂuence
measures, vote-buying (CT ) and informational lobbying power(CB).
8.3.2 Statistical model
To assess the derived measures in terms of inference and gauging potential
diﬀerences between groups of stakeholders, we need to characterize the uncer-
tainty of network measurements in terms of the network generating process.
A well-established model class for social networks is the ERGM framework
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developed by Wasserman and Pattison (1996) and modiﬁed by Snijders et al.
(2006). Lusher, Koskinen, and Robins (2013) illustrate a wide range of ERGM
applications and give a detailed introduction to the ERGM framework. This
model class can represent the structure and the driving factors of a network
by using an a priori deﬁned set of suﬃcient network statistics. These network
statistics are sub-graphs that represent particular patterns of social behavior
like reciprocity or triangulation, which allows for the modeling of the endoge-
nous self-organization of a network. The model can also represent the inﬂuence
of exogenous covariates on network tie formation.
To illustrate the ERGM framework, consider an N ×N directed adjacency
matrix y on a set of N nodes. If actor i sends a directed tie to actor j, then,
yi,j = 1 ; otherwise, yi,j = 0. As self-ties are not of interest, the diagonal of y is
always empty. Furthermore, let X denote the exogenous covariates including
dyadic and nodal speciﬁc attributes, and let s(y,X) = (s1(y,X), . . . , sQ(y,X))′
denote a known vector of Q suﬃcient network statistics that contains en-
dogenous conﬁgurations of network self-organization and the exogenous co-
variates.17 The probability density function of an ERGM can be formulated
as
Pr(y|X) = exp {θs(y,X)}∑
y˜∈Y exp {θs(y˜, X)}
, (8.7)
where θ = (θ1, . . . , θQ). The normalizing constant
∑
y˜∈Y exp {θs(y˜, X)} sum-
ming over all possible network conﬁgurations denoted as Y ensures that eq. (8.7)
is a probability distribution. The choice with regard to s(y,X) depends on the
research question and the underlying hypotheses about the network tie forma-
tion.
Due to the enormous number of possible realizations in Y , the normaliz-
ing constant is intractable even for networks of moderate size. This makes
parameter estimation challenging within the ERGM framework. Maximum
Likelihood and Bayesian estimation, which both use Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) techniques, are prominent approaches in the literature (see
Snijders (2002); Hunter and Handcock (2006)). In this paper, we refer to a
17The endogenous suﬃcient statistics are network counts for directed sub-graph conﬁgu-
rations like multiple triangles, two-paths, or star conﬁgurations; see Robins et al. (2007) for
a detailed introduction. The exogenous covariates enter the model as statistics of the form∑
j(
∑
i yij)Xj ,
∑
j(
∑
i yji)Xj , or
∑
i
∑
j yijXij .
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Bayesian estimation approach applying the R package Bergm (see Caimo and
Friel (2014)).18 The parameter estimates are then available as sample moments
for a sample drawn from the posterior distribution. This approach can then be
extended to provide inference on the derived measures of political inﬂuence.
The ERGM speciﬁcations characterize the network generating process. Via
simulating networks for each conﬁguration of s(y,X) of interest and recalcu-
lation of the inﬂuence measures CT and CB for each parameter value of the
posterior distribution sample, we have access to the corresponding posterior
distributions.19
With regard to interpretation of the estimated parameters, we reformulate
eq. (8.7) as a conditional logit (Goodreau, Kitts, and Morris, 2009; Cranmer
and Desmarais, 2011) and obtain
ln
[
Pr(yij = 1, Y Cij |X)
Pr(yij = 0, Y Cij |X)
]
= θδ(yij, Y
C
ij , X), (8.8)
where Y Cij denotes all dyads other than yij, and δ(yij, Y
C
ij , X) denotes the vector
of changes in the suﬃcient statistics when yij is toggled from 0 to 1. Corre-
spondingly, we have
Pr(yij = 1|Y Cij , X) =
Pr(yij=1,Y
C
ij |X)
Pr(yij=0,Y Cij |X)+Pr(yij=1,Y Cij |X)
=
exp{θδ(yij ,Y Cij ,X)}
1+exp{θδ(yij ,Y Cij ,X)}
.
(8.9)
To interpret the relative importance of diﬀerent network statistics, the eﬀects
on the probability given in eq. (8.9) resulting from changes in δ(yij, Y Cij , X)
need to be considered. Given that these eﬀects might diﬀer for each observation
in the sample, estimates are based on conditional average eﬀects in terms of
marginal eﬀects or log-odds.20 As we are also interested in eﬀects on the
18Bayesian and maximum likelihood estimations deliver similar results. However, for more
complex models, convergence is easier to achieve with the Bayesian approach because the
corresponding MCMC algorithm is less prone to local maxima than the maximum likelihood
approach.
19Speciﬁcally, using the estimated ERGM speciﬁcations, we draw a sample of 10,000 net-
works, and for each network, we calculated the political inﬂuence measures (CT , CB) for
each individual organization. We interpret the mean inﬂuence calculated for the drawn net-
work sample as our empirically estimated inﬂuence measures and calculated 95% conﬁdence
intervals to draw statistical inferences about these measures.
20Note that a total of N2 − N sample observations are available. To facilitate inter-
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probability given in eq. (8.9) resulting from exogenous variables and to ease
analysis slightly by making use of the directly available vectors of changes in
the suﬃcient statistics, we refer to marginal eﬀects of the network statistics,
which can be expressed as
∂Pr(yij = 1|Y Cij , X)
∂δ(yij, Y Cij , X)
= Pr(yij = 1|Y Cij , X)(1− Pr(yij = 1|Y Cij , X))θ. (8.10)
Individual marginal eﬀects are locally deﬁned and thus depend on all network
statistics, as they are derived as partial derivatives at a speciﬁc point.
8.3.3 Survey design and network data
Within the PEPAB project, network data has been collected via question-
naires answered in personal interviews with all relevant governmental and
non-governmental organizations in 2012-2013. The unit of observation in the
surveys is the organization that is interpreted as a corporative actor (Cole-
man, 1990). For each speciﬁc policy domain, the respondents are considered
to be experts for the organizations representing that domain. Targeted orga-
nizations were carefully identiﬁed. As a starting point, country-speciﬁc lists of
potentially relevant organizations were compiled based on desk research and
expert interviews. For Ghana, Senegal, and Uganda, the lists included 89, 90,
and 91 non-governmental organizations and 40, 45, and 39 governmental orga-
nizations, respectively. Based on the lists, personal interviews were conducted
with representatives of the listed organizations. The interviews began with
targeting governmental organizations, especially the Ministry of Agriculture
and Ministry of Finance, subordinate agencies, and later, the most important
interest groups (such as farm organizations).
Within the interviews, a reputation question was asked ﬁrst, and the inter-
viewees were instructed to identify all inﬂuential organizations based on the
pretation of the eﬀects from the estimated ERGM speciﬁcations, we report the mean of
the N2 − N values as an estimate for the eﬀects of speciﬁc network statistics. The cor-
responding estimates can then be calculated as 1S
∑S
s=1
1
N2−N
∑
i 6=j θ
(s)δ(yij , Y
C
ij , X) or
1
S
∑S
s=1
1
N2−N
∑
i 6=j Pr(yij = 1|Y Cij , X)(1−Pr(yij = 1|Y Cij , X))θ(s), where {θ(s)}Ss=1 denotes
a MCMC sample from the posterior distribution of θ. In this sense, we mimic conditional
average treatment eﬀects as discussed in Heckman, Lopes, and Piatek (2013) and Jacobi,
Wagner, and Frühwirth-Schnatter (2016) from a Bayesian perspective and use the MCMC
sample to approximate the involved integral.
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provided list or suggest new ones. Based on the responses, suggested orga-
nizations that received more than three nominations were also interviewed.21
Overall, the ﬁnal tally involved interviews of 46 organizations in Senegal (7
governmental and 39 non-governmental organizations), 43 in Uganda (7 gov-
ernmental and 36 non-governmental organizations), and 46 in Ghana (6 gov-
ernmental and 40 non-governmental organizations). Non-governmental organi-
zations included international donors, national research organizations, civil so-
ciety groups, and socioeconomic interest groups, such as farmers, agribusiness,
and non-agricultural interest groups (for the complete lists of organizations,
see tables B.1 to B.3). Overall, this procedure guarantees the identiﬁcation of
the most inﬂuential organizations operating in a policy domain and provides
policy network boundaries.
The data collected during the interview included two parts: a) policy net-
works and b) policy preferences (i.e., information concerning interest and posi-
tion with respect to relevant CAADP policy issues). In part a) of the question-
naire, we collected data on reputation, political support, expert information,
social relation, and organizational membership networks. To collect reliable
networks, we designed our network questions using an established format from
previous network studies (Pappi and Henning, 1999; Henning, 2009). Inter-
viewees were asked to check the organizations on the list with which they
maintain a speciﬁc relation. To facilitate orientation, the list of organizations
was organized according to the type of organization or the branch of inter-
est represented by the respective organizations (see table B.4). Based on our
theoretical framework, political support and expert information networks are
especially relevant.
The expert information network (B) is the centerpiece of our belief for-
mation model for characterizing the policy process. We consider expert in-
formation to be any kind of information about policy impacts that an actor
can communicate to another actor (e.g., knowledge about the impact of farm
input subsidies on central policy outcomes, such as the welfare of diﬀerent so-
cial groups). To collect data on the information ﬂow in the elite network, the
interviewees were asked to check the organizations on the list of organizations
21By extending the list of relevant organizations based on the nominations of the respon-
dents, possible initial selection eﬀects are mitigated.
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with which they share information about the consequences of agricultural poli-
cies. Speciﬁcally, expert information transfers were collected from a supplier
perspective (i.e., an organization delivers information to another organiza-
tion) and a demander perspective (i.e., an organization receives information
from another organization). Therefore, we could construct a conﬁrmed expert
knowledge network, which is more reliable from a network theoretical point
of view (Pappi, König, and Knoke, 1995). A particular knowledge transfer is
considered as conﬁrmed if the supplier and demander of knowledge indepen-
dently report the transfer. The weight that an actor places on her own initial
belief (Λ) is another key input in our model. To identify an actor's own level
of control, interviewees were asked to ascertain the extent to which they use
externally provided expert information as opposed to their own expertise when
formulating policy strategies.
The other network question we consider is political support (T ). As de-
scribed in the theory section, politicians seeking reelection engage in political
exchange relations and grant political favors to interest groups to receive po-
litical support from their constituency. To collect data on speciﬁc political
support relations, we followed Pappi and Henning (1999) and considered in-
terest groups as suppliers and politicians as demanders of political support.
Hence, we could again construct a conﬁrmed political support network, see
Appendix B.1 for the detailed network questions. Moreover, empirical pol-
icy network studies reveal a large proportion of indirect exchange relations,
such as support relations among interest groups (Pappi and Henning, 1999;
Austen-Smith, 1993). Therefore, we also included indirect political exchange
relations via brokerage, as indicated in our theoretical model of political ex-
change. To determine brokerage shares (µ) empirically, we followed Henning
(2009) who showed that individual brokerage shares could be derived from ob-
served political support networks. In detail, assuming that the average num-
ber of competitors on export markets reached by an agent in relation to the
number of stakeholders using an agent as a broker determine the bargaining
power, the approach of Henning (2009) calculates the individual broker shares
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µi approximately based on the observed transfer network T via
µi = 1− 1TOTi , where
TOTi = exp
(
1∑
j
Ti,j
∑
Ti,j=1
∑
k
Tk,i∑
l
Tl,j
)
Ti,j =
1 for ti,j > 0,0 else.
(8.11)
Moreover, we directly asked politicians during the interviews to assess their
relative interest in political support supplied by interest groups in regard to
political control (Ω).
In part b) of the questionnaire, we collected data on the policy preferences of
organizations. We asked about the relative interest and the preferred position
of an organization with respect to relevant CAADP policy issues. Speciﬁcally,
we assumed a nested structure of policy preferences. At the top level, we asked
about the relative interest and preferred position regarding relevant policy
concerns. These policy concerns are relevant policy outcomes determined by
CAADP, including the welfare of small scale-farmers, poverty reduction, state
budget expenditures, and the welfare of urban consumers.22
At the second level, we considered interest and positions in speciﬁc pol-
icy programs formulated in CAADP investment plans: PINA in Senegal,
METASIP in Ghana, and DISIP in Uganda. Speciﬁcally, all national plans
include speciﬁc pillars, where each pillar comprises diﬀerent national subpro-
grams.23 For each pillar and subprogram, we collected policy positions pre-
ferred by an organization, where a policy position corresponds to the amount
of budget expenditures allocated to a speciﬁc subprogram or pillar. The ac-
tors' relative interests in diﬀerent policy concerns were measured by asking
interviewees to subdivide 100 points across concerns. Analogously, we mea-
sured the relative interest of organizations in pillars and subprograms. Since
22Overall, we considered seven policy concerns: Z1 = Welfare of small-scale farmers, Z2=
Poverty reduction, Z3= Provision of public goods, Z4= Proﬁts in agricultural export sectors,
Z5= Welfare of urban consumer households, Z6 = Proﬁts of non-agricultural sectors, Z7 =
Environmental protection.
23Pillar I is "Food security and risk management;" pillar II is "Agribusiness and market
development;" pillar III is "Sustainable land and water management;" and pillar IV is "Tech-
nology generation and dissemination/Institutional strengthening and capacity building".
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we mainly deal with inﬂuence and less with ﬁnal policy decisions in this paper,
we do not further describe CAADP policies here. However, more details on
CAADP policies are provided in Henning, Badiane, and Krampe (2018).
Based on collected network data, we are able to calculate our theoretically
derived inﬂuence measures CT and CB. However, beyond network data, the
calculation of these inﬂuence indices requires information on constitutional
decision-making power (C). To assess decision-power empirically, we applied
the concept of the Banzhaf power index to transform constitutional rules into
decision-making power (Banzhaf, 1966; Ben-Dov and Shilony, 1982; Pappi and
Henning, 1998; Napel, 2006; Henning, Badiane, and Krampe, 2018).24 In
particular, we assumed six diﬀerent constitutional scenarios for the CAADP-
reform decision.25 Applying the modiﬁed legislative bargaining model (Hen-
ning, 2008) it is possible to predict the outcome of legislative decision-making
for each constitutional scenario as long as political preferences of legislators
are known. Since we observed the CAADP-budget allocation which have been
implemented in all three countries in 2015, we were able to select the con-
stitutional scenario which gave the best prediction for empirically observed
CAADP allocations. This was the scenario assuming that the government
dominates political decision-making vis-a-vis the parliament and within the
government the Ministry of Agriculture and the President have agenda set-
ting power vis-a-vis the cabinet. However, we simulated lobbying power for all
six constitutional scenarios regarding C. Interestingly, the relative lobbying
inﬂuence of non-governmental organizations did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across
constitutional scenarios (except the power of parliamentary groups which sig-
24We are aware that the application of classical voting power indices like the Banzhaf
index as a positive model of legislative decision-making is critically discussed in the literature
Tsebelis and Garrett (1996). However, there are also interesting extensions of classical voting
power that demonstrate the potential to assess decision-making power in real-life political
systems (Ben-Dov and Shilony, 1982; Henning, Badiane, and Krampe, 2018). For example,
Henning, Badiane, and Krampe (2018) identify speciﬁc conditions under which the Banzhaf
index corresponds to the voting power derived from a modiﬁed non-cooperative legislative
bargaining game of a Baron-Ferejohn type.
25A ﬁrst set of 3 scenarios assumes CAADP investment plans are decided by the gov-
ernment alone, while the parliament is not engaged in this decision. For a second set of
constitutional scenarios, CAADP investment plans are considered as a legislative decision
made by the parliament alone.
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niﬁcantly increased assuming political decisions are made by the parliament).
In the following we present simulated inﬂuence measures derived for the best-ﬁt
constitutional scenario deﬁned above.26
8.3.4 Network statistics used in the ERGM estimation
The ERGM framework can test our hypotheses on the determinants of polit-
ical support relations and expert information exchange among governmental
and non-governmental organizations in Ghana, Senegal, and Uganda. Accord-
ingly, we used conﬁrmed expert information exchange (B) and political sup-
port (T ) network ties as dependent variables. Furthermore, we used endoge-
nous network eﬀects as well as speciﬁc exogenous nodal and dyadic attributes
as explanatory variables. In detail, we calculated various network statistics
corresponding to the hypothesized mechanisms of endogenous tie formation.
Table B.5 gives an overview of the network statistics used as model terms.
This explains the internal self-organizing structure of the dependent network
variable.
The total number of edges (EDGES ) can be used to model the general
propensity of tie formation and corresponds to the unconditional probability
of tie formation.27 The number of reciprocal edges (MUTUAL) represents the
tendency to answer received ties. This term adds one network statistic to the
model and is equal to the number of pairs of actors i and j for which both
ties exist (yij = yji = 1 ). The eﬀects of triadic transitivity are modeled
using the geometrically weighted edgewise shared partner statistic (GWESP)
and the geometrically weighted dyad wise shared partner statistic (GWDSP).
GWESP measures a speciﬁc mechanism to count the number of triangles in
the network while taking into account the number of links that are involved
in multiple triangles (multimodality) (for details, see Hunter et al. (2008)). It
thereby captures how frequently two nodes are connected by a direct link as
well as by an indirect connection of length 2 (i.e., two-path) through another
node (e.g., Hunter (2007)). If a positive coeﬃcient is found for this statistic,
there is a tendency towards triadic closure in the network. GWDSP is an
26Results for all constitutional scenarios are available upon request from the authors.
27Technically, the term EDGES adds one network statistic that is equal to the number of
edges in the network.
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advanced version of the alternating k-two-path statistic put forward by Sni-
jders, Steglich, and Schweinberger (2006). It measures the extent to which a
network shows a tendency of nodes being directly linked or not directly linked
to each other while being at least indirectly linked. In other words, GWDSP
captures multi-connectivity for nodes. This approach has been shown to work
well in practice in overcoming model degeneracy and producing models that ﬁt
a wide range of data well (Hunter, Goodreau, and Handcock, 2008; Goodreau,
2007).28 If one includes both GWESP and GWDSP , then GWDSP is the
base eﬀect, which now isolates the eﬀect for those not tied only, while GWESP
occurs on top of this base and isolates the eﬀect for those who are tied. For
GWESP , a strong positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect is often observed, while for
GWDSP , an insigniﬁcant and weak eﬀect has often been found (Goodreau,
2007). Alternatively, Lee, Lee, and Feiock (2012) found a positive GWESP
and a negative GWDSP parameter, which they interpreted as a propensity
to avoid structural holes like four-cycles. Analogously, Leifeld and Schneider
(2012) also found a signiﬁcantly positive parameter for GWESP and a signif-
icantly negative parameter for GWDSP , which they interpreted as structural
28The two shared partner statistics, GWESP and GWDSP , use a geometrical series to
weight the importance of additional common neighbors; i.e.,
GWESP = eαv
n−2∑
h=1
(
1− (1− e−αv)h)EP (h), and GWDSP = eαw n−2∑
h=1
(
1− (1− e−αw)h)DP (h),
where EP (h) is the number of directed edges that are the basis for h transitive triads, and
DP (h) is the count of pairs of nodes i, j that are connected by h two paths. Unlike EP (h),
i, j do not have to be connected directly. Therefore, EP (h) is nested in DP (h). αv and
αw are tuning parameters that have to be exogenously ﬁxed prior to estimation. For our
analysis, both parameters have been ﬁxed at relatively low baseline values of αv = αw =
0.1. For further discussion of the parameterization of these multiple network statistics, see
Snijders et al. (2006); Hunter and Handcock (2006); Hunter (2007); Robins, Lewis, and Wang
(2012). Interpreting GWESP and GWDSP in terms of underlying social behavior, scholars
studying friendship or collaboration networks generally refer to the classical process of triad
closure ﬁrst suggested by Rapoport (1957). This process explains that triads containing two
ties will tend to form a third, thus creating a triangle (a set of three people who are all tied).
This may be due to propinquity (two people encounter each other through their shared time
with a third) or cognitive processes that causes two people to value each other because of
their agreement about a third (cf. structural balance theory: Cartwright and Harary (1956);
Heider (1958)).
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determinants of transaction costs.
Following our theoretical considerations, three diﬀerent categories of de-
terminants of policy network ties exist: factors determining actors' beneﬁts
derived from an established tie; the cost of establishing and maintaining a
tie; and transaction costs of political interaction. Accordingly, in our speciﬁc
context, we follow Lee, Lee, and Feiock (2012); Leifeld and Schneider (2012)
and consider the endogenous network statistics as determinants of dyadic spe-
ciﬁc transaction costs involved with political support or expert information
exchange. Furthermore, the statistics EDGES and MUTUAL can also be in-
terpreted as indicators of the costs of establishing and maintaining network
ties. Additionally, while established network ties can also be used to engage
in new political interactions, we include the support and the expert networks
as explanatory variables for each other. The expert structural model includes
the support network as an explanatory edge attribute (SUPPORT ), and vice
versa. The support structural model includes the expert information network
as an explanatory edge attribute (EXPERT ).29
Beyond network statistics, we include the following exogenous covariates as
nodal and edge-speciﬁc attribute eﬀects into the estimate. To assess the costs
of establishing and maintaining network ties, we use the number of overlap-
ping memberships in umbrella organizations or political committees with other
organizations as an indicator of meeting opportunities (Leifeld and Schneider,
2012; Lubell, Henry, and McCoy, 2010; Ansell and Gash, 2008; König and
Bräuninger, 1998). The corresponding edge-speciﬁc network statistic (MEM-
BER) is equal to the sum of overlapping memberships for all edges in the
network. Furthermore, as discussed in the theoretical section, we include per-
ceived power and political knowledge of ALTER as indicators for the beneﬁt
EGO expects from a tie with ALTER. It is not straightforward to measure
political decision-making power, and we use the collected reputation network
data to identify an organization's perceived political power. We calculated the
normalized indegrees of the reputation network as an informal power measure
29Technically, the term EXPERT (SUPPORT ) adds a single network statistic to the
ERGM speciﬁcation of the support network (the ERGM model of the expert information
network), which is equal to the sum of conﬁrmed expert information ties (the sum of con-
ﬁrmed political support ties) that exist for all edges in the support network (the expert
information network).
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of an organization. Accordingly, we added a nodal speciﬁc network statistic
(POWER) to the ERGM, which is equal to the sum of reputation power of all
organizations that receive a tie in the network. Furthermore, we included a
nodal attribute eﬀect (EXEC ) representing ties where the target is a govern-
mental organization to check whether tie formation is driven by formal political
power. The latter term counts the number of edges in the network for which
a governmental organization is the receiver of a tie.
As explained in the theory section, the beneﬁt from received information is
driven by the political knowledge of the sender. The beneﬁt of received politi-
cal support ties is that, c.p., more of it results in a larger capacity to mobilize
voters of an organization. It is impossible to observe political knowledge or
the capacity to mobilize voters directly, so we use organizational dummy vari-
ables as proxies for these variables. Hence, we include two additional nodal
attribute eﬀects (RESEARCH ) and (DONOR), which represent ties where
the sending node is a research organization or a donor organization. Again,
the corresponding network statistics are equal to the sum of edges in the net-
work for which the sending node is a research or a donor organization. In
particular, we expect organizations to demand expert information primarily
from scientiﬁc organizations because they are technically knowledgeable. We
further expect politicians to demand political support from donors because
these organizations often control international development funds granted to
national governments. For example, in selected African states, 40% of total
CAADP expenditures comprises donor funds (Gibbon, Bangura, and Ofstad,
1992; Mogues and Benin, 2012).
Finally, we include diﬀerent measures of political homophily (i.e., similarity
of policy preference) as indicators of dyadic speciﬁc transaction costs. Policy
preferences include the actors' political interests and positions in various policy
issues nested in three levels. For the ﬁrst homophily measure, we use top-
level preferences regarding policy concerns. In particular, we constructed a
dissimilarity matrix by calculating for each pair of organizations i and j the
political distance index
DIij =
√√√√ K∑
k=1
(dik − djk)2,
where dik denotes the interest of individual i in policy concern k. The dis-
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similarity measure was converted into a dyad speciﬁc similarity index (PREF-
SIM ) via (maxi,j{DIij} −DIij). We calculated an analogous homophily index
(POLSIM ) for collected policy positions regarding organizations' preferred
budget allocations across CAADP sub-programs. Thus, the index POLSIM
measures the similarity of organizations' preferred positions regarding detailed
CAADP-implementations, while the index PREFSIM measures the similarity
of the organizations' fundamental ideological positions.
Young democracies are often characterized by weakly developed interest me-
diation structures. That is, governmental organizations grant only slight access
to interest groups representing the political interest of the society. Thus, we
introduced a dyad-speciﬁc binary variable (IG) to check whether governance
structures are especially focused on coalition building among interest groups.
This variable could be interpreted as empirical evidence that political conﬂicts
between society and the governing elite are still more important than politi-
cal conﬂict lines running between diﬀerent social groups, such as labor versus
capital. The corresponding advocacy coalitions comprise both opposing social
groups and their political leaders. The term IG adds one network statistic
that counts the edges in the networks where both vertices are socio-economic
interest groups.
Overall, we estimated three model speciﬁcations for each dependent vari-
able: an endogenous model containing only endogenous network eﬀects and
two structural models containing the same endogenous eﬀects plus speciﬁc
exogenous nodal and dyadic attributes as a control. In particular, we esti-
mated a model speciﬁcation including endogenous network eﬀects and addi-
tional covariates, where POWER and EXEC are used for receiver eﬀects,
while RESEARCH and DONOR are used for sender eﬀects, and IG is used
as a pure homophily eﬀect, as explained above. However, to identify our ex-
pected sender, receiver, and homophily eﬀects correctly, it is important to
control for all possible eﬀects of corresponding nodal and dyadic attributes.
Therefore, for both endogenous network variables, we estimated a third model
including the full set of sender and receiver terms (see tables B.6 to B.8).30
As data are surveyed via personal interviews, missing information inevitably
occurs in some variables. Therefore, inferences on the importance of covariates
30We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this enriched speciﬁcation.
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or structural parameters can be biased due to missing information (Cranmer
and Desmarais, 2011; Snijders et al., 2006). Appendix B.5 provides details on
how missing information has been addressed via robustness checks within the
empirical analysis.
8.4 Results
8.4.1 ERGM parameter estimates
Tables B.6 to B.8 show the estimation results with respect to the speciﬁed
ERGM models for all countries and speciﬁcations. Models 1-3 take the con-
ﬁrmed information expert exchange network as the dependent variable, while
models 4-6 take the conﬁrmed political support networks as the dependent
variable. Models 1 and 4 include only the endogenous structural network vari-
ables as explanatory variables, while models 2-3 and 5-6 consider additional
covariates. However, controlling for exogenous covariates does not alter the
level of signiﬁcance and the parameter signs of the endogenous statistics.31
The model that best ﬁt our data was determined by using likelihood-based
measures: log-likelihood, Akaike information, and Bayesian information crite-
ria, which are reported in tables B.6 to B.8. The results reveal that for all
three countries, the full model speciﬁcations with exogenous variables ﬁt best:
speciﬁcations 2 and 5 or 3 and 6. We will report results on speciﬁcations 3
and 6 and indicate diﬀerences to the other speciﬁcations when necessary. How-
ever, these criteria may reveal only a little about the speciﬁc features of the
data captured or not captured by the model speciﬁcations. Therefore, addi-
tional goodness-of-ﬁt approaches have been developed (for example, see Hunter
et al. (2008); Goodreau, Kitts, and Morris (2009)). In appendix B.4, we dis-
cuss details about these goodness-of-ﬁt criteria indicating suﬃcient match of
the model speciﬁcations to observed data and the potential limitations of the
ERGM approach.
As shown in tables B.6 to B.8, all three countries have political interac-
tions that are signiﬁcantly embedded in endogenous network structures; i.e.,
31Only models 5 and 6 in Ghana show an insigniﬁcant parameter for the GWESP statistic,
indicating that clustering is explained by exogenous covariates.
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all relational attribute eﬀects are signiﬁcant in all models for all countries.
Hence, interpreting MUTUAL, GWESP, GWDSP, EXPERT, and SUPPORT
as indicators of social embeddedness that allow actors to punish deviating
political exchange partners implies that ERGM estimates clearly reveal the
important eﬀect of transaction costs on tie formation in policy networks in
all three countries. When organizations choose potential interaction partners,
they consider not only the potential beneﬁt they derive from an established po-
litical exchange, but also the risk that exchange partners will break their trade
promises. In particular, MUTUAL is signiﬁcant and positive for all models
in all three countries. In all three countries, the GWESP statistic is posi-
tive, and the GWDSP statistic is negative for both networks. Moreover, both
statistics are signiﬁcant for all model speciﬁcations in Senegal and Uganda and
for most speciﬁcations in Ghana, where GWDSP is insigniﬁcant for model 3
and GWESP is insigniﬁcant for models 5 and 6. This empirical result corre-
sponds to the literature in that political organizations rely on others to reduce
transaction costs when ﬁnding trustworthy sources of information or political
support (Baumgartner and Leech, 1996; Pappi and Henning, 1998; Carpen-
ter, Esterling, and Lazer, 2004; Henry, Lubell, and McCoy, 2011; Henning,
Henningsen, and Henningsen, 2012; Leifeld and Schneider, 2012).
Moreover, social embeddedness via multiplexity appears to be important
for political exchange interactions; if two organizations already engage in one
of the two political interactions captured by EXPERT and SUPPORT, they
are also signiﬁcantly more likely to engage in the other interactions. How-
ever, reciprocity as well as multiplexity might also be interpreted as relational
opportunity structures; i.e., they potentially reduce the cost of establishing
and maintaining ties. Nevertheless, beyond endogenous self-governance, our
estimation also included institutional opportunity structures via overlapping
committee memberships captured by MEMBER. Since this has a signiﬁcant
impact on only the establishment of ties for the information network in Ghana,
we conclude that reciprocity and multiplexity mainly work as structural fac-
tors that reduce transaction costs related to opportunistic behavior and less
as relational opportunity structures that decrease the costs of establishing and
maintaining network ties, at least in regard to the emergence of policy networks
analyzed in this study.
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When testing for preference homophily eﬀects, both edge-speciﬁc covariates
PREFSIM and POLSIM were found to be insigniﬁcant in all models for all
countries. Accordingly, we conclude that policy preferences are not important
drivers of policy network tie formation in development politics, at least for our
selected African states. This contrasts with the result of many policy network
studies that examine developed democracies, such as (Carpenter, Esterling,
and Lazer, 2004; Henry, Lubell, and McCoy, 2011; Weible, 2005; Zafonte and
Sabatier, 1998; Stokman and Berveling, 1998; Stokman and Zeggelink, 1996).
This implies that the transaction costs of lobbying seem to be less driven
by stakeholders' incentive to behave opportunistic. Moreover, these results
provide empirical evidence against the counteractive lobbying hypothesis for-
mulated by Austen-Smith (1993).
Interest group homophily IG is signiﬁcant and positive for models 5 and 6 in
Uganda, model 2 and 3 in Senegal as well as models 3 and 6 in Ghana. Hence,
for all three states we found some empirical evidence that socio-economic in-
terest groups tend to form coalitions among themselves to counterbalance the
transgressions of the ruling governmental elite. For Senegal we found IG-
homophily only for informational lobbying and for Uganda only for vote-buying
lobbying, while for Ghana we found this for both lobbying mechanisms, but
only in models 3 and 6.
Following our hypothesis, perceived power is an important covariate that
determines political interaction among stakeholders. In particular, perceived
power of the receiver node (POWER (indegree)) is positive and signiﬁcant
in determining political support relations for both models 5 and 6 in all
three countries, while for information exchange, perceived power of the sender
(POWER (outdegree)) is positive and signiﬁcant for all countries. Interest-
ingly, (POWER (outdegree)) is only signiﬁcant and positive for the support
network in Uganda, while (POWER (indegree)) is positively signiﬁcant in de-
termining information exchange for models 2 and 3 in Senegal as well as for
model 2 in Uganda, but not in Ghana.
Further, we applied our statistical model to test whether donor organiza-
tions are prominent suppliers of political support, and whether research orga-
nizations are especially important providers of expert information. Tables B.6
to B.8 show the corresponding nodal attribute eﬀect for research and donor or-
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ganizations. For RESEARCH (outdegree), this value is always signiﬁcant and
positive in both models 2 and 3, which implies strong evidence that research
organizations are consulted more frequently than others during expert informa-
tion exchange in all three countries. In contrast, for models 5 and 6, the eﬀect
of RESEARCH (outdegree) is never positive and signiﬁcant, which implies that
research organizations are not important suppliers of political support. These
results conﬁrm our hypothesis for expert information exchange and indicate
that the CAADP process has been successful in regard to the promotion of
evidence-based policy, at least in these countries.
Regarding donor organizations, we found less empirical evidence for our
theoretical hypothesis that political support is driven by donor money. In de-
tail, DONOR (outdegree) only has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on support
relations in Ghana, while it is not signiﬁcant in Senegal and even negative and
signiﬁcant in Uganda. Being a donor organization also seems not to increase
the probability of supplying expert information to other organizations, as in-
dicated by the insigniﬁcant or even signiﬁcantly negative ERGM parameters
for DONOR (outdegree) found for models 2 and 3. Interestingly, we found
statistically signiﬁcant receiver eﬀects for donors; i.e., DONOR (indegree) is
signiﬁcant for political support in all three countries (model 6), as well as for
information exchange in Senegal (model 3). In Senegal and Uganda signiﬁcant
positive receiver eﬀects for political support are observed. Hence, donor orga-
nizations appear to be structurally equivalent to powerful governmental agents
being targeted by vote-buying activities of other stakeholders. However, we
found a negative receiver eﬀect in Ghana. Analogously, the receiver eﬀect for
information exchange is also signiﬁcantly negative in Senegal. Thus, overall,
we obtained mixed results indicating that the role of donors in participatory
policy processes might be more complex and heterogeneous across countries
than assumed in our theoretical considerations. However, one should not jump
to general conclusions too quickly in regard to the overall role or inﬂuence of
speciﬁc organizations. First of all, the reported parameters correspond to par-
tial eﬀects of speciﬁc network statistics, but the probability that a speciﬁc
organization will form a tie depends on all network statistics. For example,
donors received above-average reputation indegrees as they are generally per-
ceived as highly inﬂuential organizations. Accordingly, the probability that
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organizations form information or support relations with donor organizations
can still be high, despite the insigniﬁcant or even negative parameter esti-
mates for the nodal speciﬁc statistics related to the organizational type donor.
Therefore, in the next subsection, we analyze the political inﬂuence derived
from our model estimations in more detail.
Before we come to this, it is interesting to analyze the importance of iden-
tiﬁed eﬀects in quantitative terms as well. In this regard, we apply the con-
ditional average marginal eﬀects, see eq. (8.10) and footnote (20). Table B.9
provides the corresponding results.32 As shown in table B.9, in quantitative
terms, the ERGM estimation results clearly reveal a high importance of rela-
tional factors for the tie formation in policy networks in all three countries. In
particular, reciprocity is the most dominant eﬀect given the highest marginal
eﬀects for MUTUAL for all model speciﬁcations (see table B.9).33 In absolute
terms, average marginal eﬀects amount to roughly 0.3 for all countries and
models. This implies the probability that expert information or political sup-
port ﬂows from EGO to ALTER will increase by roughly 30 percentage points
if the change in this network statistic marginally increases (see table B.9).
Beyond reciprocity, multiplexity is another important relational factor for all
three countries. In quantitative terms, the probability that an organization
will engage in expert information exchange with another organization increases
marginally by 8.1 up to 14.1 percentage points if these organizations already
have an established political support relation, and vice versa: the probability
of political support increases marginally by 9.3 up to 13.2 percentage points if
organizations already have an established information exchange relation. This
social embeddedness eﬀect is relatively homogenous across all countries. For
GWESP and GWDSP, the estimated average marginal eﬀects are lower when
compared to MUTUAL. There were signiﬁcant average marginal eﬀects rang-
ing from 4.8 to 14.2 percentage points for GWESP and from −0.6 to −1.2
percentage points for GWDSP.
In contrast to relational factors, average marginal impacts of covariates
were found to be lower or insigniﬁcant. The only exemptions are found for
32Conditional average marginal eﬀects have been calculated for the best-ﬁt model speci-
ﬁcations 3 and 6, as described above.
33An exception results from model 5 in Uganda, where a higher marginal eﬀect occurs for
the nodal attribute POWER (outdegree)
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the covariates POWER and RESEARCH. Especially high marginal eﬀects
of POWER (indegree) are found for the political support network, with val-
ues amounting to 26.8 percentage points in Ghana, 19.7 percentage points in
Uganda, and 9.1 percentage points in Senegal. In contrast, average marginal
eﬀects of POWER (indegree) are negative and insigniﬁcant for the information
networks except for Senegal where a positive and signiﬁcant average marginal
eﬀect of 16.2 percentage points was found. Moreover, we also found high av-
erage marginal eﬀects of POWER (outdegree) with regard to the information
network, amounting to 20.7 percentage points in Ghana, 13.7 percentage points
in Senegal, and as much as 44.9 percentage points in Uganda. Thus, perceived
power of the sender signiﬁcantly increases the probability of information sup-
ply in all three countries. Analogously, estimated ERGM parameters imply
relatively strong average marginal eﬀects of RESEARCH (outdegree) for po-
litical information supply, which range from 12.1 percentage points in Ghana
to over 20 percentage points in Senegal and Uganda. Furthermore, research
organizations are less likely to be receivers of expert information given average
marginal eﬀects of RESEARCH (indegree) for political information demand,
amounting to −11.1 percentage points in Ghana, −10.0 percentage points in
Senegal, and as much as −29.4 percentage points in Uganda.
In contrast, estimated average marginal eﬀects of (DONOR) as well as
private interest groups (IG) are rather low and negative and often not sig-
niﬁcant for all network relations and for all countries. Only for the sup-
port network in Ghana, the average marginal eﬀect of the nodal attribute
(DONOR(outdegree)) is positive and signiﬁcant, amounting to 9.6 percentage
points. However, we found signiﬁcant marginal impacts of interest group ho-
mophily in all three countries, which range from 3.7 to 7.2 percentage points
in Ghana for the expert and support networks, respectively. In Senegal, sig-
niﬁcant interest group homophily was only found for expert networks with
an average marginal eﬀect amounting to 6.3 percentage points, as well as in
Uganda for the support network with an average marginal impact of 7.3 per-
centage points.
Overall, the results of ERGM estimates can be summarized as follows. First,
tie formation in participatory policy networks within the CAADP setup is
strongly determined by transaction costs resulting from the risk of opportunis-
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tic behavior. The latter is mainly driven by structure-based potentials to
punish deviating stakeholders, while stakeholders' incentives to deviate from
established commitments seem to be less important determinants of transac-
tion costs. In contrast, costs to establish or maintain network ties appear to
have only a minor impact on tie formation. We consider this to be a remarkable
result for the following reason. In contrast to relational factors, institutional
opportunity structures can be systematically controlled. For example, within
the CAADP process committee, the membership of speciﬁc farm and CSOs
has been promoted. Hence, at least technically, these would be promising
access points for a successful strategy to design more eﬀective participatory
structures.
Beyond transaction costs, our ERGM estimation results also emphasize the
importance of expected beneﬁts from lobbying activities as driving forces of
policy network formation. Stakeholders direct their lobbying activities to-
wards other stakeholders that they perceive as political powerful. This applies
to vote-buying lobbying in all three countries but also to informational lob-
bying activities, which were given highly signiﬁcant positive receiver eﬀects
in two of the three countries analyzed. As expected, lobbying interactions
seem to be less determined by constitutional power structures, as legislative
decision-making is driven by informal legislative norms, especially in young
democracies, where the rule of law is often only weakly developed. More-
over, this result also emphasizes that stakeholders take vote-buying lobbying
into account when assessing the political power of other stakeholders. Our
ERGM estimation results imply the following results in regard to the impact
of speciﬁc organizational characteristics on the emergence of policy network
ties. The technical knowledge of organizations turns out to be an important
determinant of information exchange ties, with signiﬁcant and positive sender
eﬀects arising for research organizations for the information networks in all
three countries. In contrast, ERGM estimation delivers only mixed results in
regard to the importance of donor money as a driver of vote-buying lobbying.
Accordingly, to obtain a more global picture, we next explicitly analyze
individual vote-buying and the informational lobbying power of stakeholders.
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8.4.2 Assessing political inﬂuence measures
Using the posterior sample of ERGM parameters, we simulated a sample of
10,000 networks for each country using model speciﬁcations 3 and 6.34 The
exogenous variables are thereby sampled from the observed distributions. We
calculated the individual inﬂuence measures for each simulated network. Ac-
cordingly, for each of the three countries, we generated a sample of 10,000
inﬂuence vectors, which includes our theoretically derived inﬂuence measures
CT and CB for all individual organizations of the identiﬁed political elite net-
works. In particular, we calculated lobbying power CB, including vote-buying
lobbying; i.e., CT is equal to the vector derived from eq. (8.3). Given our
sampling procedure, the corresponding sample means can be interpreted as
the estimated empirical inﬂuence of individual organizations derived from the
observed network and corresponding uncertainty measures; for example, the
highest density intervals and variances can be calculated.
To better identify the overall inﬂuence patterns in the selected countries, we
calculated aggregated political inﬂuence measures for speciﬁc types of organi-
zations: government(EXEC ), public agencies (PUBAG), international donors
(DONOR), research (RESEARCH ), and society organizations. The latter is
further subdivided into CSOs (CSO)as well as farm (IG:FARM ) and non-farm
industrial business associations (IG:IND).35 In ﬁg. B.1, the aggregated politi-
cal inﬂuence of these diﬀerent types of organizations and their corresponding
95% highest density intervals are presented for the simulated political support
exchange networks and the expert information exchange networks.
In analyzing empirical power, structures we undertake separate analyses
for the two lobbying mechanisms (vote-buying (CT ) and informational lobby-
ing (CB)). Furthermore, for each mechanism, we focus on two aspects of the
distribution of the CT and CB across stakeholders. The ﬁrst is total power
outﬂow from governmental organizations that collectively exert total constitu-
tional power. The second is the relative distribution of power outﬂows across
stakeholder groups. Given the central empirical questions in regard to partici-
34Again, the sampler of Hunter et al. (2008) is used as described above.
35Originally, we also included two additional organizational categories: political parties
and international NGOs. However, to facilitate the interpretation, we excluded political
parties and international NGOs in ﬁg. B.1, which have negligible inﬂuence in all countries.
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patory structures in development politics, we are particularly interested in the
extent to which power outﬂows are dominated by donors or public agencies
or whether they are mainly directed towards society organizations represent-
ing the poor; i.e., small-scale farm organization and CSOs or the urban rich
(urban non-farm interests). Moreover, we test whether power structures re-
ﬂect evidence-based policy processes in terms of the extent to which research
organizations exert informational lobbying power.
As shown in ﬁg. B.1, total aggregated power outﬂows resulting from vote-
buying lobbying range from 38% in Senegal to 54% in Uganda, whereas the
lobbying inﬂuence of stakeholders takes the middle ground in Ghana at 45%.
Compared to vote-buying power, outﬂows resulting from informational lobby-
ing are higher, with outﬂows around 70% for Uganda, 58% for Ghana, and 52%
for Senegal. These overall power outﬂows are basically comparable to partic-
ipation structures observed in developed democratic countries. For example,
based on a policy network, analyses of the European Common Agricultural Pol-
icy (EU CAP) Pappi and Henning (1999) found an aggregate political power
outﬂow from governmental to non-governmental organizations amounting to
52% via vote-buying lobbying and 58% via informational lobbying.36 How-
ever, informational power outﬂows are higher in Uganda, indicating rather low
political knowledge capacities of the Ugandan government.
Regarding the distribution of power outﬂows across diﬀerent types of organi-
zations, we identify the following similar patterns for both lobby mechanisms
and across all three countries. In all three countries, non-governmental or-
ganizations can be subdivided into three blocks. The ﬁrst block represents
highly inﬂuential organizations comprising donor and research organizations.
The second is a low-inﬂuence block comprising CSO and farmer organizations,
while public agencies and industrial interest groups take the middle ground
between these blocks. These patterns partly contrast with non-governmental
inﬂuence in the European CAP.
First, the high political inﬂuence of international donor organizations is spe-
ciﬁc for African development politics. The aggregated vote-buying lobbying
36Note that Pappi and Henning (1999) did not calculate combined power outﬂows resulting
from both lobbying mechanisms; power outﬂows were calculated separately for each lobbying
mechanism.
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power (CT ) of donors ranges from 13.1% in Ghana to only 8.7% in Uganda. In
Ghana and Uganda, we found the highest aggregated informational lobbying
power for donors with over 15.1% and 11.2%, respectively, while in Senegal,
donors are only ranked second to research organizations in terms of informa-
tional lobbying power, amounting to 10.9% of total informational lobbying
power (see ﬁg. B.1). Hence, our results provide empirical support for the crit-
icism of donor dominance in development politics, especially in Ghana and
Senegal. In particular, donor organizations exert strong lobbying inﬂuence on
the government via vote-buying in that the granting of international funds
is often conditional to a speciﬁc domestic policy output (Mogues and Benin,
2012; Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp, 2013). Moreover, donors often invest
ﬁnancial resources to establish domestic stakeholder organizations and hence
exert indirect vote-buying lobbying inﬂuence by determining the agenda of do-
mestic stakeholders (Ohanyan, 2009). Furthermore, donor organizations also
exert high informational lobbying power in development politics since they are
often prominent members of advisor committees to the government. Further-
more, non-governmental stakeholders can depend on the advice of donors due
to a lack of their own knowledge capacities.
Second, research organizations exert signiﬁcant informational lobbying power
in the three African countries (see ﬁg. B.1). In contrast, research organiza-
tions are barely identiﬁed as inﬂuential in informational lobbying in devel-
oped democracies (Henning, 2009). We interpret this as an indicator that
African states have successfully implemented evidenced-based politics within
the CAADP framework. The aggregated informational lobbying inﬂuence of
research organizations was over 17% in Senegal, almost 12% in Ghana, and
only 6.7% in Uganda. Interestingly, we also found high aggregated vote-buying
lobbying power for research organizations amounting to roughly 9% in both
Ghana and Senegal, but only about 6% in Uganda (see ﬁg. B.1, upper panel).
Thirdly, society organizations such as CSOs and farmers organizations rep-
resenting marginalized groups, especially the rural poor, exert rather little
lobbying power in all three countries. This applies to both lobbying mecha-
nisms. As shown in ﬁg. B.1, aggregated vote-buying lobbying power for CSOs
and farm interest groups is below 10% in all three countries. The same results
occurred for informational lobbying in Ghana and Senegal, while in Uganda,
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farm interest groups exert some informational lobbying power with 11%. Com-
paring these rather low levels of lobbying inﬂuence found at the aggregate level
for both farm organizations and CSOs to the corresponding population shares
of poor and farm households clearly contradict the CAADP manifesto. Inter-
estingly, in all three countries, the aggregated lobbying power of private interest
groups is dominated by non-farm industrial business associations. This basi-
cally applies to both vote-buying and informational lobbying. In quantitative
terms, the lobbying inﬂuence of non-farm interest groups is more than double
that of farm interests (see ﬁg. B.1). This dominance of non-farm interest over
farm interest sharply contrasts with the absolute dominance of farm interests
in the agricultural policy domain of industrialized countries.37
Beyond donors and research, public agencies are also important lobbyists
outside society organizations. Especially in Uganda, public agencies exert
signiﬁcant informational lobbying power at over 14% of the total power. In
Ghana and Senegal as well, public agencies hold 6.5% and 5.4% of the total
informational lobbying power (see ﬁg. B.1 (lower panel)). Furthermore, public
agencies are also strong vote-buying lobbyists in Uganda, where they hold 6.5%
of total vote-buying lobbying power. As the calculated 95% highest density
intervals in ﬁg. B.1 do not overlap for most of the power indices, strong evidence
for diﬀerences across the diﬀerent organizational categories is implied. We
consider the possibility to drawing statistical inferences about derived power
structures as an advantage of our suggested approach. 38
Beyond aggregate inﬂuence patterns, it is also interesting to analyze the po-
litical inﬂuence of individual non-governmental organizations. In ﬁg. B.2, we
report the relative political inﬂuence measures of individual non-governmental
organizations, which were calculated as the relation of the estimated individ-
37Note that the farm lobby exerts over 40% of total political power in the EU CAP
(Pappi and Henning, 1999). However, these contrasting patterns between African developing
countries and developed EU countries can be well explained by standard lobbying theory,
particularly the development paradox (Anderson and Hayami, 1986; Krueger, 1992). The
negligible lobbying inﬂuence of CSOs, however, is a pattern that is analogously observed in
many developed countries (Henning, 2009).
38However, given the fact that we have only one observation for each policy network in
each country and only three countries, we are aware of the fact that conducting our analyses
based on dynamic network data for many countries would certainly further increase the
robustness of derived results.
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ual inﬂuence indices of an organization and the corresponding mean inﬂuence
across all identiﬁed non-governmental organizations in a country. Accordingly,
values above one indicate inﬂuence above the average inﬂuence of all non-
governmental stakeholders in the network, and lower values indicate below-
average inﬂuence. As shown in ﬁg. B.2, compared to aggregate inﬂuence, a
higher variance of political inﬂuence can be observed at the individual orga-
nizational level. In particular, while we found clear diﬀerences in the mean
inﬂuence between individual organizations, we also observed large and over-
lapping 95% density intervals in all three countries. We tested whether the
95% highest density interval of estimated relative inﬂuence measures includes
the value of one, where we interpret an interval excluding this value as strong
evidence for high or low relative inﬂuence. Thus, as shown in ﬁg. B.2, applying
this test reveals that only very few individual organizations can be considered
as highly inﬂuential or non-inﬂuential in the three countries. Namely, the out-
standing vote-buying lobbyists are the World Bank and FAO in Ghana, while
we ﬁnd no evidence for outstanding vote-buying inﬂuence for any other indi-
vidual organization in any of the countries. Interestingly, we also ﬁnd only
very few individual organizations that we can strongly conclude to have no
vote-buying lobbying inﬂuence. Speciﬁcally, the calculated 95% high density
intervals lie completely below one only for the parliamentary groups.
Analogously, for informational lobbying, we ﬁnd also only a few organiza-
tions being outstanding inﬂuential or non-inﬂuential. In particular, the main
national research organizations ISRA as well as ITA in Senegal and ISSER
in Ghana can be considered as outstanding inﬂuential political experts, given
that their 95% high density intervals are completely above one. Moreover,
according to this criterion, the international donor and research organizations
USAID and IFPRI, respectively, have been found to be a highly inﬂuential
group of political experts in both countries, along with the World Bank in
Senegal and with FAO in Ghana. As for vote-buying lobbying inﬂuence we
also ﬁnd only very few individual organizations that we can strongly conclude
to have no informational lobbying inﬂuence in Ghana as well as in Senegal.
Again, for the parliamentary groups the calculated 95% high density intervals
lie completely below one. In contrast to Ghana and Senegal, neither individual
donor nor research organizations are found to exert outstanding high informa-
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tional lobbying inﬂuence in Uganda. Only the public agency NARO, as well
as the ﬁsh processing industry UFPEA and manufacture industry UMA , and
interestingly, the farmer interest groups NOGAMU and UCA are found to
exert outstanding high inﬂuence in Uganda. These results imply that based
on empirical network data, we still can draw only very limited conclusions in
regard to the political inﬂuence of individual organizations. In contrast, at
least at the aggregate level, it is possible to draw signiﬁcant conclusions in
regard to the political inﬂuence of speciﬁc types of stakeholders. However, it
is still fair to conclude that empirical network analyses of participatory policy
processes are in their infancy.
Overall, we can conclude from our analyses that many of the criticisms of
participatory policy processes in developing countries also apply to stakeholder
participation induced under CAADP. In particular, participation is dominated
by donors in Ghana and Senegal and by non-farm interests and public agencies
in Uganda, while in all countries, marginalized groups are still not strongly in-
volved in the political decision-making processes. However, at least in Senegal
and Ghana, we found clear and positive empirical support for the promotion
of evidence-based policy processes under CAADP in that research organiza-
tions exert high informational lobbying inﬂuence. In contrast, in Uganda, old
patronage networks that have been characteristic for many autocratic African
states of the old days (Gibbon, Bangura, and Ofstad, 1992) are still prevail-
ing. For example, the government is captured by particular economic non-farm
interests and is mainly advised by subordinated state agencies.
Furthermore, it is fair to conclude that we cannot yet explain all identi-
ﬁed structural diﬀerences in detail, especially in regard to the inﬂuence of
individual organizations. Nevertheless, we are conﬁdent that the robust dif-
ferences we identiﬁed are not just artefacts due to limitations of the data, the
ERGM estimation, or both. This conﬁdence results from the fact that ad-
vanced goodness-of-ﬁt statistics clearly reveal that the estimated ERG model
can reproduce observed policy network relations. Accordingly, the described
inﬂuence patterns are rather robust, at least at the aggregate level, given the
calculated 95% density intervals (see ﬁg. B.1). A very interesting endeavor
for further research would be explaining the identiﬁed structural diﬀerences
among countries, especially the reason for speciﬁc organizations exerting high
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political inﬂuence in some but not in all countries. We consider our approach
as a promising starting point in this regard.
Moreover, we have to admit that presented inﬂuence measure are crucially
based on both our theoretical framework and our empirical strategy to mea-
sure constitutional power. While we provide robustness checks regarding our
empirical network data we did not provide any test or robustness checks for our
theoretical assumptions and measurement of constitutional power. However,
ﬁrst we argue that any empirical measurement of political inﬂuence depends
on an explicit theory/model of political decision-making. Accordingly, the
only robust test of derived inﬂuence measures would be the relative predic-
tion power of competing models regarding observable political decisions. But,
this endeavor is by far not trivial, especially since alternative models can lead
to observationally equivalent results. Accordingly, the best test would be con-
ducting an experimental study, e.g. shifting exogenously the political positions
of individual stakeholder organizations and comparing theoretically predicted
and empirically observed implied changes in ﬁnal policy choices. However,
conducting such an experiment for real political systems is rather diﬃcult.
Accordingly, we argue that derivation of theoretically based inﬂuence mea-
sures based on empirical network data is a promising approach to empirically
assess political inﬂuence of stakeholders given the state of art in the literature.
Secondly, please note that our main results, i.e. the identiﬁed relative inﬂu-
ence structures of non-governmental stakeholder organization categories are
rather robust across all constitutional scenarios. Only the relative inﬂuence of
parliamentary groups signiﬁcantly increased assuming constitutional decision-
making follows a truly parliamentary system, that is political decision are made
by majority voting in the parliament.39
Finally, the question remains in regard to what extent the observed partic-
ipatory structures impact the overall political performance. For example, it is
unclear whether the dominance of donor and research organizations induce eﬃ-
cient policy choices that match society's needs or whether these patterns imply
policy biases at the expense of society's welfare. As explained above, although
evaluating participatory structures is generally possible based on our theoreti-
cal framework (for example, see (Henning, Badiane, and Krampe, 2018)), this
39Results for all constitutional scenarios are available from the authors.
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is beyond the scope of this paper.40
Based on the evaluation of empirically observed participatory structures,
it would be interesting to identify potential strategies to design future policy
network structures that imply a higher political performance (i.e., reduce iden-
tiﬁed policy biases). In this regard, the undertaken ERGM-estimation can be
used as a starting point. In particular, based on estimated marginal eﬀects,
we conclude that an active design of an optimal policy network structure is
rather diﬃcult in political practice. This follows since most identiﬁed impor-
tant determinants of policy network tie formation are diﬃcult to control ex-
ogenously. In particular, relational factors especially depend on organizations'
social networking capacity. Hence, these factors are diﬃcult to control exoge-
nously because the process of social networking has not been fully understood
yet. For example, the roles of the number and qualiﬁcation of organizational
staﬀ or the organizational budget have not yet been suﬃciently analyzed in
this context. Furthermore, perceived political power is an important covari-
ate that is also diﬃcult to control exogenously; i.e., changing organizations'
perceptions of political power or the perceived potential to generate political
support is extremely limited. An interesting analysis of the emergence of po-
litical inﬂuence perceptions is given by (Heaney, 2014), who highlights the
roles organization play in multiple networks as determinants of inﬂuence rep-
utation. However, a question arises about the extent to which and how these
multiple network roles can be actively controlled by an exogenous designer.
In contrast to relational factors, institutional opportunity structures can be
40However, a ﬁrst intuitive assessment is given in the following. Following our expositions
in the theoretical section in footnote 13 , optimal inﬂuence structures imply that the relative
political inﬂuence of organizations is just equal to their relative political knowledge. Under
these assumptions, the relative political-knowledge advantages of donors in comparison to
average private interest groups would correspond to a factor ranging between 1.7 and 4.5
for donors, while the corresponding factor for research organizations would range between
1.0 and 4.7. To the extent that real relative political knowledge advantages of donors and
researchers do not match the identiﬁed relative informational inﬂuence, one has to conclude
that the identiﬁed dominance of donor and research inﬂuence is suboptimal. Although we
did not measure the knowledge capacities of individual stakeholders in detail, the calculated
knowledge advantages appear rather high. In particular, there is convincing qualitative
evidence suggesting that the relevance of donors' technical expertise in the CAADP process
is rather questionable Mockshell and Birner (2015).
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systematically controlled. For example, within the CAADP process, commit-
tee membership of speciﬁc farm organizations and CSOs has been promoted.
However, our ERGM estimation results imply that institutional opportunity
structures are hardly signiﬁcant determinants of policy network tie formation.
Overall, we conclude that both the empirical evaluation of participation
structures and the active design of optimal participatory policy processes are
interesting and important topics for future research. However, more detailed
theoretical and empirical analyses are needed. In particular, this includes a
more detailed analysis of the extent that diﬀerent organizational properties
impact tie formation. Particularly, to manage social networking, the impact of
political capacities, (such as political knowledge or representation of important
society interests) have to be disentangled from organizational capacities (such
as ﬁnancial and personal resources). Moreover, understanding the formation
of policy networks as the outcome of strategic behavior of a set of stakeholder
organizations is essential for an eﬀective design of policy networks. In this
regard, dynamic models of network formation are very interesting methodolog-
ical approaches (as suggested by Snijders, van de Bunt, and Steglich (2010)
for example). However, beyond statistical models, game-theoretic models of
network formation might also be important for better understanding of the
social process of network formation (Jackson, 2008).
8.5 Conclusion
Although stakeholder participation is increasingly promoted in development
politics, it is commonly observed that there is hardly any study that provides
a quantitative measure of political inﬂuence. Starting with this observation,
this study applied a comprehensive policy network approach to measure empir-
ically the political inﬂuence of stakeholder organizations within the CAADP
reform process in Ghana, Senegal, and Uganda. Based on comprehensive the-
oretical considerations, we calculated inﬂuence measures related to two dif-
ferent inﬂuence mechanisms: vote-buying and informational lobbying. For
each mechanism, separate measures were deﬁned and calculated empirically
based on surveyed policy network data. ERGM speciﬁcations were estimated
to assess the network generating process. Based on simulated networks, we
172
provided mean values and the highest density intervals for individual inﬂuence
measures for all identiﬁed organizations.
Our central results are as follows. First, we found signiﬁcant stakeholder
participation in all three countries given aggregated power outﬂows ranging
between 40 and 70%. Political participation of non-governmental organizations
is dominated by international donors, followed by research organizations and
industrial interest groups, as well as public agencies. Farmer interest groups
and CSOs have only minor political inﬂuence. These ﬁndings support existing
critiques about the CAADP process of excluding marginalized social groups,
such as small-scale farmers and the poor (Randall, 2011). Interestingly, donor
money not only seems to dominate classical vote-buying lobbying relations,
but donors are also inﬂuential political experts next to research organizations.
The high informational inﬂuence of research organizations appears to be in
line with the concept of evidence-based policy processes promoted within the
CAADP framework. Surprisingly, we found that research organizations are
also strong vote-buying lobbyists, at least in Senegal and Ghana.
Second, in contrast to aggregated inﬂuence by types of organizations, in-
dividual inﬂuence measures are far less robust. Hence, although we found
high diﬀerences in mean political inﬂuence between individual organizations,
the corresponding 95% highest density intervals are large and overlapping for
most organizations. Accordingly, based on our simulated network sample, we
found only very few individual organizations that can be considered as sig-
niﬁcantly more or less inﬂuential than the average of all non-governmental
organizations.
Further, our analyses imply that an active design of an optimal policy net-
work structure is rather diﬃcult in political practice. This follows directly from
our ERGM estimate, which implies an important impact of transaction costs on
tie formation in policy networks. The latter is mainly determined by relational
factors, which especially depend on organizations' social networking capacity.
Relational factors are diﬃcult to control exogenously because the process of
social networking has not been fully understood yet. In contrast to relational
factors, institutional opportunity structures can be systematically controlled.
For example, within the CAADP process committee, the membership of spe-
ciﬁc farm and CSOs has been promoted. However, ERGM estimation reveals
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that institutional opportunity structures are hardly signiﬁcant determinants
of policy network tie formation. Moreover, the perceived political power and
speciﬁc organizational categories (i.e., donor and research organizations) are
important nodal and edge-speciﬁc attributes that determine tie formation for
policy networks. These attributes, however, are also diﬃcult to control ex-
ogenously in that changing organizations' policy goals, perceptions of political
power, or the perceived potential to generate political support is extremely
limited. Overall, we conclude that both the empirical evaluation of participa-
tion structures and the active design of optimal participatory policy processes
are interesting and important topics for future research. We consider our pro-
vided policy network approach as a promising methodological starting point
to contribute to these research topics.
Finally, despite the strength of the results of our analyses, it is also essential
to recognize the limitations of the present study. The social processes behind
the formation of policy networks may be more complex than reﬂected in the
estimated models. In particular, there might be other relevant covariates, such
as organizational resources including staﬀ, budgets, or the age of an organiza-
tion, that determine policy network relations among stakeholder organizations.
Moreover, there might be more complex dynamic processes, such as sequen-
tial interaction between nodal and dyadic attributes and endogenous network
statistics. For example, speciﬁc perceived organizational power might not only
determine tie formation, but existing policy network ties might also impact
perceived power estimates (Heaney, 2014). These dynamic processes could be
captured in the estimation of a dynamic network model based on longitudinal
data (Snijders, van de Bunt, and Steglich, 2010; Fowler et al., 2011). Com-
pared to ERGM speciﬁcations that are estimated using cross-sectional data,
these dynamic models will certainly give further insights into the understand-
ing of formation and design of policy networks. However, in this study, our
main aim was to theoretically derive consistent network indices that measure
the political inﬂuence of individual stakeholders and to contrast the identiﬁed
inﬂuence patterns consistently with typical ideal participatory structures polit-
ically proclaimed under CAADP. Furthermore, given the critique of empirical
network studies, we wanted to apply a methodological approach that enables
us to take care of the potential uncertainty of network inﬂuence measures de-
174
rived from empirical network data. In this respect, we consider the estimated
ERGM speciﬁcations using cross-sectional data as an appropriate approach
that allows us to draw statistical inferences on the robustness of our results.
Chapter 9
What Drives Policy Failure:
Biased Incentives or Beliefs?
Until now, we have taken a more general view of both the economic system
and the political system separately. Those systems are not separated in real
policy systems. Therefore we now want to combine them. Political practi-
tioners make the policy choices, so it is interesting to understand better their
underlying beliefs and incentives that drive their decision making. This un-
derstanding is crucial since participatory and evidence-based policy processes
are promoted in development policies and also in CAADP. Despite this pro-
motion, sub-optimal policy decisions persist. Is it because of biased incentives,
and would constitutional reforms help, as, Persson and Tabellini (2000) as-
sume? Most political economy literature assumes perfect knowledge of the
underlying transformation, what we capture with the combination of the PIF
and GGF. This assumption does not hold, and therefore, it would be inter-
esting to also capture the eﬀect of wrong technological beliefs on the policy
choice. The political actors make the decisions; therefore, they must have at
least a partial, simpliﬁed mental model of how the policy choice transforms
into outcomes.
In section 9.1, the stated policy space, as gathered from the surveys, of the
diﬀerent political actors and organizational groups are shortly described. In
the following section 9.2, we will derive a framework allowing the estimation
of individual policy beliefs and their impact on political performance through
a collective political decision. Section 9.3 looks at the question of knowledge
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versus incentive gaps and evaluates diﬀerent strategies for improvement. A
short conclusion is given at the end of this chapter.
9.1 Policy Space
The political incentives for the diﬀerent policy goals, as introduced in sec-
tion 4.4, are derived from the relative interest in that concern. These were
collected in personal interviews with relevant political agents.
Figure 9.1 gives an overview of the distribution of the weights for the dif-
ferent concerns across the three countries. In general, the incentives are quite
diverse for diﬀerent organizations and concerns. For Senegal and Uganda, the
range of values for Z2 (poverty reduction) and Z3 (provision of public goods)
are much larger than for the other concerns. This is not the case for Ghana.
For all countries, we observe mostly small interquartile ranges, denoted by the
gap in the lines, when compared to the lower and upper quartiles. The median
values, denoted by the single dot, are very similar for Senegal and Uganda.
Poverty reduction (Z2) and provision of public goods (Z3) are the most im-
portant goals for Senegal and Uganda. In Ghana, Z4 (export crop sector
income) has the highest median weight, but Z1, Z2, and Z3 have very similar
values. This might be an indicator for more specialized lobby groups, with
Ghana being the most developed country in terms of democracy, according to
the Polity IV index (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, 2012).
Using the collected stakeholder interests, we derive weights α for a social
welfare function. We set the weights for the special sector interests (Z4 and
Z6) to zero. We then take the average of the stated interests by the political
actors as follows: αz =
∑
g
Xg,z
|G| . Then we normalize the averages, so that the
sum of the weights for the other goals except Z3 (Zps) equals 1− αZps .
This is motivated by the way the interests in the policy goals were asked in
the survey. They were asked in a nested fashion, with the top-level being the
importance of public good provision (Zps) versus the other goals, which then
were in turn further subdivided. Table 9.1 shows the derived weights for the
social welfare function.
In ﬁg. 9.2, the distribution of the desired budget allocation to agricultural
and non-agricultural investment policies of the interviewed organizations is
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Figure 9.1: Political Incentives
Table 9.1: Social Welfare Weights
Country Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6
Ghana 0.293 0.229 0.228 0 0.250 0
Senegal 0.084 0.519 0.238 0 0.158 0
Uganda 0.100 0.569 0.212 0 0.119 0
shown. The graph depicts the desired share of the total state budget. We
observe a large share for non-agricultural policies (NA) in Ghana and Senegal.
Looking at the median value for Uganda, a higher share for agricultural invest-
ment policies can be seen. In Senegal, the highest share for non - agricultural
policies of the three countries can be observed, with the agricultural shares
being mostly similar. Ghana has slightly lower desired shares for agriculture.
Figure 9.3 shows the stated policy positions in more detail, disaggregated to
pillar level. Here we observe a similar variance across all pillars in all countries.
The natural resources pillar (NR) in Uganda is the only exception.
The next step is to estimate actor speciﬁc PIFs using this data.
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9.2 Estimating Individual Policy Beliefs
Thus far, we have looked at how to specify the economic system, the technical
evaluation of policies in the economic system, and how to evaluate the political
decision-making process. Now we want to combine this and fully use the
developed CGPE framework.
In order to capture the implicit technological beliefs of the political actors,
we will estimate individual PIFs. The estimation follows the same general
procedure as described in section 5.2.2. In particular, instead of using the data
of all actors at the same time, the estimation problem is reduced to only using
the data of one speciﬁc actor at a time. This approach allows the extraction
of the assumed technology into model parameters, based on the stated policy
positions (γˆg), desired goal achievements (Zˆg) and policy interests (αˆg) of actor
g. The set of ﬁrst-order conditions in eq. (5.20) are reduced to only include
those for the actor under consideration. The results of the estimated empirical
PIF are used as priors for the individual PIF estimation as well. The required
GGF for the estimation is based on the selected model from section 6.2. We will
ignore model uncertainty in this part, but it would mainly be a computational
exercise, albeit signiﬁcant, to include it as well.
Using the derived individual policy beliefs and individual interests, we can
apply the optimization problem from eq. (7.4) to derive the individual policy
preferences Ug(γ).
As shown in section 2.2 a legislative bargaining model is needed, that com-
bines the individual policy preferences uG under given constitutional rules ξ
into a collective policy choice γ∗ = Ξ(uG, ξ). Using a modiﬁed Baron/Fere-
john legislative bargaining game, that combines the original model of Baron
and Ferejohn (1989) with a Grossman/Helpman model (Grossman and Help-
man, 1996), Henning and Hedtrich (2017); Christiansen et al. (2018) proofed
that in the equilibrium of this game the ﬁnal policy choice γ∗ follows from the
following mean voter theorem:
γ∗ =
∑
g
cgγg (9.1)
The weights cg in eq. (9.1) can be derived from the modiﬁed game, but
as shown in chapter 8 we can approximatively derive them from empirically
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observed networks. This policy choice is then transformed into policy outcomes
in the economic system. We apply the derived GGF and estimated PIF from
chapter 5 for this.
Finally, we can evaluate the derived outcome as described in section 4.9.
This framework is shown in ﬁg. 9.4.
Policy Interests Policy Beliefs
Policy Preferences
Legislative Bargaining
Performance Evaluation
Policy Outcome
Figure 9.4: Framework: Individual Policy Beliefs
We can quantify the total performance gap and disentangle it into knowledge
and incentive gaps. This is done by applying the loss function (eq. (4.20)) as
deﬁned in section 4.8 to compute the total, knowledge and incentive gaps (see
section 4.9). In this framework, this is done by changing the individual policy
interests or policy beliefs and replacing them with the true versions. Using
this, we can evaluate diﬀerent strategies for political therapy. We can simulate
the eﬀect of diﬀerent constitutional reforms. We can measure the impact
of participation of stakeholders in the policy process by using the derived
inﬂuence measure from chapter 8.
In order to analyze the individual beliefs further, it is interesting to ﬁnd
groups of organizations that share similar technological beliefs. Finding the
groups directly based on the estimated parameters χ∗g is hard since the param-
eter vector includes about 500 parameters. Therefore, based on the estimated
parameters, we calculate [∂Z
∂γ
], which is a linear approximation of the political
technology. In the countries we have nine or ten policy instruments, therefore
the resulting matrix has a size of either 6 ·9 = 54 or 6 ·10 = 60 entries for each
actor g. We interpret this approximation as the policy belief of a political ac-
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tor. In order to be able to visualize and explore the belief space, we conducted
a factor analysis. As we are right now not interested in using the factors to
explain the underlying technology further, we ﬁxed the number of factors to
two, even though the diﬀerent tests for the number of factors suggest to use
a higher number of factors. Using the computed factor scores, we conducted
a cluster analysis to ﬁnd groups with similar technological beliefs. Here we
preferred a four cluster solution.
Beyond the descriptive diﬀerences, it is interesting what these diﬀerent be-
liefs and incentives mean in terms of political performance. We use the indi-
vidual beliefs and incentives of actor g as the truth and then compute for
each actor i the performance gaps as well.
This framework builds upon the previous work and applies the previously
derived optimization models in GAMS: The factor and cluster analysis is done
in R and loads the estimated parameters using the gdxrrw package from a
gdx ﬁle. The results are also stored in a gdx ﬁle for further analysis done in
GAMS. The complete exchange and analysis in R are automated, where only
the appropriate script ﬁle has to be called with no further manual intervention.
9.3 Knowledge or Incentive Gaps
Applying the derived framework in section 9.2, we are now able to measure po-
litical performance. We use the derived social welfare weights from section 9.1
and as the true technology the selected model from section 6.2. This selection
is to our understanding the closest we can get to the actual real technology.
The results are shown in ﬁg. 9.5. The performance gaps are shown as the
share of the status quo budget that could have been saved with an optimal
allocation to achieve the same welfare level as with the decision derived from
the mean voter rule. In all three countries, notable performance gaps exist,
with Senegal having the largest. In Uganda, the interaction eﬀect of biased
incentives and wrong technological beliefs can be observed, as the total per-
formance gap is smaller than the knowledge gap. The knowledge gaps are
signiﬁcant in all three countries, and they are also larger than the incentive
gaps.
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Figure 9.5: Political Performance Gaps
9.3.1 Participation a Successful Political Therapy?
Having seen that we have signiﬁcant performance gaps in all three countries, it
would be interesting to see if constitutional reforms or increased participation
of stakeholders help in solving the problem.
We deﬁned diﬀerent constitutional reform scenarios: PRES, DUO, DUOL,
MOFA, MOFAPARL and PRESPARL. In the constitutional scenarios, diﬀer-
ent actors of the legislative and executive groups have diﬀerent levels of power,
determined by assumed agenda-setting power and relative inﬂuence (see foot-
note 25). The weights cg are derived from formal decision-making rules using
Banzhaf indices (Banzhaf, 1965; Coleman, 1971). The constitutional scenarios
are used for a technical, what-if analysis.
Table 9.2 shows the aggregated power on the organizational category level,
that is used in the mean voter decision rule. The EQUAL and EXPERT.LOBBY
columns denote two diﬀerent participation scenarios. In the EQUAL scenario,
all actors have the same weight cg, while we use the empirically derived weights
in the EXPERT.LOBBY scenario.
Figure 9.5 shows the performance gaps as the share of the status quo budget
that could have been saved with an optimal allocation to achieve the same
welfare level as with the decision derived from the mean voter rule. In all
183
Country type PRES DUO DUOL MOFA MOFA PRES EQUAL EXPERT
PARL PARL .LOBBY
Ghana EXEC 1.00 1.00 0.81 1.00 0.74 0.74 0.13 0.42
LEG 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.04 0.02
PUBAG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.07
DONOR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15
RESEARCH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.12
IG:FARM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.04
IG:IND 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.08
CSO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03
iNGO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.08
Senegal EXEC 1.00 1.00 0.79 1.00 0.79 0.79 0.15 0.47
LEG 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.21 0.21 0.02 0.01
PUBAG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.05
DONOR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.11
RESEARCH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.17
IG:FARM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03
IG:IND 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.05
CSO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.05
iNGO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02
SUPRA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04
Uganda EXEC 1.00 1.00 0.79 1.00 0.79 0.79 0.16 0.29
LEG 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.21 0.21 0.05 0.02
PUBAG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.14
DONOR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.11
RESEARCH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.07
IG:FARM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.11
IG:IND 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.19
CSO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02
iNGO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.05
Table 9.2: Aggregated Decision Power
three countries, notable performance gaps exist. Across the three countries,
Ghana still has the smallest gaps, while Senegal has the largest gaps. Across all
scenarios, the total performance gap in Uganda is smaller than the knowledge
gap, and about the same as the incentive gap. Therefore in Uganda, it appears
that the biased incentives improve the political performance, given the wrong
technological beliefs. For Senegal, we can see the same level of total and
knowledge performance gaps across all scenarios; this is because the PIF is
only a local approximation.
The constitutional scenarios, denoted by PRES to PRESPARL, have little
inﬂuence on the political performance in Ghana, Senegal, and Uganda. The
only exception being the MOFAPARL scenario in Uganda, where at least the
incentive gap can be reduced. Beyond the formal constitutional scenarios, the
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Figure 9.6: Therapy: Political Performance Gaps
EQUAL scenario shows the resulting performance if all organizations had the
same inﬂuence. In Senegal and Uganda, no real diﬀerence to the other sce-
narios can be observed. The total performance and knowledge gap are a bit
smaller in Ghana, while the incentive gap is larger than in the other countries.
There does not appear to be a substantial diﬀerence when comparing these
results with the ones for the empirically observed inﬂuence measure, denoted
by EXPERT.LOBBY. Looking at table 9.2, we see that in the empirical case,
all organizational types have at least some inﬂuence in the political decision
process. The EXPERT.LOBBY and the EQUAL scenario show that simply
increasing stakeholder participation does not improve political performance.
Therefore beyond the result from chapter 8 that the design of eﬃcient partic-
ipation structures is hard, participation also does not seem to help.
Model Uncertainty in Political Modeling
The empirically observed inﬂuence measure, denoted by EXPERT.LOBBY,
comes with its own source of uncertainty, as has been shown in section 8.3.
We used the sample of 10000 inﬂuence vectors from the previous chapter and
calculated the performance gaps for each of them. Figure 9.7 shows the re-
sulting performance gaps, again measured as the share of status quo budget
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that could be saved. The results show some variance in the performance gaps,
but the general ordering is the same as before. The results again show the
limitation of the estimated PIF, with no variance, for example, for the total
performance gap in Senegal.
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Figure 9.7: Political Performance Gaps
9.3.2 Individual Beliefs
After having seen that knowledge gaps are a signiﬁcant factor in the total
performance gaps, it is interesting to understand the underlying beliefs a little
bit better.
As described in the framework (section 9.2), individual PIFs have been
estimated for all three countries, but for the sake of brevity, only exemplary
results for Senegal are shown.
For example, in Malawi, the actors had a somewhat unrealistic belief that
they can achieve tremendous technical progress values, over 20% in some cases
(Henning et al., 2017). Figure 9.8 shows the predicted ∆tp levels for Senegal
under the status quo policy, with the bars denoting the diﬀerent values of
the stakeholders and the light gray line showing the predicted value under
the estimated and selected expert PIF, the best approximation of the true
technology. There are substantial diﬀerences for many sectors, though, the
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variance is small for some. This shows that diﬀerent actors have diﬀerent
technological beliefs in mind. For most sectors, the individuals expect a larger
value, often signiﬁcantly larger, even though the beliefs are not as extreme
as in Malawi. There are some extreme examples, like the telecommunications
sector (atelcom) or the glass manufacturing sector (aglass).
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Figure 9.8: Political Technology: Achieved ∆tp under status quo Policy -
Senegal
Belief Analysis
The next interesting step is to check if we can ﬁnd groups with similar techno-
logical beliefs. This is done using a cluster and factor analysis, as described in
section 9.2. Figures 9.9 to 9.10 show the results of the factor and cluster anal-
ysis. Tables B.1 to B.3 contain the complete lists of organizations along with
their organizational type. In all three countries, there is no clear separation
between diﬀerent organizational types. Actors of the research and executive
organizational groups tend to be in the same cluster. We ﬁnd a clear separation
between the clusters, however.
Figure 9.12 shows the desired budget allocation to the diﬀerent pillars rel-
ative to the status quo allocation. In all three countries, we can ﬁnd pillars,
where both in a cluster itself and between clusters, there is only a little vari-
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Figure 9.9: Factor Scores: Ghana
ance in the desired budget shares: For example, the FM pillar in Ghana or
the non-agricultural pillar in Senegal. Of the three countries, Uganda has the
smallest variances across the diﬀerent pillars, while Ghana has the largest,
and Senegal is in the middle. For most pillars, there is little variance between
the diﬀerent clusters with the HR pillar in Ghana being an exception. The
non-agricultural pillar in Uganda is another example, to a lesser extent.
Individual Performance
So far, we have assumed that our estimated expert PIF is the truth, but on
a technical level, it is interesting to see what happens with the gaps if we use
the individual actors PIFs as the true one.
In ﬁgs. 9.13 to 9.15 the resulting gaps are shown, derived using the individual
actors beliefs and incentives as the truth. The bars denote the average gap for
the comparison group under the truth group. The gap is shown as the share of
the allocated budget in the status quo. We observe notable diﬀerences across
the countries both in the scale of the gaps and if biased knowledge or incentives
mainly drive the gap.
In all three countries, we observe much smaller knowledge gaps compared to
the results from section 9.3.1. In Senegal, the smallest gaps are observed with
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Figure 9.10: Factor Scores: Senegal
total gaps around 5%. Knowledge gaps are a little bit larger than incentive
gaps, but both are smaller than the total gaps. Therefore the biased knowledge
and incentives enforce each other and result in a higher total performance gap.
In Ghana, larger total performance gaps around 35% are observed. In contrast
to Senegal, they are driven mostly by incentive gaps, as these are about three
times as large as the knowledge gaps. The biased knowledge and incentives do
not strengthen their eﬀect, but at least to a small extent, they balance each
other a little bit. For example, this can be seen when cluster 2 is the truth;
the total performance gap is smaller than the incentive gap. Uganda, diﬀerent
from Ghana and Senegal, has much more signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
diﬀerent clusters. Looking for example, at the total performance gap with
cluster 1 being the truth, we see that the performance gap for cluster 4 is
over three times as large as for cluster 1. Similar to Ghana, we observe much
smaller knowledge than incentive gaps.
The much smaller knowledge gaps indicate that the actors do not perform
too bad if they are in the right world, meaning they know the true technology.
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Figure 9.11: Factor Scores: Uganda
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190
total knowledge incentive
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
truth
ga
p
Comparison 1 2 3 4
Figure 9.13: Cluster Gaps: Ghana
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Figure 9.14: Cluster Gaps: Senegal
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Figure 9.15: Cluster Gaps: Uganda
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9.4 When Science meets Society: Potentials of
Transdisciplinary Research
So where does this lead to when neither constitutional reforms nor increased
participation help in reducing the political performance gap, as the results
indicate. Figure 9.16 might contain a clue for this problem. Here we can
see the policy positions derived in diﬀerent scenarios, the original position
of the stakeholders denoted by stated, the optimal position derived when the
empirical PIF is the true technology, denoted by science, and the optimal
position derived when the expert PIF is the true one, denoted by combined.
The shown positions are based on a factor analysis of the individual γ vectors.
We can see that in all three countries, there is a clear separation between the
stated and the science scenario. The science scenario can be thought of as the
modeling world, while the stated scenario represents the practitioners' world.
There is a clear cleavage between the two worlds, and we can conﬁrm the
common assumption that scientiﬁc policy analysts and political practitioners
are separated in reality (see, for example, Geurts and Joldersma (2001)).
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Figure 9.16: Political Worlds
Getting out of this dilemma is not easy. As changing constitutional rules,
or increasing participation can only shift the position inside one world, but not
get into another world. Combining the knowledge of the two diﬀerent worlds
using a transdisciplinary approach might prove fruitful. This combination
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would then result in a third world, denoted by combined.
9.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown that we can use the developed modeling and
estimation framework, as described in chapters 4 and 5, not only for under-
standing the technological transformation process better, which was more the
focus of the two previous chapters but also for understanding the political de-
cision better. Applying the framework, we can disentangle the drivers behind
persisting policy failure in the context of CAADP.
This application allows us to transform implicit mental models of actors
into a quantitative model representing those beliefs. Our analysis shows that,
contrary to what the political economy literature (Persson and Tabellini, 2000)
often assumes, both biased incentives and wrong technological beliefs have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on political performance. However, improving political per-
formance, as both increasing participation and constitutional reforms do not
truly help, is a challenge. In this regard, a transdisciplinary approach should
be applied, that connects the science world with the society's world.
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Chapter 10
Summary and Outlook
Policy analysis is deﬁned as the scientiﬁc evaluation of policy impact. It is,
however, important to analyze not only the technical transformation but also
the political decision process that determines the ﬁnal policy choice. Therefore,
a political economy equilibrium framework is required for comprehensive policy
analysis, as presented in chapter 2.
Limited data is a signiﬁcant challenge for all policy analysis. This challenge
includes not only limited observational data but also limited information on
political transformation and decision processes. This diﬃculty results in model
uncertainty, which is mostly ignored in policy analysis so far (Marinacci, 2015;
Manski, 2018). There are two main aspects to model uncertainty. The ﬁrst
aspect, from a decision-theoretic point of view, is ignoring model uncertainty
leading to ineﬃcient policies by selecting a single model. The derived policy
choice leads to a loss of expected utility. Model averaging using the expected
utility framework would lead to a higher utility. The second aspect is that
political decision-makers are also faced with model uncertainty in political
practice. They deal with this by forming simple mental models of how policies
translate into outcomes, policy beliefs. Model uncertainty and private knowl-
edge (beliefs) are considered as twin notions (Marinacci, 2015). As shown in
chapter 2, these beliefs can be biased, and therefore, they are a second source
for ineﬃcient policy choices, which has so far been mainly neglected in policy
analysis. The more prominent source in classical policy analysis are biased in-
centives of decision-makers (see, for example, (Persson and Tabellini, 2000)).
Therefore we need to disentangle the inﬂuence of biased beliefs and incentives
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on political performance gaps.
This leads to the following challenges when implementing such a politi-
cal equilibrium model with model uncertainty. Including model uncertainty
into the technical modeling process is technically complex and requires large
amounts of computational resources to compute large samples. Beyond this
technical handling of model uncertainty, we also need to include policy beliefs
into the modeling framework explicitly. In order to be able to measure the
impact of biased incentives and beliefs on political performance, we need a
quantitative model that allows just that. In addition, the developed frame-
work needs to be able to evaluate diﬀerent strategies for political therapy, like
constitutional reforms or increased participation of stakeholders.
In this thesis, we do this by deriving computational tools and implementing
them into the CGPE framework. The CGPE consists of four main modules
covering both the economic and the political system: Policy Impact Function
Module, Economic Equilibrium Module, Political Belief Formation Module,
and Political Decision Making Module (see chapter 3).
We have developed a distributed simulation tool, DST, that allows the com-
putation of large simulation samples. The computational work is split into
smaller units and distributed across multiple machines and computed in par-
allel (section 3.5). These large simulation samples are, for example, required
to measure the impact of diﬀerent model assumptions, like production or trade
elasticities in a CGE. This tool enables the application of the metamodeling
approach, for which a more complex model like a CGE is approximated by an
explicit analytical form (section 3.4). We developed a framework for estimat-
ing sector-speciﬁc PIFs, functions that transform a given policy choice into
changed factors of economic growth. This derivation is done in a Bayesian
estimation framework, combining observational with expert data in a novel
transdisciplinary research approach. This approach allows the estimation of
about 500 parameters of the PIF using only limited data. Some background on
Bayesian estimation techniques is given in section 3.3. Finally, the developed
framework allows the estimation of individual policy beliefs and to quantita-
tively disentangle political performance gaps caused by biased incentives and
beliefs.
In the second part of this thesis, the developed computational tools, and
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CGPE approach are applied empirically to the case of CAADP in three African
countries, namely Ghana, Senegal, and Uganda.
Chapter 4 gives a short introduction to the study background. The em-
pirical applications were undertaken as part of the PEBAP project. In the
CAADP, most African countries committed to allocating about 10% of the
national budget to agriculture in order to achieve a 6% annual sector growth
rate. This is motivated by the fact that the rural population is still mostly
poor and dependent on agriculture. The chapter then introduces the empirical
speciﬁcation of the GGF, capturing economic growth to outcome relations, and
PIF, capturing the transformation of policies into economic growth. The fol-
lowing chapter, chapter 5, demonstrates how the GGF can be derived and the
PIF be empirically estimated. The GGF is derived as a metamodel of a CGE.
The PIF is estimated using a Bayesian estimation framework by combining
observational, historical data with expert data. In chapter 6, a framework to
handle model uncertainty in the technical modeling part is introduced. This
includes both structural uncertainty, uncertainty about assumptions of the
model, and parameter uncertainty, uncertainty in the estimated values of the
models. Structural uncertainty is handled by a combination of an extensive
simulation study with metamodeling. An MCMC sample of the estimated
parameters derived by applying the DE − MCZ algorithm is used to take
estimation uncertainty into consideration.
This framework is used in three empirical applications.
The ﬁrst application is about the technical transformation of policies into
outcomes (chapter 7). It tries to answer the question in which sectors should
investment happen to reduce poverty; that is, what is a key sector? It looks
at the detailed policy choice in a similar way, that is, which policies should be
chosen. What is a key policy? The ﬁnal step in this application is then the
derivation of optimal policies from a technical point of view. In all these steps,
model uncertainty is explicitly incorporated.
The second application focuses on the political system. In particular, we
derived a theoretical framework that allows the measurement and evaluation of
participatory policy structures. Using observed networks, we derived separate
measures for lobbying and informational inﬂuence. As the observed networks
are only a single observation at a speciﬁc point in time, we estimated the
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network generating process by applying an ERGM. Based on the estimated
process, we applied MCMC simulations to show the inﬂuence of uncertainty
on the inﬂuence measures.
The third application combines the previous applications and asks the ques-
tion, What Drives Policy Failure: Biased Incentives or Beliefs? In order to
do this, we have estimated individual policy beliefs and, based on a modiﬁed
Baron-Ferejohn legislative bargaining game, explicitly incorporated them into
the political decision process. This not only allows the quantiﬁcation of po-
litical performance gaps (see section 4.9) but also the evaluation of diﬀerent
political therapy strategies.
Summarizing central results of these applications, we show that:
Identifying key sectors based on partial concepts like CGE elasticities might
be misleading, as they do not take the necessary generation of economic growth
by policies into account (section 7.2.1). Under model uncertainty, a broad
range of values for the key sector and key policy indicator is observed. No
clear dominance of a sector can be observed within a country and across the
countries. This missing dominance is especially true for optimal policies, as the
results can dramatically change when applying model averaging. In Senegal,
for example, model selection leads to a policy dominated by non-agricultural in-
vestments. Applying model averaging, that is maximizing the expected utility,
the primary budget share of investment policies shifts to agricultural policies.
The results from chapter 8 show that individual inﬂuence is highly uncer-
tain, but some patterns among organizational types can be found. Donor and
research organizations dominate the participatory research process, while farm
interests and civil society organizations have only a negligible inﬂuence. On a
theoretical level, we derived a framework that allows the evaluation of formal,
as determined by constitutional scenarios, and informal inﬂuence. Using this,
we show that the design of stakeholder systems is challenging since relational
factors mainly determine the underlying network structures.
In the last application, we show that actors have diﬀerent policy beliefs
(chapter 9). These varying beliefs lead to clear and signiﬁcant knowledge gaps,
showing that they are a factor why ineﬃcient policies are being chosen. Biased
incentives are also important, and as shown, biased incentives and knowledge
are not necessarily additive, there are interaction eﬀects between them. The
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developed framework allows the evaluation of proposed strategies to alleviate
the observed performance gaps. We have simulated diﬀerent constitutional
scenarios and shown that the performance gaps do not change signiﬁcantly.
A second strategy is the increased participation of stakeholders, and we can
show that this does not help either. This means that the design of optimal
participation structures is not only complicated (see chapter 8), but also that it
does not really help. Transdisciplinary research, an interaction between science
and society, can be thought of as a way out. As a step in this direction, we
developed a Bayesian estimation framework that connects implicit stakeholder
knowledge with statistical data.
The complete project of implementing all the necessary parts resulted in a
small to a medium-sized software project. During the implementation, diﬀerent
tools and languages have been used and combined into a more elaborate tool.
The project is structured around the core steps that are mostly implemented
in GAMS. R has been used for the network estimation (see chapter 8), smaller
analysis parts like the factor analysis and the visualization of the results. The
MCMC sample generation is implemented in Julia. Julia provided both the
required performance, language constructs, and structures that made it easy
to implement. For the vast number of simulations required due to the inclusion
of model uncertainty, a custom simulation tool, DST, has been developed. The
DST sits between lower-level language support of concurrent programming and
more sophisticated tools like, for example, BOINC1. All these diﬀerent tools are
connected by little scripts in those languages, as well as in Ruby, PowerShell,
or Ansible. These scripts automate the execution and setup of the required
steps. Therefore, allowing one to focus more on the actual development of
the model and not having to worry about managing everything manually. As
shown by Open Science Collaboration (2015), reproducibility is an integral
part of research. Therefore this structuring was made with this goal in mind.
In order to improve reproducibility, all code is stored in a version control
system. Additionally, the code has been refactored, so that common parts
between countries are extracted and shared between them. The code is now in
a state where it only requires little eﬀort to include new data or to do the same
analysis for a diﬀerent country (the more signiﬁcant eﬀort being in conducting
1https://boinc.berkeley.edu/
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the required surveys and collecting the data).
As pointed out in chapter 2 and shown by the empirical analysis, we need
approaches that go beyond classical approaches. This means we need ap-
proaches that model the complete system combined out of the political and
economic system. These approaches also need to handle model uncertainty
on a technical level, but also on a conceptual level, as the resulting policy
beliefs of actors drive the policy decision. They can be summarized under
the term Policy Analytics (Daniell, Morton, and Insua, 2015; De Marchi,
Lucertini, and Tsoukiàs, 2016; Tsoukias et al., 2013). They connect diﬀerent
scientiﬁc disciplines like computer science, economics, and policy analysis, but
also society and science in transdisciplinary research approaches.
Recapitulating that the primary source of model uncertainty is limited data,
that is encapsulated in highly uncertain and decentralized knowledge. An
obvious avenue for improvement is using more data that is becoming available
due to new technological advances. This data is often highly unstructured
and of large volume, which classical approaches can not handle. This can be
summarized under the term big data and requires applying and developing
new computational methods. Only using more data will not be enough, as
the studied processes are highly dynamic and complex, and therefore, we need
theory-based models to understand them better and be able to develop well-
founded intervention strategies.
As knowledge is highly decentralized, we need processes that capture the
knowledge aggregation. So far, we applied the Friedkin and Johnsen (1990)
model for belief updating/learning in networks. In the future, it would be
interesting to apply more advanced models or model belief updating in an
agent-based setting. This would allow modeling actors more realistically, as
for example rule of thumbs can be easily integrated.
As shown in the last empirical application, knowledge aggregation is only
a partial solution, as we need a way to generate new knowledge in an inter-
active exchange between science and society. Political practitioners need to
be informed about the uncertainty around the results derived based on the
CGPE. Therefore the results should not be communicated or used as the ab-
solute truth, but instead as advice of moving into that direction and thereby
allowing step-wise policy learning. In return, the models can learn from new
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observations and adapt to new framework conditions. Work has been started
on an interactive toolkit that facilitates this exchange, where the goal is to
include the learning of stakeholders from the model, of models from stakehold-
ers, and interactive learning between those two (see Hedtrich et al. (2018);
Hedtrich (2018)).
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Appendix A
Code Samples
A.1 Empirical PIF
Listing A.1: models/empirical.gms
1 sets
2 PIF_EMP_ENTROPY_PARTS /1*8/
3 ;
4
5 parameters
6 pif_emp_p_tp(AAG, YEAR)
7 pif_emp_p_bud_mu(AAG, POL_INST)
8 pif_emp_p_budshare(POL_INST, YEAR)
9 pif_emp_p_pae(YEAR)
10 pif_emp_p_bud_rho
11 pif_emp_p_gamma_non_agr(YEAR)
12 pif_emp_p_tp_exp_logistic_a(AAG)
13 pif_emp_p_tp_exp_logistic_b(AAG)
14 pif_emp_p_elast_max_logistic(AAG)
15 pif_emp_p_budshare_up(POL_INST, YEAR)
16 pif_emp_p_budshare_lo(POL_INST, YEAR)
17 pif_emp_entropy_weights(PIF_EMP_ENTROPY_PARTS)
18 pif_emp_delta(PIF_EMP_ENTROPY_PARTS)
19 ;
20
21 variables
22 PIF_EMP_V_ENTROPY
23 ;
24
25 positive variables
26 PIF_EMP_V_BUDSHARE(POL_INST, YEAR)
27 PIF_EMP_V_GAMMA_NON_AGR(YEAR)
28 PIF_EMP_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_A(AAG)
29 PIF_EMP_V_ELAST_MAX_LOGISTIC(AAG)
30 PIF_EMP_V_BUD_MU(AAG, POL_INST)
31 ;
32
33 negative variables
34 PIF_EMP_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_B(AAG)
35 ;
36
37 equations
38 pif_emp_def_entropy
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39 pif_emp_def_tp(AAG, YEAR)
40 ;
41
42 * intermediary equations and variables
43 variables
44 PIF_EMP_V_LOGISTIC(AAG, YEAR)
45 PIF_EMP_V_EPSILON(AAG, YEAR)
46 PIF_EMP_V_TFP_CONST0(AAG)
47 PIF_EMP_V_TFP(AAG, YEAR)
48 PIF_EMP_V_BUD(AAG, YEAR)
49 PIF_EMP_V_BUD_NORM(AAG)
50 PIF_EMP_V_ENTROPY_I(PIF_EMP_ENTROPY_PARTS)
51 ;
52
53 equations
54 pif_emp_def_v_bud(AAG, YEAR)
55 pif_emp_def_v_tfp(AAG, YEAR)
56 pif_emp_def_entropy_i1
57 pif_emp_def_entropy_i2
58 pif_emp_def_entropy_i3
59 pif_emp_def_entropy_i4
60 pif_emp_def_entropy_i5
61 pif_emp_def_entropy_i6
62 pif_emp_def_entropy_i7
63 pif_emp_def_entropy_i8
64 pif_emp_def_res1(POL_INST, YEAR)
65 pif_emp_def_res2(POL_INST, YEAR)
66 pif_emp_def_res3(YEAR)
67 pif_emp_def_bud_norm(AAG)
68 pif_emp_def_mu_norm(AAG)
69 pif_emp_logistic(AAG, YEAR)
70 pif_emp_def_logistic_res(AAG)
71 pif_emp_def_logistic_res2(AAG)
72 ;
73
74 pif_emp_def_v_bud(AAG, YEAR)..
75 PIF_EMP_V_BUD(AAG, YEAR) =E= PIF_EMP_V_BUD_NORM(AAG) * (
76 sum(CAADP$pif_emp_p_bud_mu(AAG, CAADP), PIF_EMP_V_BUD_MU(AAG, CAADP) *
77 (PIF_EMP_V_BUDSHARE(CAADP, YEAR) * pif_emp_p_pae(YEAR))**(−pif_emp_p_bud_rho))
78 + PIF_EMP_V_BUD_MU(AAG, "non−agr") * PIF_EMP_V_GAMMA_NON_AGR(YEAR)**(−
pif_emp_p_bud_rho)
79 )**(−1/pif_emp_p_bud_rho);
80
81 pif_emp_def_bud_norm(AAG)..
82 PIF_EMP_V_BUD_NORM(AAG) =E= sum(POL_INST, PIF_EMP_V_BUD_MU(AAG, POL_INST)**(1 / (1+
pif_emp_p_bud_rho)))**((1+pif_emp_p_bud_rho)/pif_emp_p_bud_rho);
83
84 pif_emp_def_mu_norm(AAG)..
85 sum(POL_INST, PIF_EMP_V_BUD_MU(AAG, POL_INST)) =E= 1;
86
87 pif_emp_logistic(AAG, YEAR)..
88 PIF_EMP_V_LOGISTIC(AAG, YEAR) =E= 1 / ( 1+exp(−1 * (PIF_EMP_V_BUD(AAG, YEAR)*
PIF_EMP_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_A(AAG)+PIF_EMP_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_B(AAG) ) ) );
89
90 pif_emp_def_v_tfp(AAG, YEAR)..
91 PIF_EMP_V_TFP(AAG, YEAR) =E= PIF_EMP_V_ELAST_MAX_LOGISTIC(AAG) * PIF_EMP_V_LOGISTIC
(AAG, YEAR);
92
93 pif_emp_def_tp(AAG, YEAR)..
94 PIF_EMP_V_TFP(AAG, YEAR) + PIF_EMP_V_TFP_CONST0(AAG) + PIF_EMP_V_EPSILON(AAG, YEAR)
=E= pif_emp_p_tp(AAG, YEAR);
95
96 pif_emp_def_logistic_res(AAG)..
97 PIF_EMP_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_A(AAG) =L= (log(0.99 / (1 − 0.99)) −
PIF_EMP_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_B(AAG)) / sum(POL_INST, p_gamma("sq", POL_INST));
98
99 pif_emp_def_logistic_res2(AAG)..
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100 PIF_EMP_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_A(AAG) =G= (log(0.01 / (1 − 0.01)) −
PIF_EMP_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_B(AAG)) / sum(POL_INST, p_gamma("sq", POL_INST));
101
102 pif_emp_def_res1(CAADP, YEAR)..
103 PIF_EMP_V_BUDSHARE(CAADP, YEAR) =L= pif_emp_p_budshare_up(CAADP, YEAR);
104 pif_emp_def_res2(CAADP, YEAR)..
105 PIF_EMP_V_BUDSHARE(CAADP, YEAR) =G= pif_emp_p_budshare_lo(CAADP, YEAR);
106
107 pif_emp_def_res3(YEAR)..
108 sum(CAADP,PIF_EMP_V_BUDSHARE(CAADP, YEAR)) =E= 1;
109
110 pif_emp_def_entropy_i1..
111 PIF_EMP_V_ENTROPY_I("1") =E= sum((AAG, YEAR), sqr(PIF_EMP_V_EPSILON(AAG, YEAR)));
112
113 pif_emp_def_entropy_i2..
114 PIF_EMP_V_ENTROPY_I("2") =E= sum((POL_INST, YEAR), sqr(pif_emp_p_budshare(POL_INST, YEAR) −
PIF_EMP_V_BUDSHARE(POL_INST, YEAR) ) /sqr( pif_emp_p_budshare(POL_INST, YEAR)+
pif_emp_delta("2")$(pif_emp_p_budshare(POL_INST, YEAR)=0)));
115
116 pif_emp_def_entropy_i3..
117 PIF_EMP_V_ENTROPY_I("3") =E= sum(YEAR, sqr(pif_emp_p_gamma_non_agr(YEAR) −
PIF_EMP_V_GAMMA_NON_AGR(YEAR) ) / sqr(pif_emp_p_gamma_non_agr(YEAR)+pif_emp_delta("3
")$(pif_emp_p_gamma_non_agr(YEAR)=0)));
118
119 pif_emp_def_entropy_i4..
120 PIF_EMP_V_ENTROPY_I("4") =E= sum(AAG, sqr(pif_emp_p_elast_max_logistic(AAG) −
PIF_EMP_V_ELAST_MAX_LOGISTIC(AAG) ) /sqr( pif_emp_p_elast_max_logistic(AAG)+pif_emp_delta
("4")$(pif_emp_p_elast_max_logistic(AAG)=0)));
121
122 pif_emp_def_entropy_i5..
123 PIF_EMP_V_ENTROPY_I("5") =E= sum((AAG,POL_INST), sqr(pif_emp_p_bud_mu(AAG, POL_INST) −
PIF_EMP_V_BUD_MU(AAG, POL_INST) ) /sqr( pif_emp_p_bud_mu(AAG, POL_INST) +pif_emp_delta
("5")$(pif_emp_p_bud_mu(AAG, POL_INST) =0)));
124
125 pif_emp_def_entropy_i6..
126 PIF_EMP_V_ENTROPY_I("6") =E= sum(AAG, sqr(pif_emp_p_tp_exp_logistic_a(AAG) −
PIF_EMP_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_A(AAG) ) /sqr( pif_emp_p_tp_exp_logistic_a(AAG) +pif_emp_delta(
"6")$(pif_emp_p_tp_exp_logistic_a(AAG) =0)));
127
128 pif_emp_def_entropy_i7..
129 PIF_EMP_V_ENTROPY_I("7") =E= sum(AAG, sqr(pif_emp_p_tp_exp_logistic_b(AAG) −
PIF_EMP_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_B(AAG) ) /sqr( pif_emp_p_tp_exp_logistic_b(AAG) + pif_emp_delta
("7")$(pif_emp_p_tp_exp_logistic_b(AAG)=0)));
130
131 pif_emp_def_entropy_i8..
132 PIF_EMP_V_ENTROPY_I("8") =E= sum(AAG, sqr(PIF_EMP_V_TFP_CONST0(AAG)));
133
134 pif_emp_def_entropy..
135 PIF_EMP_V_ENTROPY =E= sum(PIF_EMP_ENTROPY_PARTS, pif_emp_entropy_weights(
PIF_EMP_ENTROPY_PARTS) * PIF_EMP_V_ENTROPY_I(PIF_EMP_ENTROPY_PARTS));
136
137 model pif_empirical /
138 pif_emp_def_tp
139 pif_emp_logistic
140 pif_emp_def_logistic_res
141 pif_emp_def_logistic_res2
142 pif_emp_def_v_tfp
143 pif_emp_def_v_bud
144 pif_emp_def_bud_norm
145 pif_emp_def_mu_norm
146 pif_emp_def_res1
147 pif_emp_def_res2
148 pif_emp_def_res3
149 pif_emp_def_entropy_i1
150 pif_emp_def_entropy_i2
151 pif_emp_def_entropy_i3
152 pif_emp_def_entropy_i4
153 pif_emp_def_entropy_i5
154 pif_emp_def_entropy_i6
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155 pif_emp_def_entropy_i7
156 pif_emp_def_entropy_i8
157 pif_emp_def_entropy
158 /;
A.2 Expert PIF
Listing A.2: models/experts.gms
1 sets
2 PIF_EXPS_ENTROPY_PARTS /1*6/
3 PIF_EXPS_TS /1*10/
4 ;
5
6 alias(AAG, AAG2);
7
8 parameters
9 pif_exps_entropy_weights(PIF_EXPS_ENTROPY_PARTS)
10 pif_exps_p_gamma(POL_AGG, POL_INST)
11 pif_exps_p_bud_rho
12 pif_exps_p_tp_exp_logistic_a(AAG)
13 pif_exps_p_tp_exp_logistic_b(AAG)
14 pif_exps_p_elast_max_logistic(AAG)
15 pif_exps_p_cge_const(HZ)
16 pif_exps_p_cge_mult(AAG, HZ)
17 pif_exps_p_x(POL_AGG, HZ)
18 pif_exps_p_bud_mu(AAG, POL_INST)
19 pif_exps_p_pol_z3_base "B_0"
20 pif_exps_delta(PIF_EXPS_ENTROPY_PARTS)
21 pif_exps_discount
22 pif_exps_donor_share
23 pif_exps_delta_jps(HZ) "= (1 − pif_exps_donor_share) for Z3"
24 pif_exps_t(PIF_EXPS_TS) "ord(PIF_EXPS_TS) − 1"
25 pif_exps_ideo_variance(POL_INST)
26 pif_exps_epsilon_variance(HZ)
27 ;
28
29 variables
30 PIF_EXPS_V_Z(POL_AGG, HZ, PIF_EXPS_TS) growth rate of policy concern Z
31 PIF_EXPS_V_ENTROPY
32 ;
33
34 positive variables
35 PIF_EXPS_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_A(AAG)
36 PIF_EXPS_V_ELAST_MAX_LOGISTIC(AAG)
37 PIF_EXPS_V_BUD_MU(AAG, POL_INST)
38 ;
39
40 negative variables
41 PIF_EXPS_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_B(AAG)
42 ;
43
44 equations
45 pif_exps_def_v_tfp(POL_AGG, AAG)
46 pif_exps_def_foc(POL_AGG, POL_INST)
47 pif_exps_def_bud_norm(AAG)
48 pif_exps_def_wz(POL_AGG, HZ, PIF_EXPS_TS)
49 pif_exps_def_entropy
50 ;
51
52 * intermediary equations and variables
53 variables
54 PIF_EXPS_V_EPSILON(POL_AGG, HZ)
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55 PIF_EXPS_V_IDEO(POL_AGG, POL_INST)
56 PIF_EXPS_V_DTFP(POL_AGG, AAG)
57 PIF_EXPS_V_DBE(POL_AGG, POL_INST, AAG)
58 PIF_EXPS_V_BUD_NORM(AAG)
59 PIF_EXPS_V_BUD_I1(POL_AGG, AAG)
60 PIF_EXPS_V_DPIF(POL_AGG, HZ, POL_INST)
61 PIF_EXPS_V_WZ_I1(POL_AGG, HZ)
62 PIF_EXPS_V_WZ_I2(POL_AGG, HZ)
63 PIF_EXPS_V_FOC_I1(POL_AGG, POL_INST, PIF_EXPS_TS)
64 PIF_EXPS_V_FOC_I2(POL_AGG, PIF_EXPS_TS)
65 PIF_EXPS_V_LOGISTIC(POL_AGG, AAG)
66 ;
67
68 positive variables
69 PIF_EXPS_V_TFP(POL_AGG, AAG) sectoral PIF function
70 PIF_EXPS_V_BUD(POL_AGG, AAG)
71 PIF_EXPS_V_ENTROPY_I(PIF_EXPS_ENTROPY_PARTS)
72 ;
73
74 equations
75 pif_exps_def_vbud_i1(POL_AGG, AAG)
76 pif_exps_logistic_restriction(POL_AGG, AAG)
77 pif_exps_logistic(POL_AGG, AAG)
78 pif_exps_def_wz_i1(POL_AGG, HZ)
79 pif_exps_def_wz_i2(POL_AGG, HZ)
80 pif_exps_def_v_dtfp(POL_AGG, AAG)
81 pif_exps_def_v_dbe(POL_AGG, POL_INST, AAG)
82 pif_exps_def_dpif(POL_AGG, HZ, POL_INST)
83 pif_exps_def_foc_i1(POL_AGG, POL_INST, PIF_EXPS_TS)
84 pif_exps_def_foc_i2(POL_AGG, PIF_EXPS_TS)
85 pif_exps_def_v_bud(POL_AGG, AAG)
86 pif_exps_def_mu_norm(AAG)
87 pif_exps_def_entropy_i1
88 pif_exps_def_entropy_i2
89 pif_exps_def_entropy_i3
90 pif_exps_def_entropy_i4
91 pif_exps_def_entropy_i5
92 pif_exps_def_entropy_i6
93 ;
94
95
96 pif_exps_def_mu_norm(AAG)..
97 sum(POL_INST, PIF_EXPS_V_BUD_MU(AAG, POL_INST)) =e= 1;
98
99 pif_exps_def_bud_norm(AAG)..
100 PIF_EXPS_V_BUD_NORM(AAG) =e= sum(POL_INST, PIF_EXPS_V_BUD_MU(AAG, POL_INST)**(1 / (1+
pif_exps_p_bud_rho)))**((1+pif_exps_p_bud_rho)/pif_exps_p_bud_rho);
101
102 pif_exps_def_vbud_i1(POL_AG_EST, AAG)..
103 PIF_EXPS_V_BUD_I1(POL_AG_EST, AAG) =E= sum(POL_INST, PIF_EXPS_V_BUD_MU(AAG, POL_INST
) *
104 pif_exps_p_gamma(POL_AG_EST, POL_INST)**(−
pif_exps_p_bud_rho));
105
106 pif_exps_def_v_bud(POL_AG_EST, AAG)..
107 PIF_EXPS_V_BUD(POL_AG_EST, AAG) =e= PIF_EXPS_V_BUD_NORM(AAG) * PIF_EXPS_V_BUD_I1(
POL_AG_EST, AAG)**(−1/pif_exps_p_bud_rho);
108
109
110 *numerical bound!
111 pif_exps_logistic_restriction(POL_AG_EST, AAG)..
112 PIF_EXPS_V_BUD(POL_AG_EST, AAG)*PIF_EXPS_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_A(AAG)+
PIF_EXPS_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_B(AAG) =G= −100;
113
114 pif_exps_logistic(POL_AG_EST, AAG)..
115 PIF_EXPS_V_LOGISTIC(POL_AG_EST, AAG) =E= 1 / (1 + exp(− (PIF_EXPS_V_BUD(POL_AG_EST, AAG
)*PIF_EXPS_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_A(AAG)+PIF_EXPS_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_B(AAG) ) ) );
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116
117 pif_exps_def_v_tfp(POL_AG_EST, AAG)..
118 PIF_EXPS_V_TFP(POL_AG_EST, AAG) =E= PIF_EXPS_V_ELAST_MAX_LOGISTIC(AAG) *
PIF_EXPS_V_LOGISTIC(POL_AG_EST, AAG);
119
120 pif_exps_def_v_dtfp(POL_AG_EST, AAG)..
121 PIF_EXPS_V_DTFP(POL_AG_EST, AAG) =e= PIF_EXPS_V_TFP(POL_AG_EST, AAG) *
PIF_EXPS_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_A(AAG) * (1− PIF_EXPS_V_LOGISTIC(POL_AG_EST, AAG));
122
123 pif_exps_def_v_dbe(POL_AG_EST, POL_INST, AAG)$pif_exps_p_gamma(POL_AG_EST, POL_INST)..
124 PIF_EXPS_V_DBE(POL_AG_EST, POL_INST, AAG) =e= PIF_EXPS_V_BUD(POL_AG_EST, AAG) * ((
PIF_EXPS_V_BUD_MU(AAG, POL_INST) * pif_exps_p_gamma(POL_AG_EST, POL_INST)**(−
pif_exps_p_bud_rho − 1)) / PIF_EXPS_V_BUD_I1(POL_AG_EST, AAG));
125
126 * wv_z_i1 is exogoneously ﬁxed except for Z3, where epsilon is ﬁxed at zero.
127 pif_exps_def_wz_i1(POL_AG_EST, HZ)..
128 PIF_EXPS_V_WZ_I1(POL_AG_EST, HZ) =e= pif_exps_p_cge_const(HZ) + sum(AAG, PIF_EXPS_V_TFP(
POL_AG_EST, AAG)/100 * pif_exps_p_cge_mult(AAG, HZ)) + PIF_EXPS_V_EPSILON(POL_AG_EST,
HZ);
129
130 pif_exps_def_wz_i2(POL_AG_EST, HZ)..
131 PIF_EXPS_V_WZ_I2(POL_AG_EST, HZ) =e= pif_exps_delta_jps(HZ) / pif_exps_p_pol_z3_base * sum(
POL_INST, pif_exps_p_gamma(POL_AG_EST, POL_INST));
132
133 pif_exps_def_wz(POL_AG_EST, HZ, PIF_EXPS_TS)..
134 PIF_EXPS_V_Z(POL_AG_EST, HZ, PIF_EXPS_TS) =e= 1 + pif_exps_t(PIF_EXPS_TS) *
PIF_EXPS_V_WZ_I1(POL_AG_EST, HZ) − PIF_EXPS_V_WZ_I2(POL_AG_EST, HZ);
135
136 pif_exps_def_dpif(POL_AG_EST, HZ, POL_INST)$pif_exps_p_gamma(POL_AG_EST, POL_INST)..
137 PIF_EXPS_V_DPIF(POL_AG_EST, HZ, POL_INST) =e= sum(AAG, pif_exps_p_cge_mult(AAG, HZ) *
PIF_EXPS_V_DBE(POL_AG_EST, POL_INST, AAG) * PIF_EXPS_V_DTFP(POL_AG_EST, AAG) /
100);
138
139 pif_exps_def_foc_i1(POL_AG_EST, POL_INST, PIF_EXPS_TS)$pif_exps_p_gamma(POL_AG_EST, POL_INST)
..
140 PIF_EXPS_V_FOC_I1(POL_AG_EST, POL_INST, PIF_EXPS_TS) =e= sum(HZ$(pif_exps_p_x(
POL_AG_EST, HZ) > 0), (pif_exps_p_x(POL_AG_EST, HZ) / PIF_EXPS_V_Z(POL_AG_EST, HZ,
PIF_EXPS_TS)) * ((−pif_exps_delta_jps(HZ) / pif_exps_p_pol_z3_base) + pif_exps_t(PIF_EXPS_TS) *
PIF_EXPS_V_DPIF(POL_AG_EST, HZ, POL_INST)));
141
142 pif_exps_def_foc_i2(POL_AG_EST, PIF_EXPS_TS)..
143 PIF_EXPS_V_FOC_I2(POL_AG_EST, PIF_EXPS_TS) =E= prod(HZ$(pif_exps_p_x(POL_AG_EST, HZ) > 0),
PIF_EXPS_V_Z(POL_AG_EST, HZ, PIF_EXPS_TS)**(pif_exps_p_x(POL_AG_EST, HZ)));
144
145 pif_exps_def_foc(POL_AG_EST, POL_INST)$(pif_exps_p_gamma(POL_AG_EST, POL_INST) > 0.0001)..
146 PIF_EXPS_V_IDEO(POL_AG_EST, POL_INST) =e= sum(PIF_EXPS_TS, pif_exps_discount**(pif_exps_t(
PIF_EXPS_TS)) * PIF_EXPS_V_FOC_I2(POL_AG_EST, PIF_EXPS_TS) * PIF_EXPS_V_FOC_I1(
POL_AG_EST, POL_INST, PIF_EXPS_TS));
147
148 pif_exps_def_entropy_i1..
149 PIF_EXPS_V_ENTROPY_I("1") =e= sum((POL_AG_EST, POL_INST), sqr(PIF_EXPS_V_IDEO(
POL_AG_EST, POL_INST)) / pif_exps_ideo_variance(POL_INST) );
150
151 pif_exps_def_entropy_i2..
152 PIF_EXPS_V_ENTROPY_I("2") =e= sum((POL_AG_EST, HZ), sqr(PIF_EXPS_V_EPSILON(POL_AG_EST,
HZ)) / pif_exps_epsilon_variance(HZ));
153
154 pif_exps_def_entropy_i3..
155 PIF_EXPS_V_ENTROPY_I("3") =e= sum(AAG, sqr(pif_exps_p_elast_max_logistic(AAG) −
PIF_EXPS_V_ELAST_MAX_LOGISTIC(AAG) ) /sqr( pif_exps_p_elast_max_logistic(AAG)+
pif_exps_delta("3")$(pif_exps_p_elast_max_logistic(AAG) = 0)));
156
157 pif_exps_def_entropy_i4..
158 PIF_EXPS_V_ENTROPY_I("4") =e= sum((AAG, POL_INST), sqr(pif_exps_p_bud_mu(AAG, POL_INST) −
PIF_EXPS_V_BUD_MU(AAG, POL_INST) ) /sqr( pif_exps_p_bud_mu(AAG, POL_INST) +
pif_exps_delta("4")$(pif_exps_p_bud_mu(AAG, POL_INST) = 0)));
159
160 pif_exps_def_entropy_i5..
161 PIF_EXPS_V_ENTROPY_I("5") =e= sum(AAG, sqr(pif_exps_p_tp_exp_logistic_a(AAG) −
PIF_EXPS_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_A(AAG) ) /sqr( pif_exps_p_tp_exp_logistic_a(AAG) +pif_exps_delta
("5")$(pif_exps_p_tp_exp_logistic_a(AAG) = 0)));
162
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163 pif_exps_def_entropy_i6..
164 PIF_EXPS_V_ENTROPY_I("6") =e= sum(AAG, sqr(pif_exps_p_tp_exp_logistic_b(AAG) −
PIF_EXPS_V_TP_EXP_LOGISTIC_B(AAG) ) /sqr( pif_exps_p_tp_exp_logistic_b(AAG) +
pif_exps_delta("6")$(pif_exps_p_tp_exp_logistic_b(AAG) = 0)));
165
166
167 pif_exps_def_entropy..
168 PIF_EXPS_V_ENTROPY =e= sum(PIF_EXPS_ENTROPY_PARTS, pif_exps_entropy_weights(
PIF_EXPS_ENTROPY_PARTS) * PIF_EXPS_V_ENTROPY_I(PIF_EXPS_ENTROPY_PARTS));
169
170 * model for estimation with expert data
171 model pif_experts /
172 pif_exps_def_v_tfp
173 pif_exps_def_foc
174 pif_exps_def_bud_norm
175 pif_exps_def_wz
176 pif_exps_def_entropy
177 pif_exps_def_vbud_i1
178 pif_exps_logistic_restriction
179 pif_exps_logistic
180 pif_exps_def_wz_i1
181 pif_exps_def_wz_i2
182 pif_exps_def_v_dtfp
183 pif_exps_def_v_dbe
184 pif_exps_def_dpif
185 pif_exps_def_foc_i1
186 pif_exps_def_foc_i2
187 pif_exps_def_v_bud
188 pif_exps_def_mu_norm
189 pif_exps_def_entropy_i1
190 pif_exps_def_entropy_i2
191 pif_exps_def_entropy_i3
192 pif_exps_def_entropy_i4
193 pif_exps_def_entropy_i5
194 pif_exps_def_entropy_i6
195 /;
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Appendix B
Social networks
B.1 Survey questions
B.1.1 Expert information
Stakeholder organizations, research institutes or political actors can frequently
provide expert information to other organizations, especially when consequences
of complex policies have to be evaluated. Such kind of expert information com-
prises the knowledge of the eﬀects of diﬀerent policy instruments on the welfare
of diﬀerent social groups. Therefore expert information is very interesting for
political organizations as well as for other interest groups when designing and
inﬂuencing agricultural policy programmes.
Sending information:
Using the list of organizations again, please check all organizations to which
your organization provides expert information on agricultural policies.
Receiving information:
Using the list of organizations again, please check all organizations from which
your organization receives expert information on agricultural policies.
B.1.2 Political support
In democracies stakeholder organizations are representatives of their mem-
bers and their interests. Therefore the policy position of such a group is highly
connected with the resulting welfare for their members. Thus, a major role of
stakeholder organizations in democracies is intermediating their clientele's in-
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terest to politicians, i.e. trying to inﬂuence policy or politicians to generate as
much welfare as possible for their members. Obviously, politicians won't sup-
port a stakeholder organization's position without any reward. On their part
they expect in return the political support of members of the stakeholder organi-
zation. However, political agents also represent their electorate in parliament.
Therefore, political agents are interested to ﬁnd political solutions supported by
a majority of their electorate.
Governmental actor:
Please check those organizations which are important for you regarding the
intermediation of political positions supported by voters.
Non-governmental actor:
Taking now the above described kind of support relation between organizations
and political agents into account, please check those political institutions on the
list with which your organization has such a relationship.
B.1.3 Social relation
The formulation and development of FASDEP II is already dating back sev-
eral years. A lot of organizations which are nowadays active in the agricultural
policy domain have been already active in the formulation process of previous
agricultural programmes. Thus, it frequently occurred that the same people of
diﬀerent organizations have been communicating and working together for a
very long time period. Therefore, some organizations have established social
relations which go beyond their pure professional contacts facilitating the co-
operation among these organizations at the same time.
Please tell me with which organization on this list does your organization have
such a relationship?
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B.2 Tables
Table B.1: List of Organizations: Ghana
acronym full name type
Pre President EXEC
MOA Ministry of Food & Agriculture EXEC
MOF Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning EXEC
MLNR Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources EXEC
MEST Ministry of Environment, Science & Technology EXEC
MOTI Ministry of Trade and Industry EXEC
NDC New Democratic Congress LEG
NPP New Patriotic Party LEG
EPA Environmental Protection Agency PUBAG
COCOBOD Ghana Cocoa Board PUBAG
GIDA Ghana Irrigation Development Authority PUBAG
LCG Lands Commission Ghana PUBAG
FiCG Fisheries Commission Ghana PUBAG
GiZ (GTZ) Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH DONOR
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency DONOR
AFD Agence Française de Développement DONOR
USAID U. S. Agency for International Development DONOR
WB The World Bank DONOR
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations DONOR
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development DONOR
CRIG Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana RESEARCH
ISSER Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, University of Ghana RESEARCH
STEPRI Science and Technology Policy Research Institute RESEARCH
UG College of Agriculture and Consumer Science University Ghana RESEARCH
FARA Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa RESEARCH
IWMI International Water Management Institute RESEARCH
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute RESEARCH
GAIDA Ghana Agriculture Input Dealers Association IG:IND
GAABIC Ghana Agricultural Associations Business Information Centre IG:IND
WGL Wienco Ghana Limited IG:IND
FAGE Federation of Association of Ghanaian Exporters IG:IND
AGI The Association of Ghana Industries IG:IND
PEF The Private Enterprise Foundation IG:IND
GEA Ghana Employers' Association IG:IND
GNAFF Ghana National Association of Farmers and Fishermen IG:FARM
GNAPF Ghana National Association of Poultry Farmers IG:FARM
PFAG Peasant Farmers Association of Ghana IG:FARM
APFOG Apex Farmers Organization of Ghana IG:FARM
FoodSPAN Food Security Policy Advocacy Network CSO
EPAG Environmental Protection Association of Ghana CSO
GAWU General Agricultural Workers' Union CSO
AGRA Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa iNGO
ACDI/VOCA ACDI/VOCA iNGO
TS TechnoServe iNGO
ADRA The Adventist Development and Relief Agency iNGO
CRS Catholic Relief Services iNGO
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Table B.2: List of Organizations: Senegal
acronym full name type
Pres Président de la Republique EXEC
PM Premier Ministre EXEC
MOA Ministère de l'agriculture et de l'equipement rural EXEC
MOF Ministère de l'economie et des ﬁnances EXEC
MINEL Ministère de l'élevage EXEC
MPEM Ministère de la pêche et des aﬀaires maritimes EXEC
MTA Ministère du commerce, de l'industrie et du secteur informel EXEC
Assemblee Nationale Commission du développement et de l'aménagement du territoire LEG
CEDEAO Communauté économique des états de l'afrique de l'ouest SUPRA
UEMOA Union économique et monétaire ouest africaine SUPRA
ANCAR Agence nationale de conseil agricole et rural PUBAG
ASEPEX Agence sénégalaise de promotion des exportations PUBAG
CSA Commissariat à la sécurité alimentaire PUBAG
FNRAA Fonds national de recherches agricoles et agroalimentaires PUBAG
SAED Société d'aménagement et d'exploitation des terres du delta, de la moyenne
vallée et de la falémé
PUBAG
CIDA Agence canadienne pour le developpement international DONOR
AFD Agence Française de developpement DONOR
BAD Banque africaine de developpement DONOR
WB Banque Mondiale DONOR
IFAD Fonds international pour le developpement agricole DONOR
EU Union européenne DONOR
USAID United States agency for international development DONOR
CRES Consortium pour la recherche économique et sociale RESEARCH
ENSA Ecole nationale supérieure d'agronomie RESEARCH
IPAR Initiative prospective agriculture rurale RESEARCH
ITA Institut de technologie alimentaire RESEARCH
INP Institut national de pédologie RESEARCH
ISRA Institut Sénégalais de Recherches Agricoles RESEARCH
UCAD Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar RESEARCH
UGB Université Gaston Berger RESEARCH
CORAF Conseil ouest et centre africain pour la recherche et le développement agri-
coles
RESEARCH
IFPRI International food policy research institute RESEARCH
CNIA Comité national interprofessionnel pour l'arachide IG:IND
FENAFILS Fédération nationale des acteurs de la ﬁlère lait local du Sénégal IG:IND
ONAPES-SEPAS Organisation nationale des producteurs exportateurs de fruits et légumes
du Sénégal
IG:IND
UNIS Union nationale interprofessionnelle des semences IG:IND
GDS Grands domaines du Sénégal IG:IND
SODEFITEX Société de développement et des ﬁbres textiles IG:IND
CNCR Conseil national de concertation et de coopération des ruraux IG:FARM
RESOPP Réseau des organisations paysannes et pastorales du Sénégal IG:FARM
CONGAD Conseil des organisations non gouvernementales d'appui au développement CSO
FONGS Fédération des organisations non gouvernementales du Sénégal CSO
UNCS Union nationale des consommateurs du Sénégal CSO
CNTS/SNTPA Confédération nationale des travailleurs du Sénégal CSO
ENDA Diapol Enda tiers monde iNGO
OXFAM GB Oxfam iNGO
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Table B.3: List of Organizations: Uganda
acronym full name type
Pres Oﬃce of the President EXEC
PM Oﬃce of the Prime Minister EXEC
MOA Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries EXEC
MOF Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development EXEC
MoLG Ministry of Local Government EXEC
MTTI Ministry of Trade and Tourism Industry EXEC
MWE Ministry of Water and Environment EXEC
FDC Forum for Democratic Change LEG
NRM National Resistance Movement LEG
CDO Cotton Development Organisation PUBAG
DDA Dairy Development Authority PUBAG
NARO National Agricultural Research Organisation / System PUBAG
NEMA National Environment Management Authority PUBAG
NPA National Planning Authority PUBAG
UCDA Uganda Coﬀee Development Authority PUBAG
EU European Union DONOR
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization DONOR
IFAD International Fund for Agriculture DONOR
JICA Japanese International Cooperation Agency DONOR
USAID United States Agency for International Development DONOR
WB World Bank DONOR
ACODE Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment RESEARCH
AFRISA African Institute for Strategic Animal Resources Development RESEARCH
COAES College of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences, Makerere University RESEARCH
EPRC Economic Policy Research Center RESEARCH
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute RESEARCH
NUCAFE National Union of Coﬀee Agribusinesses and Farm Enterprises IG:IND
UCTF Uganda Coﬀee Trade Federation IG:IND
UFPEA Uganda Fish processors and Exporters Association IG:IND
UNADA Uganda National Agro-Input Dealers Association IG:IND
UNDTA Uganda National Dairy Traders Association IG:IND
UOSPPA Uganda Oil Seed Producers and Processors Association IG:IND
USTA Uganda Seed Traders' Association IG:IND
UTA Uganda Tea Association IG:IND
PSFU Private Sector Foundation Uganda IG:IND
UMA Uganda Manufacturers Association IG:IND
NOGAMU National Organic Agricultural Movement of Uganda IG:FARM
UCA Uganda Cooperative Alliance IG:FARM
UNFFE Uganda National Farmers' Federation IG:FARM
EAU Environmental Alert Uganda CSO
SG Sasakawa Global 2000 iNGO
SEATINI Strengthening Africa in World Trade iNGO
TS Techno Serve iNGO
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Table B.4: Classiﬁcation of actors with absolute and relative frequency (in
parentheses)
Category Group Ghana Senegal Uganda
Political Agents Executive (EXEC) 6 (0.13) 7 (0.15) 7 (0.16)
Public Sector Agencies (PUBAG) 5 (0.11) 5 (0.11) 6 (0.14)
Legislative (LEG) 2 (0.04) 1 (0.02) 2 (0.05)
Supra National Government (SUPRA) 0 (0.00) 2 (0.04) 0 (0.00)
Interest Groups Donor (DONOR) 7 (0.15) 7 (0.15) 6 (0.14)
(RESEARCH) 7 (0.15) 10 (0.22) 5 (0.12)
Industrial Interest Groups (IG:IND) 7 (0.15) 6 (0.13) 10 (0.23)
Farm Interest Groups (IG:FARM) 4 (0.09) 2 (0.04) 3 (0.07)
Civil Society Organizations (CSO) 8 (0.17) 6 (0.13) 4 (0.09)∑
46 46 43
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Table B.5: Model Terms
Ghana Senegal Uganda
Expert Support Expert Support Expert Support
EDGES
network densitya 0.2261 0.2145 0.2812 0.1585 0.2542 0.2259
POLSIM
mean simil.e 0.4232 0.3405 0.5980
(0.1313) (0.1210) (0.1687)
PREFSIM
mean simil.e 0.2311 0.2441 0.2734
(0.1190) (0.1152) (0.1672)
MEMBER
network densitya 0.0203 0.1623 0.0587
mean membere 1.0118 1.6310 1.0189
(0.1081) (1.2293) (0.1367)
MUTUAL
reciprocityb 0.3868 0.3604 0.3591 0.3171 0.3399 0.3137
GWESP & GWDSP
transitivityd 0.3907 0.3597 0.4541 0.3437 0.4287 0.3947
EXPERT & SUPPORT
mean degreec 20.35 19.30 25.30 14.26 21.35 18.98
(11.79) (12.02) (13.40) (9.95) (11.74) (12.24)
POWER
mean reputatione 0.3391 0.6899 0.4668
(0.1157) (0.1444) (0.1291)
mean i.degreee 19.50 31.38 22.78
(8.65) (9.06) (8.50)
mean o.degreee 19.50 31.38 22.78
(8.65) (9.06) (8.50)
EXEC
mean i.degreeg 17.33 16.33 13.00 7.71 13.57 11.00
(10.33) (6.74) (7.42) (5.77) (8.83) (11.82)
mean o.degreeg 16.50 15.17 16.57 9.43 13.71 9.57
(10.45) (6.43) (6.11) (6.92) (6.42) (8.96)
DONOR
mean i.degreef 12.29 15.00 10.86 10.57 9.00 11.00
(3.63) (2.71) (8.36) (6.58) (4.00) (6.32)
mean o.degreef 13.29 17.71 11.43 9.14 12.50 7.33
(4.39) (3.68) (6.27) (6.62) (5.36) (5.96)
RESEARCH
mean i.degreef 12.86 8.86 21.70 7.40 15.60 8.40
(6.31) (5.79) (6.67) (7.32) (10.50) (5.32)
mean o.degreef 8.14 8.86 13.60 6.60 2.80 6.60
(4.10) (7.01) (7.78) (5.89) (1.64) (6.35)
IG
share IG:IG h 0.2579 0.2033 0.1787 0.1754 0.2707 0.3277
mean i.degreef 6.86 4.86 8.83 5.58 9.93 10.43
(3.32) (3.76) (6.22) (3.78) (5.89) (5.56)
mean o.degreef 7.29 5.71 11.33 5.58 10.86 12.14
(3.58) (4.32) (6.01) (4.60) (5.17) (6.30)
Notes: a share of directed ties among all possible N2 −N ties, b share of reciprocal ties, c mean degree (standard
deviation), d clustering coeﬃcient, see Wasserman and Faust (1994), e mean value (standard deviation), f mean outdegree
(standard deviation), g mean indegree (standard deviation), h share of homophilic ties among all IG ties.
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Table B.6: Bayesian estimation of ERGM speciﬁcations for Ghana
Expert B network Support T network
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
EDGES −4.332∗∗∗ -3.776 -4.271 −2.333∗∗∗ -3.203 -3.59
(0.445) (4.722) (4.732) (0.259) (4.645) (4.559)
MUTUAL 3.733∗∗∗ 3.54∗∗∗ 3.951∗∗∗ 3.263∗∗∗ 3.1∗∗∗ 3.171∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.258) (0.302) (0.231) (0.236) (0.255)
SUPPORT 1.167∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.174)
EXPERT 1.112∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.161)
GWESP 1.554∗∗∗ 1.268∗∗∗ 1.155∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗ 0.171 0.114
(0.377) (0.361) (0.364) (0.164) (0.157) (0.161)
GWDSP −0.061∗∗ −0.042∗ -0.021 −0.174∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028)
MEMBER 1.007∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗ 0.158 0.146
(0.247) (0.261) (0.237) (0.244)
POWER (indegree) 0.803 -0.738 2.792∗∗∗ 3.062∗∗∗
(0.807) (0.995) (0.826) (0.968)
POWER (outdegree) 2.753∗∗∗ 0.993
(0.991) (0.883)
EXEC (indegree) 0.311∗ -0.278 0.532∗∗∗ 0.118
(0.239) (0.306) (0.223) (0.261)
EXEC (outdegree) 0.764∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗
(0.317) (0.274)
DONOR (indegree) -0.191 −0.619∗∗
(0.304) (0.28)
DONOR (outdegree) -0.294 -0.164 0.879∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗
(0.265) (0.336) (0.215) (0.278)
RESEARCH (indegree) −1.478∗∗∗ -0.14
(0.33) (0.257)
RESEARCH (outdegree) 0.802∗∗∗ 1.601∗∗∗ 0.115 0.341
(0.222) (0.291) (0.224) (0.273)
POLSIM -1.593 -1.42 -0.795 -0.511
(7.037) (7.024) (6.904) (6.772)
PREFSIM -1.467 -1.136 -1.234 -1.435
(7.028) (7.021) (6.901) (6.788)
IG (indegree) −0.611∗∗ −0.868∗∗∗
(0.277) (0.255)
IG (outdegree) 0.205 0.151
(0.298) (0.247)
IG (homophily) 0.142 0.491∗ 0.219 0.829∗∗
(0.262) (0.364) (0.273) (0.356)
log Likelihood -848.064 -736.081 -706.022 -871.407 -744.025 -735.617
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1704.128 1498.161 1450.044 1750.814 1514.051 1509.235
Bayes Inf. Crit. 1726.669 1571.42 1557.115 1773.355 1587.31 1616.306
Notes: Parameter estimates are based on mean value and standard deviation of MCMC sample. MCMC sample is based on
multiple chains (number of parameters times four), where each chain has a length of 10000 and 50% of each chain is
discarded for burn-in. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate that the corresponding 90%, 95%, and 99% one-sided highest posterior
density intervals do not include zero.
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Table B.7: Bayesian estimation of ERGM speciﬁcations for Senegal
Expert B network Support T network
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
EDGES −3.749∗∗∗ −4.632 −5.439 −3.196∗∗∗ −3.801 −3.993
(0.671) (4.35) (4.316) (0.27) (4.262) (4.174)
MUTUAL 2.951∗∗∗ 2.973∗∗∗ 3.399∗∗∗ 2.927∗∗∗ 2.687∗∗∗ 2.755∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.212) (0.266) (0.238) (0.244) (0.252)
SUPPORT 1.401∗∗∗ 1.395∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.186)
EXPERT 1.488∗∗∗ 1.485∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.158)
GWESP 1.68∗∗∗ 1.373∗∗∗ 1.406∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗
(0.585) (0.528) (0.522) (0.156) (0.159) (0.161)
GWDSP −0.211∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.038) (0.04) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033)
MEMBER 0.063 0.059 −0.026 −0.07
(0.082) (0.088) (0.095) (0.102)
POWER (indegree) 1.867∗∗∗ 1.611∗∗∗ 1.571∗∗∗ 1.146∗∗
(0.566) (0.613) (0.617) (0.679)
POWER (outdegree) 1.365∗∗ 0.541
(0.675) (0.647)
EXEC (indegree) 0.603∗∗∗ 0.276 −0.371∗ −0.184
(0.208) (0.261) (0.235) (0.291)
EXEC (outdegree) −0.13 0.271
(0.287) (0.27)
DONOR (indegree) −0.596∗∗ 0.616∗∗
(0.274) (0.271)
DONOR (outdegree) 0.11 0.103 0.193 −0.014
(0.216) (0.282) (0.205) (0.271)
RESEARCH (indegree) −0.999∗∗∗ 0.358∗
(0.265) (0.245)
RESEARCH (outdegree) 1.746∗∗∗ 2.026∗∗∗ −0.488∗∗∗ −0.53∗∗
(0.19) (0.248) (0.199) (0.248)
POLSIM −1.788 −1.471 −1.39 −1.51
(7.189) (7.122) (7.1) (6.973)
PREFSIM −1.954 −1.751 −0.863 −1.07
(7.192) (7.109) (7.108) (6.985)
IG (indegree) −0.058 0.023
(0.24) (0.262)
IG (outdegree) −0.192 −0.228
(0.273) (0.266)
IG (homophily) 0.708∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗ −0.119 0.311
(0.259) (0.341) (0.305) (0.374)
log Likelihood −1020.097 −854.297 −834.505 −746.997 −661.261 −656.091
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2048.194 1734.594 1707.011 1501.993 1348.522 1350.181
Bayes Inf. Crit. 2070.735 1807.853 1814.081 1524.534 1421.781 1457.252
Notes: Parameter estimates are based on mean value and standard deviation of MCMC sample. MCMC sample is based on
multiple chains (number of parameters times four), where each chain has a length of 10000 and 50% of each chain is
discarded for burn-in. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate that the corresponding 90%, 95%, and 99% one-sided highest posterior
density intervals do not include zero.
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Table B.8: Bayesian estimation of ERGM speciﬁcations for Uganda
Expert B network Support T network
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
EDGES −3.348∗∗∗ −3.015 −3.897 −2.631∗∗∗ −2.549 −3.463
(0.439) (5.776) (5.633) (0.311) (5.659) (5.602)
MUTUAL 2.761∗∗∗ 2.73∗∗∗ 3.703∗∗∗ 2.483∗∗∗ 2.284∗∗∗ 2.357∗∗∗
(0.216) (0.226) (0.298) (0.21) (0.223) (0.235)
SUPPORT 1.254∗∗∗ 1.189∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.175)
EXPERT 1.2∗∗∗ 1.188∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.156)
GWESP 1.326∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
(0.362) (0.35) (0.338) (0.221) (0.223) (0.213)
GWDSP −0.174∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.165∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.03) (0.031) (0.032)
MEMBER 0.389∗ 0.277 0.044 0.122
(0.263) (0.276) (0.268) (0.271)
POWER (indegree) 1.2∗∗ −0.663 2.306∗∗∗ 1.785∗∗∗
(0.599) (0.776) (0.591) (0.68)
POWER (outdegree) 5.002∗∗∗ 2.107∗∗∗
(0.759) (0.681)
EXEC (indegree) 0.392∗∗ −0.18 0.203 0.511∗∗
(0.198) (0.268) (0.193) (0.234)
EXEC (outdegree) 0.523∗∗ −0.384∗
(0.296) (0.246)
DONOR (indegree) 0.197 0.448∗∗
(0.299) (0.261)
DONOR (outdegree) −0.12 −0.714∗∗ −0.515∗∗∗ −0.928∗∗∗
(0.218) (0.332) (0.215) (0.27)
RESEARCH (indegree) −3.262∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗
(0.439) (0.259)
RESEARCH (outdegree) 1.319∗∗∗ 2.351∗∗∗ −0.415∗∗ −0.735∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.29) (0.226) (0.281)
POLSIM −1.652 −2.344 −1.344 −1.275
(6.627) (6.477) (6.48) (6.391)
PREFSIM −1.184 −1.668 −1.876 −1.752
(6.638) (6.477) (6.484) (6.402)
IG (indegree) −0.538∗∗ 0.053
(0.25) (0.237)
IG (outdegree) 0.065 0.029
(0.27) (0.215)
IG (homophily) 0.134 0.4 0.563∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗
(0.228) (0.329) (0.212) (0.286)
log Likelihood −864.493 −774.599 −679.051 −832.544 −738.143 −724.768
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1736.985 1575.199 1396.101 1673.088 1502.287 1487.537
Bayes Inf. Crit. 1758.981 1646.684 1500.58 1695.084 1573.772 1592.015
Notes: Parameter estimates are based on mean value and standard deviation of MCMC sample. MCMC sample is based on
multiple chains (number of parameters times four), where each chain has a length of 10000 and 50% of each chain is
discarded for burn-in. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate that the corresponding 90%, 95%, and 99% one-sided highest posterior
density intervals do not include zero.
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Table B.9: Average marginal eﬀects for Expert B and Support T networks
Ghana Senegal Uganda
Expert Support Expert Support Expert Support
EDGES −0.322 −0.309 −0.551 −0.317 −0.349 −0.381
(0.363) (0.4) (0.438) (0.335) (0.504) (0.624)
MUTUAL 0.297∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.01) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017)
SUPPORT 0.081∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.019) (0.016)
EXPERT 0.093∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.017)
GWESP 0.087∗∗∗ 0.01 0.142∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.014) (0.052) (0.013) (0.03) (0.024)
GWDSP −0.002 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
MEMBER 0.071∗∗∗ 0.013 0.006 −0.006 0.025 0.013
(0.02) (0.022) (0.009) (0.008) (0.025) (0.03)
POWER (indegree) −0.055 0.268∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗ −0.059 0.197∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.084) (0.062) (0.054) (0.069) (0.077)
POWER (outdegree) 0.207∗∗∗ 0.087 0.137∗∗ 0.044 0.449∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.078) (0.069) (0.051) (0.067) (0.075)
EXEC (indegree) −0.021 0.011 0.028 −0.014 −0.016 0.057∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.024) (0.026)
EXEC (outdegree) 0.058∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗ −0.013 0.021 0.047∗∗ −0.043∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.029) (0.021) (0.026) (0.027)
DONOR (indegree) −0.014 −0.054∗∗ −0.06∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.018 0.05∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.021) (0.027) (0.029)
DONOR (outdegree) −0.012 0.096∗∗∗ 0.011 −0.001 −0.064∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.022) (0.03) (0.029)
RESEARCH (indegree) −0.111∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.100∗∗∗ 0.029∗ −0.294∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.019) (0.036) (0.028)
RESEARCH (outdegree) 0.121∗∗∗ 0.030 0.204∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.023) (0.031)
POLSIM −0.107 −0.053 −0.143 −0.122 −0.212 −0.144
(0.537) (0.596) (0.724) (0.558) (0.579) (0.713)
PREFSIM −0.086 −0.133 −0.172 −0.086 −0.15 −0.195
(0.537) (0.598) (0.722) (0.56) (0.578) (0.714)
IG (indegree) −0.046∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.005 0.002 −0.049∗∗ 0.006
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026)
IG (outdegree) 0.015 0.013 −0.019 −0.019 0.006 0.003
(0.022) (0.022) (0.028) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
IG (homophily) 0.037∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.024 0.036 0.073∗∗
(0.027) (0.031) (0.035) (0.03) (0.03) (0.032)
Notes: Estimates are based on mean value and standard deviation of MCMC sample for marginal eﬀects. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗
indicate that the corresponding 90%, 95%, and 99% one-sided highest posterior density intervals do not include zero.
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B.3 Figures
Figure B.1: Aggregated Power Plots: Support T (upper panel) and Expert B
(lower panel) networks
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Figure B.2: Power Plots: Support T (upper panel) and Expert B (lower panel)
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B.4 Goodness of ﬁt
Model ﬁt can be assessed using traditional likelihood-based measures such as
AIC, which we report in tables B.6 to B.8. According to AIC, BIC, and log
likelihood, model speciﬁcations with exogenous variables are preferred across
all countries against model speciﬁcations with only endogenous network statis-
tics. However, these criteria may reveal only little about the speciﬁc features
of the data captured or not captured by the model speciﬁcations. Therefore,
additional goodness-of-ﬁt approaches have been developed (see for example
Hunter et al. (2008); Goodreau, Kitts, and Morris (2009)). In particular, the
MCMC algorithm of described by Hunter et al. (2008) is used to generate a
sample based on the estimated ERGM parameters, where each sample com-
prises of 10,000 networks for each model speciﬁcation and each of the three
countries.1
We gauge the model ﬁtness via comparing the empirically observed fre-
quency of edgewise network statistics, i.e. edgewise in-degrees, edgewise out-
degrees, edge-wise shared partners, and the minimum geodesic distances, with
expected distributions of edgewise network statistics as implied by the esti-
mated parameter estimates characterizing the network generating process. Ex-
pected distributions are thereby assessed via simulating 10,000 networks using
the estimated parameter conﬁgurations per model speciﬁcation and country
and calculation of the edgewise distributions of network characteristics of in-
terest. In general, the distributions arising from model speciﬁcations 2 and 3
or 5 and 6 respectively are much more in line with the observed distributions
compared to model speciﬁcations 1 and 4.
However, it possibly suﬀers (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011; Goodreau,
Kitts, and Morris, 2009) from degeneracy problems. Essentially, degeneracy
results from a speciﬁcation of a model that ﬁts the data poorly.2. However,
as Cranmer and Desmarais (2011) nicely put it `degeneracy is, in some sense,
a statement about the model ﬁt' and therefore they consider degeneracy not
1Note that within the Bayesian context, each network is drawn conditional on a draw
from the posterior distribution of parameters provided by the MCMC estimation output.
2If the model is not well speciﬁed, the MCMC process will move to an extreme graph
of all or no edges, where it will stay, and the model is said to be degenerate, see Hunter,
Goodreau, and Handcock (2008) for details
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as a serious limitation of the ERGM approach, as all empirical models are
supposed to ﬁt observed data. Given the goodness of ﬁt observed within the
application, we are conﬁdent that the estimated ERGM speciﬁcations suﬃ-
ciently match observed network data.
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Figure B.3: GOF: Ghana Expert network Models 1 to 3 (ﬁrst three rows) and
Ghana Support network Models 3 to 6 (last three rows)
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Figure B.4: GOF: Senegal Expert network Models 1 to 3 (ﬁrst three rows) and
Senegal Support network Models 3 to 6 (last three rows)
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Figure B.5: GOF: Uganda Expert network Models 1 to 3 (ﬁrst three rows)
and Uganda Support network Models 3 to 6 (last three rows)
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B.5 Handling of missing information in surveyed
data
Missing information within the surveyed data relates either to non-conﬁrmed
ties within the political support network or to personal, i.e. node, character-
istics of organizations not provided within the survey interview due to time
constraints. To deal with missing information, we proceed as follows. Miss-
ing information regarding conﬁrmation of political support ties is substituted
with information on links available from surveyed network on social relations.
This substitution is necessary as governmental organizations have been asked
to mark only organizations from whom they receive political support, while
vice versa non governmental organizations by design only marked organiza-
tions or agents to whom they supply political support. This design was chosen
to reduce the response burden but does provide complete network information
only when brokerage is absent. However, to account for the likely possibil-
ity of brokerage within the exchange of political support, we used surveyed
network information on social contacts to conﬁrm political support ties be-
tween agents or organizations. Note that non conﬁrmed political support ties
are present in 25 cases in Ghana, in 19 cases in Senegal, and in 18 cases in
Uganda. Information with regard to individual characteristics is only missing
with regard to political preferences. Thereby, missing values are handled via
hot deck imputations referring to a set of plausible candidate values delin-
eated from the set of observed values using similar types of organizations and
expert knowledge on political proximity of organizations. Model estimations
using diﬀerent draws from the candidate sets provided substantially the same
results. Corresponding estimation results are available upon request.
